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Motivation and contribution to literature 
 
Recent literature in the field of energy economics has returned to investigating the 
household or the individual by implementing household’s decision models. Household’s 
decision models are useful for studying the effectiveness of energy and environmental 
policies. In particular, energy demand systems include behavioral responses of households 
and allow for welfare and environmental analyses of energy policy reforms. Such frameworks 
can help to find the groups which are overconsuming energy relative to the population as a 
whole so that they can be targeted with various policy measures in order to change their 
consumer behavior.  
Demand systems have been widely applied in the context of residential energy demand in 
several countries and to explore different energy policy changes. Several studies have 
explored the effects of gasoline or electricity taxes using demand models. Namely, Dumagan 
and Mount (1992) were among the first to apply such framework and to show that carbon tax 
has regressive effect in the US i.e. the tax burden as share of income is larger proportion for 
the poor than for the rich households. Some years later, West and Williams III (2004) find 
gasoline tax to be regressive in the U.S., and Brännlund and Nordström (2004) also find 
carbon tax (on gasoline and electricity) to be regressive in Sweden. Tiezzi (2005) finds that 
carbon tax burden is progressively distributed across Italian households, but she uses total 
expenditures instead of income as the ordering criterion. Beznoska (2014) considers an eco-
tax on gasoline and diesel, and finds that the regressively of the gasoline tax to be lower than 
the regressively of taxes on electricity in Germany.  Gahvari and Tsang (2011) study the 
effects of electricity taxes in the U.S. and  prove that an energy tax on electricity is 
detrimental for consumer welfare, despite its environmental benefits. While many papers have 
considered the distribution or welfare impacts, only few papers have dealt with the 
environmental effects of energy taxes (for example: Brännlund and Nordström (2007)),even 
fewer that deal with the effects of energy taxes on poverty, and almost none which have 
considered all of those effects in a consistent framework. The paper of Klauss (2016) is 
unique in the sense that it estimates how an energy price change influences poverty. The 
author finds that gas price increase leads to higher poverty levels among Armenian 
households but he does not consider the separate effects of energy taxes on poverty nor does 
he consider behavioral responses. Other studies have applied demand system to estimate price 
and income elasticities without conducting tax simulations (see for instance Filipinni (1995), 
Kohn and Missong (2003), and Kratena and Wüger (2009) among others). None of these 
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studies have addressed the trade-offs between emissions and inequality, and emissions and 
consumer welfare. Nor have they studied energy poverty or the effects of energy taxes or 
surcharges on income poverty and energz poverty.  
The year of birth can influence life opportunities and also consumer or environmental 
habits of the individual. However, the role of birth cohorts in explaining energy consumption 
and energy related residential emissions has not been widely researched. The few studies 
which have addressed this question include Chancel (2014), Segall (2013), Sànchez-Peña 
(2013), and Aguiar and Hurst (2013).   Chancel (2014) finds that the French households with 
leaders born between 1930 and 1955 are the highest CO2 emitters. The results of Sànchez-
Peña (2013) confirm that the cohorts born 1923–1968 consume more energy (and emit more 
CO2) than the average household in Mexico. Both Aguiar and Hurst (2013) and Segall (2013) 
find significant cohort effects in explaining utilities consumption or energy budget allocation 
in the U.S. However, all of those studies have only considered the cohort effects of the 
household’s leader and none has examined the birth cohort effects of other household’s 
members.  
The dissertation contributes to the existing literature in several ways. To begin with, 
Germany is at the center of the analyses of this dissertation. Germany is particularly 
interesting case to analyse since it is one of the EU countries which prioritize both distributive 
justice and environmental protection in their policy agenda. In this country, energy taxes and 
surcharges are imposed with the goal to restrict energy consumption and to finance green 
energy, and energy prices are among the highest in the EU.  Secondly, this dissertation uses 
very recent and very detailed data on energy expenditures of German households.  The dataset 
preparation was complex task since demand systems impose strict requirements for the data: 
waves must be comparable, consistent, of high quality, and randomly drawn. The final dataset 
is very extensive and covers around 170,000 (220,000) German households in 4 (5) cross 
sections between 1993 and 2008 (2013). Most importantly, I provide a consistent framework 
in which consumer welfare, income distribution, environmental, and poverty effects of 
different energy policy reforms can be measured. The demand system itself is quadratic, 
demographically scaled, corrects for potential endogeneity, and encompasses improved price 
variation. The tax simulations allow for studying the effects of changes in car fuels and (or) 
electricity price on the dimensions mentioned above.  In addition, energy related emissions 
are calculated and the following emissions’ determinants are considered: income, area of 
residence, age, and birth cohort. A significant gap in the literature is filled by considering the 
birth cohort effects of other household’s members in addition to the households’ leader.   
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As mentioned, German households are faced with relatively high energy prices, which are 
mainly caused by increasing taxes and surcharges. The Ecological Tax Reform-ETR in 
Germany (1998–2003) led to increases in the existing taxes on fossil fuels and an introduction 
of tax on electricity. Moreover, in 2007 the value-added tax rate was increased from 16 to 19 
percent. By 2008, energy and other taxes constituted 59 percent of the price of car fuels 
(gasoline and diesel). Furthermore, the electricity price has been also growing due to increases 
in the yearly adjusted surcharge for renewable energy (Renewable Energy Act surcharge or 
EEG-Umlage
1
), which has grown from 0.2 euro cents per kWh in 2000 to 6.35 euro cents per 
kWh of electricity in 2016. In 2013 energy and other taxes and surcharges were amounting to 
45 percent of the electricity price in Germany and it was the second highest in Europe.  
Three essays which deal with households’ energy demand and CO2 emissions are part of 
the dissertation. The first paper examines the environmental, distributive, and welfare effects 
of the car fuels tax. Higher car fuels taxes could potentially lead to lower car fuels’ 
consumption and lower CO2 emissions but can increase inequality in the post-tax income 
distribution and decrease consumer welfare. The second paper scrutinizes the effects of the 
EEG surcharge, which was introduced in Germany as means to finance renewable energy 
production, on energy poverty, income poverty, and CO2 emissions. Abolishing of the EEG 
surcharge is expected to lower the tax burdens of the low income households and hence 
decrease both income poverty and energy poverty. Both chapters can provide policy makers 
with empirical evidence about how to weight environmental and inequality/poverty concerns, 
and point out potential targets groups (of households) that can lead to largest energy 
consumption savings or largest energy poverty decreases. The third paper investigates the 
determinant of energy related emissions’ inequalities among three dimensions: income, area 
of residence, and birth cohort. Again, this kind of analyses will help to find the determinants 
of CO2 emissions, and to identify the groups of the population that should be targeted in order 
to decrease the inequalities and emissions altogether.   
The first paper is titled “On the Emissions–Inequality and Emissions–Welfare Trade-offs 
in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the German Car Fuels Tax” and examines how changes in 
the car fuels tax affect households in Germany. The price elasticity of demand for car fuels is 
critical for the size of the environmental effect and the shape of the Engel curve is crucial for 
the welfare and distributive effects. Moreover, analyzing the determinants of demand for 
energy goods is important especially since residential energy consumption has recently 
increased in Europe despite higher energy taxes (The World Bank, 2013). For that purpose, a 
                                                 
1
 I refer to it as the EEG surcharge throughout the dissertation.  
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Demographically-scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (DQUAIDS) is estimated 
using German household level data for the years 1993–2008 (Ray (1983), Banks et al. (1997), 
and Blacklow et al. (2010)). The parameter estimates are consistent, statistically significant, 
and allow for calculation of income and price elasticities: car fuels are necessity good and 
demand is price inelastic (–0.203). The several tax simulations reveal the existence of the 
emissions inequality and emissions welfare trade-offs in energy taxation: if the car fuels tax 
increases, the CO2 emissions decrease but the income inequality and the welfare loss both 
increase.  
 Even though many papers have investigated the impact of energy taxes on the income 
distribution or on the energy related emissions, this study builds on those results in a number 
of dimensions. First of all, the study provides a consistent framework (which updates previous 
ones because it includes corrections for endogeneity and increased price variation) in which 
welfare, environmental, and inequality effects of an energy tax change can be measured. 
Secondly, the paper graphically scrutinizes the trade-offs between emissions, inequality, and 
welfare which most papers have overlooked. By addressing those trade-offs, we ensure that 
no groups in the German population will be harmed more than others due to a policy reform.      
  My contributions to this co-authored paper are described as follows. I have assembled 
and prepared all the relevant data: household income and expenditure micro data (Income and 
Expenditure Survey); time series of commodity prices; information on changes in energy and 
environmental policies. Moreover, I coded the STATA program files necessary for the 
econometric analyses (estimation of demographically scaled quadratic demand systems). 
Furthermore, I compiled the programs for executing the tax simulations (using the demand 
system estimates) in order to evaluate the effect of different levels of the car fuels tax on the 
three dimensions investigated in the study: (1) energy consumption; (2) CO2 emissions levels; 
(3) distributional effects-consumer welfare and income inequality. 
 The second paper, entitled “How Electricity Prices Alter Poverty and CO2 Emissions ‒ 
The Case of Germany” deals with the effects of changes in the Renewable Energy Act 
Surcharge (EEG-Umlage) on energy poverty and residential electricity related emissions. By 
examining energy poverty, how it evolved over time, how it is related with income poverty, 
which are its determinants, and how energy taxes influence it, I have tackled a crucial topic in 
the face of growing energy costs and income poverty. Energy poverty (the lack of adequate 
energy services) represents a growing concern in developed countries with colder climates 
since can lead to health problems and rationing of other household budgets. Energy poverty is 
found to have increased in Germany between 1993 and 2013, and is higher among single 
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parents, unemployed, and households living in rural areas. Income poverty is found to be 
significant factor behind of the probability of being energy poor. Electricity demand is found 
to be price inelastic and a decrease in the electricity price (abolishing of the EEG surcharge 
and slight increase in the car fuels tax) is expected to be beneficial for households – by 
lowering energy poverty and electricity tax/surcharge burdens – while increasing emissions 
by a small amount and keeping government tax revenues almost constant.  
 This second paper addresses the gap in the literature by using a very recent data from 
2013 for Germany. Moreover, it captures energy poverty in this country and analyses in detail 
the determinants of energy poverty. In addition, the effects of changes in the EEG surcharge 
on income and energy poverty, and also CO2 emissions are investigated, which has not been 
done before. Furthermore, I identify a positive relationship between higher EEG surcharge 
and energy poverty indicating that an increase in the surcharge will always increase poverty 
and hurt the most vulnerable groups of households/individuals, such as low income 
households or single parents. 
The third paper has the following title: “Inter- and Intra-generational Emissions 
Inequality in Germany: Empirical Analyses”. The main research question is to investigate the 
effect of income, area of residence, and birth cohort on residential energy related emissions. I 
identify: a) income related emissions inequalities, with low income households emitting much 
less CO2 than high income households; b) area of residence emissions inequalities, with rural 
households having much higher emissions than urban households; and c) birth cohort 
emissions inequalities, with cohorts 1933–1963 being the highest CO2 emitters. A De-trended 
Age Period Cohort (APCD) model allows for separation of the effects of birth cohort from the 
effects of age, income, and other explanatory variables, while it solves the identification 
problems inherent to Age Period Cohort (APC) models. The results from the APCD confirm 
that having either a household’s leader or household’s member from the cohorts 1943–1968 
increases energy related emissions by more than the cohorts born before 1943 or after 1968.  
The last paper has several contributions to the existing literature on residential energy 
related emissions. To start with, it calculates electricity, gas, and car fuels related emissions of 
German households using expenditure data, prices, and emissions factors. Second of all, the 
paper investigates the descriptive evidence of birth cohort related inequalities by carefully 
analyzing the demographic and economic characteristics of households according to the birth 
cohort of the household’s leader. Crucially, the APCD model examines the effects of birth 
cohorts of other household’s members on CO2 emissions, which none of the previous studies 
have considered.    
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Chapter 1 
On the Emissions–Inequality and Emissions–Welfare 
Trade-offs in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the German 
Car Fuels Tax 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Faced with climate change and threats to environmental sustainability, many countries, 
particularly those in Europe, are redesigning and enhancing their environmental policies to 
reduce anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions (World Nuclear Association, 2011). The 
introduction and increase of energy taxes has the aim to limit energy consumption, and special 
focus has been put on the households sector. Despite these changes, fossil fuels consumption, 
an important determining factor of CO2 emissions, has increased in recent years (The World 
Bank, 2015). This apparently paradoxical situation calls for thorough investigation of the 
determinants of demand for car fuels and other energy goods by the households. 
Our study deals with the environmental, distributive, and welfare effects of the car fuels 
tax in Germany, a country that places high priority on both environmental protection 
(International Energy Agency, 2007) and distributive justice. The car fuels tax is charged as a 
fixed monetary amount per liter and serves as an instrument to reduce households’ vehicle 
emissions, the largest source of CO2 emissions after the industrial sector (International Energy 
Agency, 2007). Crucial for the size of the environmental effect is the price elasticity of 
demand for car fuels: The more elastic the demand, the larger the environmental effect in 
terms of CO2 emissions reductions. Crucial for the distributive and welfare effects is the shape 
of the Engel curve: If the expenditure (share) for fuels decreases in income, then households 
with a greater ability to pay will pay lower taxes relative to income and also incur a smaller 
relative reduction in welfare.  
                                                 

 This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Dr. Carsten Schröder from DIW Berlin, see Nikodinoska and 
Schröder (2016) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.03.001. 
Chapter 1.On the Emissions–Inequality and Emissions–Welfare Trade-offs in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the 
German Car Fuels Tax      8 
 
The potential emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs in energy tax policy 
have become an important issue in political and academic debate.
2
 As pointed out by Baumol 
and Oates (1988), by ignoring these trade-offs, “we may either unintentionally harm certain 
groups in society or, alternatively, undermine the program politically” (p. 235). Most studies 
investigate the trade-offs in a traditional tax incidence framework, i.e., by quantifying average 
tax burdens at different points of the income distributions. Only a few studies, among them 
Jorgenson et al. (1992), Oladosu and Rose (2007), Araar et al. (2011), and Grösche and 
Schröder (2014a),
 3
 provide a detailed examination of the redistributive or welfare effects. 
We suggest and implement a two-step procedure for a systematic assessment of the 
potential emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs using the German car fuels 
tax as an example. First, we estimate a demographic specification of the Quadratic Almost 
Ideal Demand System, which describes how household demands respond to price and income 
changes. The estimated price elasticities reveal how household demands respond to variations 
of the car fuels tax. Second, based on the demand system estimates we quantify the following 
three outcomes of interest for various tax levels: (a) emissions; (b) inequality, by means of a 
comprehensive set of inequality indices; and (c) household welfare, by means of 
equivalent/compensating variations and tax burdens over the quantiles of the income 
distribution. In sum, the proposed two-step procedure gives answers to the following type of 
question: “Suppose the car fuels tax increases by five percent: How does the tax increase 
change emissions, inequality, and households’ economic welfare?” The answers are 
visualized by means of trade-off curves that depict how the three outcomes vary with the tax 
rate. 
Each separate ingredient of the proposed procedure is well-known. However, the 
combination of the tools provides a comprehensive picture of the intensity of emissions–
inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs that most previous literature has been lacking and 
that can be applied fruitfully in many other settings. The procedure can also be embedded in a 
broader framework that combines the household-micro level perspective with multisector 
general equilibrium techniques as presented in Araar et al. (2011). 
To our knowledge, we are the first to implement such a detailed trade-off analyses. This 
study focuses on Germany, a country where environmental sustainability is highly prioritized 
on the policy agenda. Our estimates indicate the presence of an emissions–inequality trade-
                                                 
2
 See Pearson and Smith (1991), Wier et al. (2005), Scott and Eakins (2004), Oladosu and Rose (2007), Callan et 
al. (2008), Fullerton (2009), Grainger and Kolstad (2009), Jacobsen et al. (2003), or Grösche and Schröder 
(2014a).  
3
 Other studies for Germany include Bach et al. (2002) and Sterner (2012), but they provide less detailed 
analyses. 
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off: As an example, increasing the original tax rate by 50 percent (from 0.606 euros/liter to 
0.909 euros/liter) reduces CO2 emissions by about 8.2 percent, and increases the Gini index 
from the distribution of equivalent disposable income by about 0.2 percent. This is because 
the associated tax burden relative to disposable income decreases in household needs-adjusted 
(equivalent) income.
4
 
At first glance, the redistributive effect and the intensity of the emissions–inequality 
trade-off may appear small. The key reason for the small magnitude of the effect is the small 
share of car-fuel expenditures in household budgets, about 3.75 percent. Our basic interest, 
however, is in the sign of the redistributive effect, which turns out to be regressive: Several of 
the environmental taxes in Germany (electricity taxes or taxes on heating fuels) work in a 
comparable manner to the car fuels tax and thus add to the regressive effect.
5
 According to a 
simulation analyses for various OECD countries, Flues and Thomas (2015) conclude that also 
taxes on heating fuels and, particularly, electricity are “clearly regressive” (p. 40). These 
environmental taxes thus add to the regressive effect of fuels taxes measured in the present 
study. Our analyses also reveals an emissions–welfare trade-off. A 50 percent tax increase 
amounts to an annual welfare loss in terms of equivalent variation by 283 euros on average, 
and by 148 euros for the first decile, a sizeable amount for low-income households. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a literature review. Section 1.3 
describes the data and Section 1.4 the quantitative methods. Section 1.5 provides the demand 
system estimates and Section 1.6 the results from the policy analyses. Section 1.7 provides 
sensitivity analyses, and Section 1.8 presents the concluding remarks.  
 
1.2 Literature review  
 
Several studies have investigated environmental taxes and their impact on households’ 
energy consumption, welfare or emissions levels. From a technical perspective, the studies 
can be classified according to three criteria: (a) static one-period vs. dynamic multi-period 
framework; (b) partial analyses of a single sector vs. total analyses with inter-sector linkages; 
(c) abstraction from or explicit modeling of behavioral responses.  
Because the international literature is so extensive, we confine our review to selected 
works with a framework similar to ours: a one-period partial analyses of the household sector 
                                                 
4
 Equivalent income is derived by dividing household income by the modified OECD equivalence scale (see 
Section 1.4.3 for details). 
5
 For an assessment of the feed-in tariff induced redistributive effects in Germany’s electricity sector, see 
Grösche and Schröder (2014a). 
Chapter 1.On the Emissions–Inequality and Emissions–Welfare Trade-offs in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the 
German Car Fuels Tax      10 
 
with consideration of behavioral responses. One such study is Brännlund and Nordström 
(2004) using Swedish data. They use the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) 
and tax simulations to analyse the consumer responses and welfare effects of a CO2 tax. The 
authors find that doubling of the CO2 tax lowers petrol demand by ten percent.
6
 Further, using 
the compensating variation as assessment criterion, the authors show that low-income 
households carry a larger share of the tax burden relative to their income (0.55 percent) in 
comparison to high-income households (0.33 percent), meaning that the tax is regressive.  
Studies for the US include Dumagan and Mount (1992) and West and Williams III 
(2004). Using a generalized logit demand system, Dumagan and Mount (1992) investigate the 
welfare effect of carbon tax in the US and find evidence of a regressive effect. West and 
Williams III (2004) use a general demand system to quantify welfare changes and 
redistributive effects (but not the environmental effect) of the US gasoline tax. They find a 
regressive effect of the carbon tax (except in the case when the revenue is used to fund lump-
sum transfers).  
Tiezzi (2005) estimates an AIDS for Italy in order to explore the distributional and 
welfare effects of a carbon tax. She finds that the welfare loss from an introduction of the 
carbon tax is non-negligible: 2.32 billion euros over four years. Contrary to many other 
studies, she finds that the tax burden is progressively distributed across Italian households, but 
she uses total monthly expenditures as opposed to income as the ordering criterion.  
Kohn and Missong (2003) and Beznoska (2014) have estimated demand systems for 
West Germany and Germany, respectively. Kohn and Missong (2003) estimate both linear 
and quadratic expenditure systems (both exclude demographic scaling) composed of several 
nondurables categories. Their estimates for the income elasticities reveal that food and shelter 
(which includes energy) are necessity goods while mobility (which includes car fuels) is a 
luxury good. Price elasticities reveal that food, shelter, and mobility are relatively price 
inelastic. Their study does not investigate the effects on any potential tax policy changes. 
Beznoska (2014) estimates a demand system of energy, mobility, and leisure using a non-
scaled AIDS. His results demonstrate substitutional character between mobility (consisting of 
diesel, gasoline, and public transport) and heating and between mobility and leisure. The 
author conducts welfare and distributional analyses of an eco-tax on gasoline and diesel and 
finds that the regressively of the gasoline tax appears to be lower than the regressively of 
other indirect taxes, including energy goods like electricity. His results show that static tax cut 
                                                 
6
 In a later study, Brännlund et al. (2007) find that in order to keep CO2 emissions at their initial levels (to 
neutralize the rebound effect), CO2 tax should be raised by 130 percent. 
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of 15 cents per liter shows a progressive effect up to the third decile of income (seventh decile 
of expenditures),which is followed by a regressive effect. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  Most importantly, we 
suggest a coherent framework to study how a car fuels tax affects a set of outcomes: (a) 
environmental effects – evaluated by CO2 emissions; (b) redistributive effects – by a 
comprehensive set of inequality indices; (c) welfare implications – by means of the 
compensating and equivalent variation and also tax burdens over the deciles of the income 
distribution. In particular, this framework allows a systematic assessment of the potential 
trade-offs between emission reductions and inequality increases, and between emissions 
reductions and welfare. Further, our analyses relies on thorough demand estimations: We 
have estimated a demographic specification of the quadratic demand system, which takes into 
account differences in households’ size and behavioral responses and corrects for the potential 
endogeneity of total expenditures. Finally, we are the first to present such a detailed analyses 
for Germany, a country which is in the focus of large number of studies in the area of 
environmental economics.  
 
1.3 Data and data preparation 
 
We use two data sources provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The first 
is the German Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), i.e., representative micro-level 
household income and expenditure data. The second source is consumer price data for various 
expenditure categories.  
 
1.3.1 German Income and Expenditure Survey 
 
The German IES is a cross-sectional household micro database, collected once every 
five years. Each wave includes a quota sample of about 60,000 German households, for which 
frequency weights are provided to ensure representativeness (for further information on the 
data, see Bönke et al., 2013, and references therein). The variable spectrum of the data is 
broad, including socio-economic and demographic characteristics, income and other revenues, 
paid taxes and contributions, inventories, wealth (accumulation), et cetera. Most importantly 
for our purposes, IES is the single German database providing in-depth information on all 
kinds of household expenditures – from food and electrical appliances to cars and car fuels. 
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From the most recent IES waves 1993 to 2008, we have generated a pooled database 
with time-consistent information. Details on the pooling strategy can be found in Bönke et al. 
(2013). Most importantly, we have converted all expenditures to yearly amounts in euros and 
implemented a symmetric trimming of disposable incomes (lowest and highest percentile of 
the distribution). Furthermore, households with extreme ratios of total expenditures relative to 
disposable income are not included in the sample.
7
 
The final working sample includes 169,486 households in four cross-sections. The 
following IES variables are used in the empirical analyses: total expenditures; expenditures 
for food, electricity, other fuels, and car fuels;
8
 disposable income; number and age of 
household members; population size of the place of residence; and frequency weights. 
The core variable for the analyses that follows is expenditure on car fuels. It can be 
derived from the original IES waves by combining a set of variables, identified by a uniform 
short notation “ef” (German abbreviation for an identifier) and a serial number. For 1993, 
expenditure on car fuels is the sum of ef761, ef762, and ef763. For 1998–2008, it is ef810, 
ef299, and ef300 respectively.
9
  Unfortunately, separate data on gasoline and diesel fuel is 
available only for 1993, making it impossible to separate the two fuels in the empirical 
analyses. For this reason we cannot control for substitutability between gasoline and diesel, 
which is taxed-favored by many governments in Europe (exceptions are Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom). Hence, we also cannot distinguish emissions of carbon and harmful air 
pollutants from using gasoline and diesel,
 10
 although emission costs are known to be higher 
for diesel (see Harding, 2014). For the inequality analyses the inability to distinguish gasoline 
and diesel means that we cannot separate the distributional effects of taxes on gasoline and 
diesel.
11
 Table 1.6 in the Appendix provides details on the construction of all the expenditure 
variables used in our empirical analyses. Summary statistics of these variables as well as 
others are provided in Tables 1.7–1.10 in the Appendix. 
Figure 1.1 represents the development of the expenditure shares between 1993 and 
2008. The expenditure share of a good is its related expenditure divided by total household 
expenditures. Each panel in Figure 1.1 shows the tenth, fiftieth (median), and ninetieth 
percentile of the expenditure share for each good. The expenditure share of car fuels increased 
                                                 
7
 Households belonging to the lowest and highest percentiles of the distribution of total expenditures relative to 
disposable income were excluded from the sample. 
8
 The choice of the expenditure categories follows Brännlund et al. (2007). 
9
 For further details about the original IES variables, please refer to Table 1.6 in the Appendix.  
10
 In this study, the emissions per liter of car fuels are also derived by weighting the carbon emissions content of 
gasoline and diesel. 
11
 According to Flues and Thomas (2015, p. 25) taxing diesel higher usually hits high-income households harder 
than low-income households. 
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steadily over the period under consideration. The increasing expenditure share of car fuels 
reflects the increasing fuel prices during the period and less changes in demand.
12
 The price 
increases are due to both increasing energy taxes on car fuels (see Section 1.4.2 for details) 
and prices of crude oil. The question of whether increases in oil prices are immediately and 
fully passed-through to retail fuel prices in Germany has been widely researched. E.g., the 
German Federal Statistical Office in their 2015 report on “Prices- Data on Energy Price 
Trends” conclude that the development of both gasoline and diesel price strongly depends on 
the dynamics of crude oil price on the world markets. The second driver in Germany is energy 
taxes (see Table 1.1 in Section 1.4.2 for further details). 
Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between the expenditure shares and disposable 
income. The expenditure share of car fuels displays a nonlinear relationship with income: For 
the households in the first income decile it is 0.023; it increases to around 0.045 for the sixth 
and seventh deciles; and then decreases slightly to 0.041 for the tenth decile. The expenditure 
share of other fuels is also decreasing with disposable income. The share of food in total 
expenditures is highest (0.171) for the households belonging to the lowest disposable income 
deciles and decreases with income; for the richest households it is 0.125. While for the 
poorest households, electricity makes up 3.5 percent of their total expenditures, for the richest 
households it is only 2.2 percent. In contrast to all the other expenditure shares, the share of 
other goods is increasing with disposable income, indicating that as households become 
richer, they can afford more leisure, travel, culture, education, et cetera. 
Figure 1.5 in the Appendix provides the kernel density functions for the expenditure 
shares by household type for 2008. For other fuels and car fuels, a substantial fraction of 
households do not seem to consume the goods as they have no related expenditures. The 
densities also indicate some marked differences across household types: In particular, the 
expenditure shares for food and car fuels increase with household size, whereas the opposite 
holds for other goods. Densities for food and electricity indicate that both goods have 
characteristics of basic goods: Basically all households report positive expenditure shares.
13
  
 
1.3.2 Consumer prices  
 
 
  
                                                 
12
 Between 1993 and 1998, demand increased by around 13.5 percent for the average German household, 
decreased by about 7 percent up to 2003,0 and by another 12.4 percent up to 2008. 
13
 The small fraction of households with expenditure shares of zero for electricity can be explained by particular 
social security instruments that step in once households cannot afford to pay their electricity bills. 
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Figure 1. 1 Development of expenditure shares over time 
Note. Median values (dashed line) of expenditure shares and tenth (solid line) and ninetieth (dotted line) percentile are given. Database is IES, 1993–2008. 
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Figure 1. 2 Expenditure shares and income 
Note. Average values of variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are presented. Database is IES 2008.  
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Because the German Federal Statistical Office is responsible for collecting the IES 
data and computing consumer prices for various goods, we find the same categorization of 
consumption aggregates in both data sources. From the consumer prices and household 
expenditure data, we derive Stone Price Indices (SPI) for three aggregated expenditure 
categories: food, other fuels, and other goods. As car fuels and electricity are not composed of 
any subcategories, we take the price indices as provided by the statistical office. The SPIs 
reflect differences in consumption patterns across household units. To derive the SPIs, we 
follow the approach outlined in Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008). Let 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴 denote the 
different expenditure categories. An expenditure category can encompass several sub-
categories of expenditures, 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑆. The corresponding prices are 𝑝𝑎1 , … , 𝑝𝑎𝑆. The 
expenditure share of an expenditure category 𝑎 for household ℎ in period 𝑡, 𝑤𝑎,ℎ,𝑡, is defined 
as, 𝑤𝑎,ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑎,ℎ,𝑡  ∑ 𝑥𝑎,ℎ,𝑡𝑎⁄ , with 𝑥𝑎,ℎ,𝑡 denoting nominal expenditures. The SPI for category  
𝑎 is: 
 
  𝑃𝑎,ℎ,𝑡 =
1
𝑘
 ∏ (
𝑝𝑎𝑠
𝑤𝑎𝑠,ℎ,𝑡
)𝑤𝑎𝑠,ℎ,𝑡
𝑎𝑠
 (1.1) 
 
with 𝑘 =  ∏ (𝑤𝑎𝑠,𝑡)
−𝑤𝑎𝑠,𝑡𝑎𝑠 , and with ?̅?𝑎𝑠,𝑡 denoting the expenditure share of the reference 
household in period 𝑡. A household with average budget shares is taken as the reference 
household. Finally, the prices for each category are divided by the lowest price in the base 
period (1993).  
Summary statistics of prices are provided in Tables 1.7–1.10 in the Appendix. The 
price of car fuels increased over time during the period under observation; the mean price 
index was 1.552 in 2008, which represents 83 percent increase from the price in 1993. Thus, 
the increase in car fuel expenditures over the period can be attributed largely to price 
increases but also to changes in the quantity of fuels consumed.   
 
1.4 Estimation strategy and policy evaluation criteria  
 
1.4.1 Demographically-Scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
 
There exists a wide range of demand systems. Our analyses builds on a Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System (DQUAIDS). It allows for the modelling of household 
demographics within the QAIDS framework, and incorporates the well-known AIDS as a 
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nested model.
14
 Demand systems are an exceptionally useful tool for (ex-ante) evaluation of 
policy reforms as they describe consumer choices in a consistent framework that secures basic 
economic assumptions. That is, estimates are consistent with the household budget 
constraints, satisfy the axioms of order, and aggregate over consumers (see Banks et al., 
1997). Most importantly, the demand system estimation takes into account behavioral 
responses of the households, and should, in practice, match the patterns of observed consumer 
behavior and at the same time be consistent with consumer theory (see Banks et al., 1997). 
The motivation for applying the DQUAIDS is threefold. First, compared to the linear, 
the quadratic specification allows for more flexibility and budget shares which are non-linear 
in log of total expenditures. The QUAIDS model was proven to be more flexible and superior 
to the AIDS in several empirical cases.
15
 Secondly, the QUAIDS is shown to provide more 
precise valuations of welfare changes in comparison to the AIDS.
16
 Third, the quadratic 
expenditure term allow for goods to be necessities at specific expenditure levels and luxuries 
at others. Finally, like the AIDS, the demographic version of QUAIDS allows the 
incorporation of demographic variables.
17
  
A detailed description of the DQUAIDS used in the present study can be found in 
Banks et al. (1997), Ray (1983), Blacklow et al. (2010), and Poi (2012). Here we focus on the 
central equations. In order to ease notation, household and time period subscripts are 
suppressed. The estimable demand system takes the following form: 
 
 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗ln (𝑝𝑗 )
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ (𝛽𝑖  + ∑ 𝜃𝑖s𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
 ) 
∗ (ln(𝑚) − ln(𝑎(𝑝)) −  ln (1 +  ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
)) + (
𝜆𝑖
(𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧))
)
∗ {(ln(𝑚) − ln(𝑎(𝑝)) −  ln (1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
))}
2
+  𝑢𝑖 
(1.2) 
 
with 𝑤𝑖 denoting the expenditure share of commodity 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 in total expenditures 𝑚. The 
variable 𝑝𝑗 denotes the price of good 𝑗, and 𝑎(𝑝) the subsistence level. The variable zs 
                                                 
14
 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
15
 See Banks et al. (1997) for the UK, Kohn and Missong (2003) for Germany, and Betti (2000) for Italy. 
16
 Gahvari and Tsang (2011) find AIDS to overestimate welfare losses (𝐸𝑉), and the bias increases with income. 
17
 Blow (2003) argues that household’s composition affects expenditures allocation due to different needs of 
members and economies of scale. 
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describes the demographic characteristic, 𝑠,18 with  𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑡. The bliss level is 𝑏(𝑝), and 
𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧) is a Cobb-Douglas price aggregator.19 
Accordingly, the parameters to be estimated are 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖𝑗, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖, with 𝛼0 set at the 
lowest level of natural logarithm of total expenditures in the base year (1993). Several 
restrictions are imposed on the parameters in order to ensure adding up of the budget 
constraint, homogeneity of degree zero, and Slutsky symmetry, summarized in equation (1.3): 
 
 ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1 ;  
𝑖
 ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0 ;  
𝑖
 ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 0 ;  
𝑖
  ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑗 = 0
𝑘
 ;  ∑ 𝜃𝑖1 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖2 = 0
𝑖
 .
𝑖
 (1.3) 
 
The DQUAIDS can be tested against nested models including the QUAIDS and the AIDS. All 
results are provided in Section 1.5.  
 
1.4.2 The car fuels tax 
 
In Germany, two taxes are levied on top of the producer price of car fuels: the car 
fuels tax and the value-added tax. The car fuels tax is a quantity tax charged per liter and it 
differs between gasoline and diesel fuel. The tax base of the value-added tax is the fuel price 
per liter including the car fuels taxes. Hence, for our period of investigation, 2008, the end 
consumer price of car fuels takes the form:
 20
  
 
 𝑝𝑓 = (𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑓 + 𝐶𝑀𝑓 + 𝑇𝑓) ∗ (1 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇) (1.4) 
 
where 𝑝𝑓 denotes the consumer price for fuel of type 𝑓, gasoline or diesel. The import price is 
𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑓 (in 2008: 0.525 euros/liter gasoline and 0.650 euros/liter diesel); 𝐶𝑀𝑓 denotes the 
contribution margins (this part covers the expenses of mineral-oil companies and their profits 
plus costs of the emergency storage fund); 𝑇𝑓 is the car fuels tax, and VAT the value-added 
tax.
21
 Because we cannot distinguish between diesel and gasoline after 1993 in our household 
                                                 
18
 The number of adults and number of children in the household are included as demographics. When the 
difference between rural and urban households is considered, a variable for city size is also included. 
19
 Details on subsistence and bliss levels, cost and indirect utility functions are provided in Section 1.9.2.1 in the 
Appendix. Section 1.9.2.2 in the Appendix outlines the method for correcting for potential endogeneity. 
20
 See Federal Ministry of Finance, 2014.  
21
 Value-added tax is imposed on the basis of the Value Added Tax Act of 15 July 2006. See Federal Ministry of 
Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014d. 
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micro data, we have constructed a weighted average for the end user price on car fuels using 
the consumption shares of gasoline and diesel in total car fuel consumption in 2008 as weights 
(0.73 and 0.27, respectively
22
). A weighted average was constructed in the same way for the 
car fuels tax.  
Table 1.1 provides a summary of pre-tax prices,
23
 car fuels taxes,
24
 and final consumer 
prices of car fuels in Germany during the investigation period 1993–2008. During the period, 
the car fuels tax was increased several times. For example, the tax on gasoline (diesel) 
increased from 0.4193 (0.2812) to 0.5011 (0.3170) euros per liter between 1993 and 1994. 
Since 2003 it has averaged 0.6545 (0.4704) euros per liter. Also in 2007 the value-added tax 
was increased from 16 to 19 percent, leading to a further increase in the consumer price of car 
fuels. The tax and import-price increases are the key drivers of the rise in car fuel 
expenditures shares documented in Figure 1.1 in Section 1.3.1.  
 
Table 1. 1 Pre-tax and final consumer prices of car fuels 
 Diesel  (EUR/liter) Gasoline (EUR/liter) 
Period 
Pre-tax price Car fuels  tax 
Total 
price 
Pre-tax price Car fuels tax 
Total 
price 
01.01.93–31.12.93 0.195 0.281 0.548 0.199 0.419 0.712 
01.01.94–31.12.94 0.191 0.317 0.584 0.192 0.419 0.797 
01.01.95–31.12.95 0.181 0.317 0.573 0.188 0.501 0.793 
01.01.96–31.12.96 0.224 0.317 0.622 0.218 0.501 0.827 
01.01.97–31.12.97 0.234 0.317 0.634 0.242 0.501 0.854 
01.01.98–31.12.98 0.186 0.317 0.582 0.202 0.501 0.814 
01.01.99–31.12.99 0.210 0.348 0.638 0.229 0.532 0.874 
01.01.00–31.12.00 0.312 0.378 0.801 0.312 0.562 1.015 
01.01.01–31.12.01 0.300 0.409 0.822 0.289 0.593 1.024 
01.01.02–31.12.02 0.284 0.440 0.840 0.279 0.624 1.048 
01.01.03–31.12.03 0.294 0.470 0.886 0.287 0.655 1.093 
01.01.04–31.12.04 0.338 0.470 0.937 0.324 0.655 1.136 
01.01.05–31.12.05 0.448 0.470 1.065 0.399 0.655 1.223 
01.01.06–31.12.06 0.492 0.470 1.116 0.456 0.655 1.289 
01.01.07–31.12.07 0.512 0.470 1.169 0.472 0.655 1.341 
01.01.08–31.12.08 0.650 0.470 1.333 0.525 0.655 1.403 
Note. Source: International Energy Agency (2008). All numbers are in nominal terms. 
 
1.4.3 Policy evaluation criteria 
 
                                                 
22 See Statista, 2014. 
23
 The question of the extent to which changes in oil prices are passed through to retail fuel prices in Germany 
has been widely researched. For example, the German Federal Statistical Office (2015) concludes that the 
development of both gasoline and diesel prices depends heavily on the dynamics of crude oil prices on world 
markets. 
24
 The car fuels tax replaced the mineral oil tax in 2006. It is imposed on the basis of the Energy Tax Act of 15 
July 2006. See Energy Tax Act, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014a.  
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Our central aim is the quantification of the potential trade-offs between emissions and 
inequality as well as emissions and households’ material welfare. To achieve this goal, we 
take the DQUAIDS estimates and derive household expenditures and demands in year 2008 
for various levels of the tax on car fuels (including its actual value in 2008 as a benchmark). 
Then we derive the outcomes of interest: aggregate car-related CO2 emissions, inequality in 
the post-tax income distribution, and household material welfare. 
Our assessment of the responsiveness of aggregate car-related CO2 emissions of the 
household sector to car fuel taxes follows Brännlund et al. (2007). The percentage change in 
CO2 emissions (𝛥𝐸) for a particular change in the car fuels tax is: 
 
 𝛥𝐸 =
( 𝜃𝑞1 − 𝜃𝑞0 )
𝜃𝑞0
 (1.5) 
 
with 𝜃 denoting the carbon factor of car fuels in tons per liter, and 𝑞0 (𝑞1) denoting average 
fuel demand in the status quo (after the tax variation). 
Our assessment of the distributional effects relies on two standard inequality 
measures: the Gini and the Theil index. Let ?̅? denote the mean equivalent income of the 
population and 𝐹(𝑦) the proportion of the population with income less than or equal to 𝑦, or: 
 
   Φ(𝑦) =
1
𝑦
∫ 𝑧𝑑𝐹(𝑧).
𝑦
0
 (1.6) 
 
The term Φ(𝑦) gives the proportion of total income received by individuals with income less 
than 𝑦 and 𝑧 is the integration variable, income.  Then the Gini index (𝐺) is defined as: 
 
 𝐺 =  1 –  2 ∫ Φ𝑑𝐹.
1
0
 (1.7) 
 
It is thus defined as twice the area between the line of perfect equality (everyone has 
the same income) and the Lorenz curve (𝐹, Φ), the graphical representation of population 
proportion 𝐹 versus the income proportion Φ.25 A Gini index of 0 means perfect equality and 
index of 1 means perfect inequality. The Gini index puts a great deal of weight to the middle 
                                                 
25
 See The World Bank, 2014. 
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of the income distribution. As an alternative measure, we consider the Theil entropy index, 𝑇 , 
defined as:              
 
 𝑇 =
1
𝑛
∑
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
𝑛
𝑖=1
log (
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
) . (1.8) 
 
If the Gini or the Theil index increases (decreases) with the tax rate, the tax is 
regressive (progressive), increasing (decreasing) inequality. Both indices are derived from the 
distribution of equivalent disposable income after car fuels taxes. Equivalent disposable 
income is the household’s disposable income adjusted by the household’s equivalence scale. 
Equivalences scales adjust for differences in needs of households of different composition 
(number of adults and children). Here we use the OECD modified equivalence scale (𝐸𝑆), 
 
 𝐸𝑆 =  1 +  0.5 ∗ (𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 − 1) + 0.3 ∗  𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛, (1.9) 
 
with 𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 (𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛) denoting the number of adults (children) in the household.  
Our assessment of the welfare changes relies on three indicators. The first indicator is 
the change in tax burden (𝛥𝑡) due to a change in the tax rate, 
 
    𝛥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑇1𝑞1 −  𝐸𝑇0𝑞0, (1.10) 
 
with 𝐸𝑇0 and 𝐸𝑇1 and denoting the tax burden in the status quo and in another tax regime. 
Further we make use of two standard measures from welfare analyses: equivalent and 
compensating variations. The equivalent variation (𝐸𝑉), the amount of money that a 
household is willing to give up in order to avert the price change, is: 
 
 𝐸𝑉 = 𝑒 (𝑝1, 𝑉1) –  𝑒 (𝑝0, 𝑉1), (1.11) 
 
with 𝑒 (𝑝1, 𝑉1) denoting the expenditure function at new prices and utility levels and 
𝑒 (𝑝0, 𝑉1) representing the expenditure at old prices and utility after the tax change. Positive 
value for the equivalent variation indicates a welfare loss due to a tax change while the 
negative value indicates a welfare gain. The compensating variation (𝐶𝑉) measures how much 
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money each household should be given in order to maintain their old utility levels after the 
price change:  
 
 𝐶𝑉 =  𝑒 (𝑝1, 𝑉0) –  𝑒 (𝑝0, 𝑉0). (1.12) 
 
To gain a more detailed picture of the welfare changes, we further derive the welfare 
indicators for different quantiles of the distribution of equivalent disposable income. The 
emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs are visualized graphically by the 
combinations of the three outcomes for different levels of the car fuels tax. For example, the 
emissions–inequality trade-off is visualized by all potential combinations of CO2 emissions 
and the Gini index. 
 
1.5 Demand System Estimates 
 
In the DQUAIDS estimation, we have considered five commodities: car fuels, food,
26
 
electricity, other fuels, and an aggregate of other goods. A demographically scaled version is 
estimated using the numbers of adults and children as explanatory variables.
27
 The estimated 
coefficients do not have direct economic interpretations and hence we have shifted them to 
Table 1.12 in the Appendix. The table also provides the results from the non-scaled 
AIDS/QUAIDS and the analogous DAIDS specification. The results confirm the DQUAIDS 
as the appropriate specification. 
Table 1.2 summarizes all mean income and uncompensated price elasticities together 
with the lower and upper bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals.
28
 Following Banks et al. 
(1997), a weighted average elasticity is constructed with the household’s share of total sample 
expenditure for the relevant good as weight.  The income elasticities show that car fuels, food, 
electricity, and other fuels are normal and necessity goods: That is, a one percent income 
increase raises the demand for car fuels by 0.832 percent. The aggregate of other goods is 
normal but a luxury good (income elasticity above one).  
The price elasticities for car fuels indicate that the demand is highly price-inelastic. 
According to our estimates, a one percent price increase lowers the demand by only 0.084 
percent. Gicheva et al. (2007, 2010) find a similar result for households in California. There 
                                                 
26
 Food includes food away from home and non-alcoholic beverages. 
27
 Children are household members below age 15. 
28
 Section 1.9.2 in the Appendix explains the calculation of own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities. 
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are at least two explanations for the inelastic demand. First, many households rely on 
automobiles on a daily basis (i.e., commuters) and they have trouble reducing their 
consumption of car fuels ‒ at least in the short run ‒ particularly because purchasing a new car 
is a costly investment. Second, many people perceive cars as status symbols or prefer driving 
to public transportation ‒ even in the presence of a good public transport system. Indeed, we 
find low price elasticities for residents of both rural and urban areas,
29
 with the latter having 
presumably better public transport systems and shorter commuting distances. Cross-price 
elasticities reveal that car fuels are a complementary good to food and other goods.
30
 Car fuels 
are found to be substitutes for electricity and other fuels, but all of these cross- price 
elasticities are rather low.  
Interestingly, we find a rather high price elasticity for food (– 0.972). However, this is 
the uncompensated elasticity, and compensated elasticities are usually lower in absolute 
terms. Other studies find estimates of similar sizes.
31
 Another interesting result pertains to 
food and electricity, which appear to be substitute goods. One explanation is that the IES food 
aggregate includes food at home and food at restaurants. It might be that as restaurant food 
becomes increasingly expensive people start to cook more at home, hence using more 
electricity. Indeed, Gicheva et al. (2007, 2010) find that as gasoline prices increase, people in 
California shift from eating out to buying groceries and cooking at home. This result is not at 
odds with our finding of complementarity between food and car fuels, as our food aggregate 
also covers food away from home.
32
 
 
Table 1. 2 Income and price elasticities (uncompensated) 
 
Income 
elasticities 
Price elasticities 
  Food Electricity Other fuels Car fuels Other goods 
                                                 
29
 See Table 1.14 in the Appendix. 
30
 Gicheva et al. (2007) also find that as gasoline prices rise, households in California reduce their food 
expenditures.  
31
 Banks et al. (1997) obtain an elasticity of –0.959 and Bränlund et al. (2004) of –0.840. Andreyeva et al. 
(2010) review 160 studies on the price elasticity of food demand and concluded that the elasticity ranged from 
0.27 to 0.81 (absolute values). They argue that “food away from home, soft drinks, juice, and meats being most 
responsive” (p. 216), components that are also included in the food aggregate in the German Income and 
Expenditure Survey underlying our estimations. 
32
 Our elasticities estimates are comparable to the estimates from previous studies for other countries as well to 
estimates for Germany of Kohn and Missong (2003) and Beznoska (2014). Kohn and Missong (2003) estimate a 
non-demographic QUAIDS for broad number of goods categories in Germany for the years 1988–1993, while 
Beznoska (2014) estimates a non-demographic AIDS for Germany for energy, mobility and leisure for the years 
1998–2008. Both of those studies include the category mobility, which includes car fuels as well as expenditures 
on public transport. See Table 1.15 in the Appendix for comparison of our results with those studies as well as 
others. 
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Table 1. 2 (continued) 
 
Income 
elasticities 
Price elasticities 
  Food Electricity Other fuels Car fuels Other goods 
Food 0.415 –0.972 0.030 -0.041 –0.041 0.608 
 
[0.376; 
0.445] 
[–0.975;  
–0.969] 
[0.027; 
0.032] 
[-0.042; 
 -0.040] 
[–0.042;  
–0.040] 
[0.600; 
0.616] 
Electricity 0.507 0.140 –0.811 0.216 0.083 –0.135 
 
[0.505; 
0.509] 
[0.139; 
0.141] 
[–0.813;  
–0.810] 
[0.214; 
0.216] 
[0.082; 
0.084] 
[–0.136;  
–0.134] 
Other fuels 0.724 –0.171 0.153 -0.559 0.152 –0.299 
 
[0.723; 
0.725] 
[–0.173; 
 –0.168] 
[0.151; 
0.155] 
 [-0.560;  
-0.558] 
[0.150; 
0.154] 
[–0.301;  
–0.298] 
Car fuels 0.832 –0.180 0.046 0.134 –0.084 –0.747 
 
[0.831; 
0.833] 
[–0.182;  
–0.178] 
[0.044; 
0.048] 
 [0.133; 
0.135] 
[–0.085;  
–0.083] 
[–0.745; 
 –0.749] 
Other goods 1.136 0.007 –0.021 –0.028 –0.050 –1.044 
 
[1.133; 
1.139] 
[0.006; 
0.005] 
[–0.022;  
–0.020] 
[–0.029; 
 –0.027] 
[–0.052;  
–0.048] 
[–1.045; 
 –1.043] 
Note. Average values of the coefficient estimates and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals 
are provided. Database is IES, 1993–2008. 
  
1.6 Policy analyses 
 
To assess the effects of the car fuels tax on emissions, inequality, and household 
welfare, we proceed as follows. We start with a summary of indicators for the three outcome 
domains in the status quo ‒ 2008, the last year observed in the data. That is, we provide the 
level of emissions together with the set of inequality and welfare indices explained in Section 
1.4.3. We proceed with a simulation of a 1 percent variation of the tax on car fuels to derive 
the marginal effects on the indicators from all outcome domains. We conduct the same 
exercise but for four “sizeable” tax reforms, i.e., an increase and decrease of 25 and 50 
percent in the car fuels tax. This exercise adds to the marginal analyses as our simulations rely 
on a quadratic demand system, meaning that the results from the marginal tax variation cannot 
be extrapolated in a linear manner. Finally, we provide the emissions–inequality and 
emissions–welfare trade-offs by means of the graphical devices detailed in Section 1.4.3. For 
example, one graph shows the emissions–inequality trade-off by providing, for a wide range 
of tax rates, potential combinations of CO2 emissions and the Gini index, while another shows 
the emissions–welfare trade-off by presenting potential combinations of emissions and 
equivalent variation (Figure 1.4). 
We first characterize the status quo, that is, the situation in 2008.  In that year, the car 
fuels tax amounted to 0.606 euros per liter of car fuel. Table 1.3 presents the corresponding 
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key figures on emissions, tax burdens, and inequality indices for the post-tax distributions. All 
the numbers relate to the average German household for a period of one year. The average 
household produces car fuels-related emissions of 2.065 tons of CO2 and pays 622 euros for 
car fuels tax. The level of inequality in the post-tax equivalent income distribution, as 
captured by the Gini index (Theil index), is 0.266 (0.112). We take the 2008 situation as a 
benchmark and now simulate a marginal 1 percent tax variation in the car fuels tax. If the tax 
is reduced by one percent, emissions increase by 0.003 tons (0.15 percent) while the tax 
burden decreases by 6.4 euros (1.03 percent). Because the additional tax burden is small 
compared to household incomes, the Gini index and Theil index remain basically unchanged. 
If the tax is increased by one percent, emissions decrease by 0.003 tons (0.15 percent) and the 
tax burden increases by 3.9 euros (0.627 percent).  
 
Table 1. 3 Status quo 
  
Tax rate 
(in EUR/liter) 
Emissions 
(in tons) 
Tax burden 
(in EUR) 
Gini index Theil index 
Status quo 
0.606 2.065 621. 675 0.266 0.114 
 [2.055; 2.075] [617.639; 623.712] [0.265; 0.267] [0.112; 0.116] 
1 percent tax 
decrease 
0.600 2.068 615.309 0.266 0.114 
[2.058;    2.079] [612.299;   618.318] [0.265; 0.267] [0.112; 0.116] 
1percent tax 
increase 
0.612 2.062 625.631 0.266 0.114 
[2.051;    2.072] [622.569;    628.693] [0.265; 0.267] [0.112; 0.116] 
Note. Average values of the variables and 95 percent lower and upper confidence intervals are provided. 
Database is IES, 2008. 
 
Departing from the status quo, we assess four alternative scenarios: tax reductions and 
increases of 25 and 50 percent. The results of the four tax scenarios are summarized in Table 
1.4. For the 50 (25) percent reduction of the tax, the tax burden is 46 (22) percent lower than 
in the status quo and the welfare gain amounts to 307 (150) euros for the average German 
household as measured by the 𝐸𝑉.33 The average emissions increase to 2.22 (2.15) tons per 
household or by 7.99 (4.11) percent in comparison to the status quo.  The Gini and the Theil 
indices indicate a moderate reduction of inequality (by about 0.001 (0.0007) points). The 
small change in the inequality can be attributed to the fact that the poorer households spend a 
much smaller proportion of their total expenditures on car fuels (2.95 percent in the status 
quo) in comparison to the richer households (4.98 percent in the status quo). Car fuels 
expenditures relative to income in the status quo is 2.75 percent for low-income (equivalent 
                                                 
33
 All the welfare results derived from the EV are reconfirmed by the CV. The respective results are provided in 
the Appendix (see Table 1.16 and Figure 1.6).  
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income below 12,221 euros), 3.70 percent for middle-income (equivalent income between 
23,528 and 26,412 euros), and 2.39 percent for high-income households (equivalent income 
above 42,419 euros). Further, the mean tax burden paid for car fuels in the status quo 
represents 1.96 percent of the disposable income of the average household. For the 50 (25) 
percent tax increases, the tax burden increases by 37 (19) percent and the households suffer a 
welfare loss of 284 (146) euros. The inequality in the post-tax distribution is 0.005 (0.0001) 
percentage points higher, while emissions drop by 8.2 (4.3) percent relative to the status 
quo.
34
  
 
Table 1. 4 Tax simulations with 50 and 25 percent tax decrease, and 25 and 50 percent 
tax increase 
 
Tax rate 
(in EUR/liter) 
Emissions 
(in tons) 
Tax 
burden 
(in EUR) 
EV 
(in EUR) 
Gini 
index 
Theil 
index 
50 percent tax reduction 
0.303 2.223 334.027 –306.556 0.2649 0.1123 
 
[2.213; 
2.234] 
[332.412; 
335.643] 
[–307.892; 
–305.220] 
[0.2648; 
0.2650] 
[0.1122; 
0.1124] 
25 percent tax reduction 
0.455 2.150 484.536 –149.958 0.2653 0.1137 
 
[2.140;    
2.161] 
[482.180;   
486.892] 
[–150.620; 
–149.300] 
[0.2652; 
0.2654] 
[0.1136; 
0.1138] 
25 percent tax increase 
0.758 1.979 743.138 145.898 0.2661 0.1144 
 
[1.969;    
1.988] 
[739.478;    
746.798] 
[145.244;    
146.552] 
[0.2660; 
0.2662] 
[0.1143; 
0.1145] 
50 percent tax increase 
0.909 1.895 854.230 284.318 0.2665 0.1147 
 
[1.886; 
1.905] 
[849.995; 
858.464] 
[283.033; 
285.603] 
[0.2664; 
0.2666] 
[0.1146; 
0.1148] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided. Database is IES, 2008. 
 
To better understand how changes in the car fuels tax rate impact “rich” and “poor” 
households, Figure 1.3 provides, for each of the four different scenarios, the decile-specific
35
 
averages of the following outcomes: changes in CO2 emissions, changes in tax burdens, and 
equivalent variations. Hence, there is a set of three graphs per scenario, one graph per 
outcome. In each graph, the abscissa indicates the deciles. The left (right) ordinate depicts the 
average (percentage) change of the outcome within a decile. Solid (dashed) lines indicate the 
total (percentage) changes. 
We first comment on the two scenarios of tax reductions. The first row of graphs 
provides the decile-specific changes in emissions. If the tax is decreased by 50 (25) percent, 
                                                 
34
 Austin and Dinan (2005) find the gasoline tax to be an efficient policy instrument for achieving great 
immediate gasoline and emissions savings by encouraging people to drive less and eventually to buy more fuel-
efficient cars. 
35
 The deciles are identified based on equivalent disposable income in the status quo.  
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emissions increase for all the deciles and exhibit an inverse u-shaped relationship. The 
percentage increase in CO2 emissions is about 6.3 (3.7) percent for the lowest deciles, grows 
to 8.6 (4.5) percent for the households in the fourth decile, and declines thereafter. Thus, CO2 
emissions reductions are largest for the middle part of the equivalent income distribution 
under both scenarios. The second row gives the decile-specific average changes in tax burden. 
A tax reduction of 50 percent implies an average nominal tax relief of 143 euros for the 
bottom and of 466 euros for the top decile. While the tax relief, in absolute terms, increases 
over the deciles, the opposite holds for the relative relief as percentage of income: it is highest 
for the lowest decile ‒ 1.1 (0.5) percent ‒ and lowest for the richest households ‒ 0.6 (0.3) 
percent. The third row gives the welfare changes, expressed by the equivalent variation (𝐸𝑉). 
The 𝐸𝑉, as proportion of income, is highest for the poorest households, 1.2 (0.6) percent, and 
decreases with income, indicating that the monetary welfare gain is highest for the bottom of 
the equivalent income distribution.  
We now comment on the two scenarios of tax increases. If the tax is increased by 50 
(25) percent, the emissions decrease over the deciles, with the decline exhibiting an inverse-u 
shape. For the lowest decile, emissions decline by about 7.8 (3.9) percent for the poorest, by 
about 8.5 (3.5) percent for the third to fifth decile, and by around 6.0 (2.9) percent for the 
richest households. In absolute (relative) terms, the change in the average tax burden is 
increasing (decreasing) over the deciles. The pattern is very similar for the average decile-
specific 𝐸𝑉. The monetary loss, in terms of equivalent variation, for the poorest households 
amounts to 150 (76) euros and for the richest to around 440 (225) euros.
36
  
In a final step, we derive the functional relationships between emissions, inequality, 
and welfare by systematically varying the tax rate: the emissions–inequality and emissions–
welfare trade-offs. The results are summarized in Figure 1.4, which provides six graphs in 
total. The three graphs in the upper row and the first graph in the lower row give the 
relationships between nominal car fuel tax rates (in EUR/liter) and the following four 
outcomes at the household-sector level: CO2 emissions, car fuels tax burden, welfare 
(equivalent variation), and inequality (Gini index). The last two graphs in the lower row give 
the corresponding emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs. 
                                                 
36
 The tax simulations of Brännlund and Nordström (2004) involve a doubling of the CO2 tax and reduction of 
the general VAT in Sweden, which meant higher prices of petrol and oil and lower price of electricity. They find 
on 10.8 percent reduction in the consumption of petrol and CV of around 105 euros (0.47 percent of income). If 
car fuels tax is doubled in Germany and revenue is not recycled, our results demonstrate that consumption 
decreases by around 15.6 percent and the CV is found to be 555 euros (1.8 percent of income). 
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Figure 1. 3 Four tax scenarios: effects of tax change on emissions, tax burdens, and EV across the equivalent income deciles 
Note. Average values of variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are presented. In the first row of the graph, solids line stands for emissions 
changes in tons and the size can be read from the left y axis while the dashed line stands for percentage change and the size can be read from the right y axis. Similarly in the 
second (third) row solid line represents the change in tax burden (EV) in euros and the dashed line represents the change in tax burden (EV) as percentage of income. Database is 
IES 2008. 
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While the relationship between CO2 emissions and tax rate is negative and almost 
linear, the relationship between the tax rate and the other three outcomes (tax burden, welfare, 
and inequality) is positive, suggesting the presence of systematic emissions – inequality and 
emissions – welfare trade-offs. As an example, in the status quo, the total car fuels-related 
emissions of German households are 77.6 megatons (Mt), and the inequality in the post-tax 
income distribution is 0.266 percent (Gini index).
37
  Increasing (lowering) the tax by 50 
percent lowers (increases) emissions by 8.25 percent (7.63 percent) but increases (decreases) 
the Gini index by 0.27 percent (0.34 percent). The figure also indicates the trade-off between 
emissions and households welfare. Increasing (lowering) the tax by 50 percent decreases 
(increases) monetary welfare by a total of 11.51 (10.7) billion euros as measured by the sum 
of the equivalent variation over all households, but nevertheless lowers (increases) emissions 
by 8.25 percent (7.63 percent). Policy makers are yet to decide how to weigh environmental 
goals against equality and welfare concerns to determine an optimal tax level. 
At first glance, the small changes in the Gini coefficient might suggest that one need 
not worry about the redistribute effects of the car fuels tax. However, one should keep in mind 
that the moderate changes in inequality are due to the small expenditure share of car fuels in 
households’ overall budgets. Accordingly, the nominal tax burden is relatively small, and so 
is the change in the inequality measures. Our basic interest should thus be in the sign of the 
effect, which turned out to be regressive. The sign matters because the car fuel tax is not the 
only environmental tax in Germany that taxes households’ demands as a basis. Another such 
tax is the electricity tax, which has also been shown to be regressive (Grösche and Schröder, 
2014a). Flues and Thomas (2015) show that also taxes on heating fuels are “clearly 
regressive” (p. 40). Both thus add to the regressive effect of fuels taxes measured here. 
Finally, the associated welfare losses are sizeable, especially for poor households. 
 
 
1.7 Sensitivity analyses  
 
In Sections 1.4.1 and 1.9.3 we have shown the advantages of the DQAIDS model 
specification over nested models like QAIDS
38
 or (D)AIDS. Also, we already addressed the 
potential differences in demand patterns between residents of rural and urban areas. As 
another robustness check, we have re-estimated the original DQAIDS specification separately 
by quartiles of the equivalent disposable income distribution. Table 1.5 shows the elasticities 
                                                 
37
 The relationship between the Theil index (𝐶𝑉) and the tax rate and the Theil index (𝐶𝑉) and emissions is 
depicted in Figure 1.7 in the Appendix, and the patterns are the same as with the Gini index and 𝐸𝑉.  
38
 See Tables 1.12 and 1.13. 
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Figure 1. 4 The relationship between tax rate, emissions, tax burden, Gini index, and EV 
Note. Average values of total emissions (and Gini index) and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are presented. Database is IES 2008.  
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for each quartile of the equivalent income distribution. Overall, the estimated income 
elasticities do not differ substantially across quartiles. Critical for our policy analyses is the 
price elasticity of demand for car fuels. The results are that households at the top of the  
distribution respond to an increase in the price of car fuels with a stronger reduction in fuel 
demand than households at the bottom of the distribution. Using the quartile-specific 
elasticities would therefore imply an intensification of the estimated emissions–inequality 
trade-off.  
 
Table 1. 5 Elasticities by equivalent income classes 
Equivalent income quartiles 0–25 percent 25–50 percent 50–75 percent 75–100 percent 
Income elasticities 
    
Food 1.034 1.116 1.128 0.667 
 [1.033; 1.035] [1.113; 1.119] [1.127; 1.129] [0.665; 0.669] 
Electricity 0.771 0.862 0.861 0.392 
 [0.769; 0.773] [0.861; 0.863] [0.860; 0.862] [0.390; 0.394] 
Other fuels 0.657 0.677 0.656 0.521 
 [0.655; 0.659] [0.675; 0.679] [0.654; 0.658] [0.520; 0.522] 
Car fuels 1.336 1.022 0.937 0.355 
 [1.334; 1.338] [1.021; 1.023] [0.935; 0.939] [0.354; 0.356] 
Other goods 1.007 0.992 0.996 1.121 
 [1.005; 1.009] [0.990; 0.994] [0.993; 0.999] [1.120; 1.122] 
Price elasticities     
Food –1.175 –1.205 –1.206 –1.036 
 [–1.176: –1.174] [–1.207; –1.203] [–1.208; –1.204] [–1.038; –1.034] 
Electricity -0.822 –0.749 –0.885 -0.523 
 [–0.824; –0.820] [–0.751; –0.747] [–0.886; –0.884] [–0.525; –0.521] 
Other fuels –0.659 –0.790 –0.776 –0.621 
 [–0.661; –0.657] [–0.792: –0.788] [–0.778; –0.774] [–0.623; –0.619] 
Car fuels –0.064 –0.240 –0.244 –0.404 
 [–0.065; –0.063] [–0.242; –0.238] [–0.246; –0.242] [–0.406; –0.402] 
Other goods –0.914 –0.904 –0.900 –1.028 
 [–0.916; –0.912] [–0.905; –0.903] [–0.901; –0.899] [–2.030; –1.026] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided. Database is IES, 1993–2008. 
 
1.8 Interim Conclusion 
 
In many countries, policies have been implemented that tackle the issues of climate 
change and environmental pollution. Environmental and energy taxes are important 
Chapter 1.On the Emissions–Inequality and Emissions–Welfare Trade-offs in Energy Taxation: Evidence on the 
German Car Fuels Tax      32 
 
components of these policies. These taxes are intended to promote environmentally friendly 
activities by means of economic incentives. The German car fuels tax is a prototypical 
example: for every purchased liter of gasoline, 0.525 euros (which represents 38 percent of 
the price) are levied on the consumers, increasing the relative consumer price of gasoline. The 
quantitative effect on the demand for car fuels and thus the potential emissions reduction 
hinges on the price elasticity of this demand.  
Environmental taxes not only alter demands, they also affect households’ budgets 
(income after taxes), implying distributional and welfare effects. As the tax base is 
consumption of particular commodities rather than economic capability, regressive effects 
cannot be excluded. If the effect is regressive, environmental taxes might counteract efforts at 
reducing inequality and poverty.  
Here we have suggested and implemented a framework to systematically investigate 
the potential trade-offs between emission, distribution, and welfare targets that builds on a 
demographically-scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System. Our estimates indicate the 
presence of an emissions–inequality and an emissions–welfare trade-off: Increasing the 2008 
car fuels tax by 5 percent implies an emissions reduction of 0.9 percent, an increase in 
inequality of 0.04 percent (according to the Gini coefficient), and a considerable welfare 
reduction (according to the equivalent variation) for low-income households of 17 euros (0.12 
percent of income). 
A partial equilibrium framework such as ours has been adopted in many studies 
worldwide (e.g., West and Williams III, 2004, and Bento et al., 2009). Such a framework 
ignores possible general equilibrium effects. While such effects are possibly small for small-
scale policy changes, they might invalidate the conclusions from partial equilibrium analyses 
for major policy reforms (see Goulder and Williams III, 2003, Böhringer and Rutherford, 
1997, Fullerton and Heutel, 2010, Bhattacharyya, 1996, or Araar et al., 2011). Future work 
could incorporate our household-sector analyses into a computable general equilibrium 
framework to study the role of general equilibrium effects for tax variations of different 
magnitudes.  
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1.9 Appendix 
 
1.9.1 Data tables  
Table 1. 6 Identifiers of the underlying original IES variables 
Original IES variables in each 
category 
    Content 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 
 Food and beverages 
expenditures (no alcohol, no 
tobacco) 
    
 
 ef109 ef125 ef51 ef61  Food, beverages and tobacco 
 ef644 ef740    Other beverages, tobacco 
Electricity expenditures     
 
 
ef705 ef770 ef258 ef251  Electricity (including solar from 2003 on) 
  ef771    
  ef772    
Other fuels expenditures     
 
 ef707 
ef773; 
ef774; 
ef775 
ef259 ef252 
 Gas 
 ef709 
ef776; 
ef777; 
ef778 
ef260 ef253 
 Liquid fuels 
 
ef711; 
ef713; 
ef715 
ef779; 
ef780; 
ef781 
ef261 ef254  Solid fuels: including hard coal, coke, 
wood, lignite, etc.  
 ef718 ef782; ef262 ef255  District heating, hot water 
  ef783;    
  ef784    
Car fuels expenditures     
  ef761 
ef810 ef299 ef300 
 Gasoline 
 ef762  Diesel 
 ef763 
 Consumables for motor vehicles and   
bicycles 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2008. 
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Table 1. 7 Descriptive statistics for 1993 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑦 38378 33630.450 17749.480 7016.458 105893.200 
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 38378 26732.410 13139.430 3488.475 138006.000 
𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  38378 4338.383 2399.318 2556.453 47433.570 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  38378 601.557 4356.844 0.000 8141.812 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  38378 701.997 5169.145 0.000 13367.220 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  38378 698.220 5816.776 0.000 6959.194 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  38378 20392.250 11219.500 1221.674 126590.700 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  38378 0.172 0.066 0.000 0.616 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  38378 0.026 0.018 0.000 0.286 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  38378 0.033 0.026 0.000 0.349 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  38378 0.025 0.023 0.000 0.230 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  38378 0.744 0.076 0.317 0.978 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) 38378 1.285 0.115 0.993 1.681 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 38378 1.201 0.000 1.201 1.201 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 38378 0.945 0.129 0.384 1.222 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 38378 0.848 0.000 0.848 0.848 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) 38378 1.212 0.087 0.049 1.640 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 38378 2.036 0.831 1.000 8.000 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 38378 0.595 0.960 0.000 6.000 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 38378 0.637 0.481 0 1 
Note. Database is IES 1993. 
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Table 1. 8 Descriptive statistics for 1998 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑦 47747 38462.200 20493.800 7454.636 124794.100 
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 47747 29171.110 17187.370 3675.714 215394.200 
𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  47747 4087.903 2.067.809 4090.335 23813.930 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  47747 570.083 4.102.481 0.000 7415.777 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  47747 691.718 7.366.757 0.000 16563.810 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  47747 940.144 7.681.655 0.000 10872.110 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  47747 22881.260 15783.510 2164.336 207614.400 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  47747 0.155 0.069 0.000 0.525 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  47747 0.024 0.017 0.000 0.283 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  47747 0.030 0.029 0.000 0.383 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  47747 0.031 0.029 0.000 0.353 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  47747 0.760 0.085 0.347 0.983 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) 47747 1.347 0.004 1.062 1.755 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 47747 1.193 0.000 1.193 1.193 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 47747 0.951 0.122 0.527 1.304 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 47747 0.960 0.000 0.960 0.960 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) 47747 1.343 0.098 0.153 1.713 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 47747 2.021 0.815 1.000 8.000 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 47747 0.568 0.912 0.000 6.000 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 47748 0.646 0.478 0 1 
Note. Database is IES 1998. 
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Table 1. 9 Descriptive statistics for 2003 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑦 41046 41307.400 22416.890 7612.000 131484.000 
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 41046 27869.260 16098.570 3206.515 232843.300 
𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  41046 3650.286 1909.102 32.000 21440.000 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  41046 662.423 4840.913 0.000 10064.000 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  41046 930.854 1082.000 0.000 23628.000 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  41046 1201.276 9895.956 0.000 11424.000 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  41046 21424.420 14489.550 2470.718 225339.300 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  41046 0.144 0.061 0.001 0.571 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  41046 0.028 0.019 0.000 0.350 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  41046 0.038 0.038 0.000 0.518 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  41046 0.041 0.037 0.000 0.360 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  41046 0.749 0.083 0.319 0.982 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) 41046 1.386 0.122 1.081 1.756 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 41046 1.312 0.000 1.313 1.312 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 41046 1.238 0.065 0.931 1.378 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 41046 1.276 0.000 1.276 1.276 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) 41046 1.373 0.074 0.084 1.708 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 41046 1.997 0.824 1.000 8.000 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 41046 0.440 0.826 0.000 6.000 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 41046 0.706 0.456 0 1 
Note. Database is IES 2003. 
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Table 1. 10 Descriptive statistics for 2008 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝑦 42315 40989.970 22710.660 7504.000 129240.000 
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 42315 26306.320 14525.560 3111.000 213739.000 
𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  42315 3847.322 2037.563 28.000 21924.000 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  42315 755.444 5664.706 0.000 11620.000 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  42315 1203.773 1716.214 255.000 29391.000 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  42315 1398.887 1223.770 0.000 13376.000 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  42315 19100.890 12446.150 1812.000 201304.000 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  42315 0.158 0.066 0.001 0.595 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  42315 0.034 0.023 0.000 0.372 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  42315 0.049 0.052 0.001 0.634 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  42315 0.049 0.045 0.000 0.531 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  42315 0.710 0.094 0.100 0.975 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) 42315 1.512 0.172 1.195 1.868 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 42315 1.566 0.000 1.566 1.566 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 42315 1.662 0.044 1.134 1.907 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 42315 1.552 0.000 1.553 1.553 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) 42315 1.389 0.063 0.181 1.751 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 42315 1.933 0.807 1.000 8.000 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 42315 0.358 0.749 0.000 6.000 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 42316 0.689 0.463 0 1 
Note. Database is IES 2008. 
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1.9.2 Estimation details 
 
 
1.9.2.1 Technical details concerning the methodology 
 
The first step for obtaining the demand equations is the specification of a function, 
which is general enough to be a second-order approximation of the utility or cost function. 
Banks et al. (1997) rely on the Price-Independent Generalized Logarithmic (PIGLOG) 
preferences, with demands having expenditure shares linear in logarithm of total expenditures. 
These demands arise from indirect utility functions (𝑉), which are linear in logarithm of total 
expenditures, but also include an extra term, 𝜆(𝑝), which allows for non-linearity: 
 
 ln(𝑉) = [ (
ln(𝑚)−ln(𝑎(𝑝))
𝑏(𝑝)
)
(−1)
+ 𝜆(𝑝) ](−1). (1.13) 
 
In equation (1.13),  ln (𝑎(𝑝))  represents the cost of subsistence, which takes a translog form: 
 
 ln (𝑎 (𝑝)) = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖ln (𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 0.5 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗ln (𝑝𝑖)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ln (𝑝𝑗). (1.14) 
 
Moreover, 𝑏(𝑝) represents the cost of bliss, and is a simple Cobb-Douglass price aggregator: 
 
    𝑏(𝑝) =  ∏ 𝑝𝑖
𝛽𝑖 𝑛
𝑖=1 . (1.15) 
 
𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧) is also a price aggregator, dependent on the demographics:  
 
 𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧) =  ∏ 𝑝𝑗
∑ 𝜃𝑗s𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑘
𝑗=1
 (1.16) 
 
And 𝜆 represents the nonlinear specification of the Engel curves; it is a differentiable, 
homogeneous function of degree zero in prices: 
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 𝜆(𝑝) = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . (1.17) 
 
Cost function, which defines the minimum expenditure necessary to attain specific 
utility level given the prices, can also be used to represent the PIGLOG preferences.  Such a 
cost function takes the following form:  
 
 ln (𝐶(𝑉, 𝑝)) = ln (𝑎(𝑝)) + 𝑏(𝑝)(𝑙𝑛𝑉 −
1
𝜆(𝑝)
).   (1.18) 
 
By price differentiation of equation (1.18), the demand functions can be derived:   
 
 
𝜕ln (𝐶)
𝜕ln (𝑝𝑖)
=
𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖
𝐶
= 𝑤𝑖. (1.19) 
 
1.9.2.2 Correcting for endogeneity  
 
Exogeneity is necessary in the estimation of demand systems in order to have 
consistent and unbiased estimates. As LaFrance (1991) claims, it is almost impossible for 
expenditures to be exogenous in a set of demand functions and he presents evidence that the 
endogeneity significantly impacts the demand parameter estimates. According to Dhar et al. 
(2003), any inference based on endogenous estimates would be invalid.  
The exogeneity assumption is likely to be violated as the budget shares of the 
commodities are likely to be jointly determined with total expenditures, which makes total 
expenditures endogenous in the budget equations. Let us rewrite equation (1) as  
 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗(ln(𝑚)) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. Then endogeneity implies that 𝐸(𝜀𝑗| ln (𝑚)) ≠ 0. We follow the 
augmented regression technique of Blundell et al. (1998) to correct for the potential 
endogeneity. Let us suppose there exists a variable 𝑦 such that  ln(𝑚) = 𝜋 ∗ 𝑦 + 𝜗 with 
 𝐸(𝜗 | 𝑦) = 0. Then assume the following model holds true: 
 
 𝑤𝑗 = 𝑔𝑗(ln(𝑚)) + 𝜗 ∗ 𝜌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸(𝜀𝑗| ln(𝑚)) = 0,     (1.20) 
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which implies that 𝑤𝑗 − 𝐸(𝑤𝑗| ln(𝑚)) = (𝜗 − 𝐸(𝜗| ln(𝑚)))𝜌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗. The estimator of 
𝑔𝑗(ln(𝑚)) is given by:  
 
 𝑔𝑗ℎ̂(ln(𝑚)) = 𝑡𝑗ℎ
?̂?  (ln(𝑚)) + 𝑡𝑗ℎ
?̂?  (ln(𝑚))𝜌?̂? (1.21) 
 
And in place of the unobservable error component, the first stage residuals are used: 
 
 ?̂? = 𝑚 − 𝑦?̂?, (1.22) 
 
where ?̂?  is the least squares estimator of 𝜋. All the variables included in the augmented 
equation are statistically significant (see Table 1.11).  
 
1.9.2.3 Calculation of income and price elasticities of demand 
 
We differentiate equation (1.2) from Section 1.4.1 with respect to ln(𝑚) to obtain the 
income elasticity, and with respect to ln (𝑝𝑗), to derive the price elasticity. 
 
  𝜀𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
𝑤𝑖
+ 1 (1.23) 
 
where  
 
 
𝜇𝑖 ≡
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕 ln(𝑚)
= 𝛽𝑖
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑠𝑧𝑠
t
𝑠=1
+ {
2𝜆𝑖
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧)
} {𝑙𝑛𝑚 − ln (𝑎(𝑝)) − ln (1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
)} 
(1.24) 
 
Equation (1.23) represents the income elasticity of demand. Income elasticity lower 
than one indicates necessities, while elasticity greater than one indicates luxury goods.  
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Positive income elasticity is associated with normal goods whereas negative income elasticity 
is associated with Giffen goods.  
The uncompensated price elasticity is calculated in the following manner: 
 
 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑢 =
𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖
− 𝛿𝑖𝑗 (1.25) 
 
where  
 
 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 ≡  
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕ln (𝑝𝑗)
= 𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖(𝛼𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑘ln (𝑝𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
))
− {
(𝜆𝑖(𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖s𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1 )
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧)
} {(ln(𝑚) − ln (𝑎))
− ln (1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1
)}2 
(1.26) 
 
and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is the Kroneker delta, 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 = 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. 
The compensated price elasticity is derived from the following equation: 
 
    𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑐 = 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑢 + 𝜀𝑖𝑤𝑗 (1.27) 
       
Own-price elasticity should be negative;  𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑐  lower than one is a sign of inelastic 
demand; 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑐   higher than one is a sign of price-elastic demand. Substitute goods are associated 
with positive cross-price elasticity whereas complementary goods are associated with negative 
cross-price elasticity.  For instance, if a price of a certain good goes up, the demand for the 
complementary good will go down. 
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1.9.3 Estimation Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. 11 The augmented equation for ln (m) 
Variable Coefficient 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 0.175*** 
ln (𝑦) 1.131*** 
𝑙𝑛 ((𝑦)2) –0.024*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) –0.024*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 0.102*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) –0.075*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) –0.675*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) –0.836*** 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 0.083*** 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛  0.044*** 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.216*** 
Note. Authors’ calculations; Database is IES 1993–2008. *** Significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 1. 12 Coefficient estimates of the demand systems 
Coefficient AIDS QUAIDS DAIDS DQUAIDS 
𝛼1 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
𝛼2 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
𝛼3 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
𝛼4 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 
𝛽1 –0.027*** –0.002*** –0.068*** –0.069*** 
𝛽2 –0.009*** –0.008*** –0.012*** –0.013*** 
𝛽3 –0.014*** –0.009*** –0.013*** –0.011*** 
𝛽4 0.004*** 0.026*** –0.001*** 0.006*** 
𝛾11 –0.027*** –0.014*** –0.004*** –0.007*** 
𝛾12 0.000 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002*** 
𝛾13 –0.001*** –0.004*** –0.007*** –0.007*** 
𝛾14 –0.015*** –0.006*** –0.011*** –0.008*** 
𝛾22 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
𝛾23 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
𝛾24 –0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
𝛾33 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
𝛾34 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
𝛾44 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
𝜌1   0.964*** –0.002*** 
𝜌2   0.410*** 0.001*** 
𝜃11   –0.003*** 0.001*** 
𝜃21   0.001* –0.009*** 
𝜃31   0.002*** 0.010*** 
𝜃41   –0.006*** –0.006*** 
𝜃21   –0.006*** 0.001*** 
𝜃22   0.001 –0.005** 
𝜃32   0.002*** 0.010*** 
𝜃42   –0.004*** 0.942*** 
𝜆1  –0.017***  0.004*** 
𝜆2  –0.001***  0.001*** 
𝜆3  –0.003***  –0.003*** 
𝜆4  –0.014***  –0.011*** 
𝜈1 –0.012*** –0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 
𝜈2 –0.003*** –0.004*** –0.003*** –0.003*** 
𝜈3 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
𝜈4 –0.014*** –0.015*** –0.005*** –0.008*** 
Note. Authors’ calculations; Database is IES 1993–2008. * Significant at 10 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, 
*** Significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 1. 13 Comparison of Base and Demographic QUAIDS elasticities 
 
Income elasticities Price elasticities 
 
Base Demographic Base Demographic 
Food 0.991 0.415 –1.083 –0.972 
 [0.990; 0.992] [0.376; 0.445] [–1.085; –1.081] [–0.975; –0.969] 
Electricity 0.703 0.507 –0.714 –0.811 
 [0.701; 0.705] [0.505; 0.509] [–0.715; –0.713] [–0.813; –0.810] 
Other fuels 0.749 0.724 –0.686 –0.559 
 [0.748; 0.750] [0.723; 0.725] [–0.690; –0.680] [–0.560; –0.558] 
Car fuels 1.520 0.832 –0.305 –0.084 
 [1.518; 1.522] [0.831; 0.833] [–0.307; –0.303] [–0.085; –0.083] 
Other goods 0.991 1.136 –0.930 –1.044 
 [0.990; 0.992] [1.133; 1.139] [–0.935; –0.925] [–1.045; –1.043] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided. Database is IES, 1993–2008. 
 
 
Table 1. 14 Comparison of rural and urban households’ elasticities 
 
Income elasticities Price elasticities 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Food 0.611 0.519 –1.004 –0.995 
 [0.601; 0.621] [0.515; 0.523] [–1.010; –0.980] [–0.998; –0.992] 
Electricity 0.445 0.486 –0.788 –0.766 
 [0.436; 0.454] [0.482; 0.490] [–0.792; –0.784] [–0.768; –0.764] 
Other fuels 0.793 0.701 –0.582 –0.556 
 [0.783; 0.803] [0.699; 0.703] [–0.587; –0.573] [–0.558; –0.554] 
Car fuels 0.549 0.868 –0.146 –0.068 
 [0.542; 0.556] [0.866; 0.870] [–0.150; –0.142] [–0.070; –0.066] 
Other goods 1.138 1.131 –1.047 –1.043 
 [1.135; 1.141] [1.130; 1.132] [–1.050; –1.044] [–1.045; –1.041] 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided. Rural dummy is included as a demographic variable in the demand system estimation. Rural 
households are those living in areas with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. Database is IES, 1993–2008. 
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Table 1. 15 Comparison with previous literature estimates 
Studies 
DQUAIDS 5 
Germany 
Bränlund et al. 
(2004) 
Banks et al. 
(1997) 
Kohn and 
Missong 
(2003) 
Labandeira et al. 
(2006) 
Beznoska 
(2014) 
Income elasticities   
Food 0.415 0.770 0.568 0.684 0.600 - 
Electricity 0.507 0.830 - - 0.811 0.840 
Other fuels 0.724 1.290 - - 0.621 1.230 
Car fuels 0.832 1.060 0.475 1.236 1.790 0.810 
Other goods 1.136 1.490 1.261 1.532 - 1.010 
Price elasticities 
Food –0.972 –0.840 –0.959 –0.326 –0.422 - 
Electricity –0.811 –0.710 - - –0.797 –0.680 
Other fuels –0.559 –0.610 - - –0.207 –0.910 
Car fuels –0.084 –0.920 –0.804 –0.385 –0.110 –0.500 
Other goods –1.044 –0.860 –0.683 –0.465 - –1.080 
Note. Elasticities estimates are taken from the relevant studies. 
 
 
Table 1. 16 Compensating variation with 50 and 25 percent tax decrease, and 25 and 50 
percent tax increase 
 
Note. Average values of the variables and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are 
provided. Database is IES, 2008. 
 
  
 
Tax rate 
(in EUR/l) 
CV (in EUR) 
50 percent tax reduction 0.303 –303.014 
 [–304.347; –301.680] 
25 percent tax reduction 0.455 –149.102     
 [–149.761;   –148.443] 
25 percent tax increase 0.758 146.727     
 [146.072;    147.382] 
50 percent tax increase 0.909 287.494 
 [286.204; 288.784] 
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Figure 1. 5 Density functions for the expenditure shares 
Note. Database is IES, 2008. Solid line: household type 1– single adults; dashed line: household type 2 – single parents; dotted line: household type 3  
– two adults with no children; dashed and dotted line:  household type 4 – two or more adults with children. 
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Figure 1. 6 Four scenarios: effects on compensating variation 
Note. Average values of CV and lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals are provided. Solids line stands for CV in euros and the size can be read from the left y 
axis while the dashed line stands for CV as percentage of income, and the size can be read from the right y axis. Database is IES 2008.  
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Figure 1. 7 The relationship between tax rate, emissions, Theil index, and CV 
Note. Average values of the inequality index and total emissions; as well as lower and upper bound of 95 percent confidence intervals  are provided. Database is IES, 2008. 
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Chapter 2 
How Electricity Prices Alter Poverty and CO2 Emissions ‒ 
The Case of Germany 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Energy poverty, defined as lack of (adequate) energy services, is present and growing 
concern both in developing and developed countries in cold climate regions. In Darby (2013), 
the definition of energy poverty is the inability to heat the home up to a socially and 
materially necessitated level. Energy poverty can have severe consequences, ranging from 
rationing of energy consumption and cold homes (affecting human health and quality of life) 
to potential energy debts and reduction of other budgets like food (Dubois, 2012).   In 
particular, Murray (2012) finds evidence of the heat or eat behavior among poor U.S. 
households.  
Growing energy prices and low incomes are usually found to be associated with 
energy poverty.
 
Those factors have been present even in developed countries such as the U.K. 
and Germany. The results of Palmer et al. (2008) confirm that high fuel prices and income 
poverty, as well as poor energy efficiency of dwellings are major factors behind energy 
poverty in England. In Germany, the electricity prices have been constantly growing in recent 
years and are among the highest in Europe nowadays. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2013) warns that between 2007 and 2011 the constant and the nominal electricity prices in 
Germany increased by 40 and 60 percent respectively. Neuhoff et al. (2013) find that poor 
German households suffer the most from the increase in the electricity price, which is caused 
by increases in the Renewable Energy Act Surcharge (EEG-Umlage), which is part of the 
electricity bill.
 39
  Taxes and surcharges constituted 45 percent of the final consumer price for 
electricity in 2013 (IEA, 2013). Schumacher et al. (2015) discern that an increasing number of 
                                                 
39
 For details on the composition of households’ electricity price in Germany, refer to Section 2.4. 
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German households cannot afford to pay their energy bills due to increasing prices of 
necessities like electricity
40
 and housing, and stagnating incomes. In addition, the risk of 
income poverty in Germany has increased by 12.1 percent:  from 14 percent in 2006 to 15.7 
percent in 2015 (Statista (2016)). Up-to-date, most of the studies for Germany measure 
poverty based on disposable equivalent income, i.e. income after income taxes plus transfers, 
adjusted for household size. Grabka et al. (2015) find that the risk of poverty among the 
German population grew considerably between 2000 and 2009 but stagnated between 2010 
and 2012. The results of Grabka et al. (2012) show that young adults among the age groups 
and single adults and single parents among the household types are at highest poverty risk. 
However, none of those studies have considered the potential effect of energy taxes or energy 
expenditures on poverty in Germany.  
Energy and (or) environmental taxes and surcharges have been introduced in many 
European countries, with the aim to reduce energy consumption and to finance a greener 
energy production. In Germany, one of the pioneer countries when it comes to renewable 
energy, the Renewable Energy Act Surcharge (EEG Umlage) 
41
 is implemented since 2000 as 
means to finance the production of electricity from Renewable Energy Sources (RES). The 
EEG surcharge is calculated as the difference between the Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs) paid by 
utilities for renewable energy and the revenues from sales of that energy. This surcharge is 
also the main driver of the electricity price increase in Germany (the EEG surcharge has 
increased by 80 percent increase since 2001 while the before tax electricity price only by 2 
percent). Neuhoff et al. (2013) find that because of the raising surcharge, electricity share in 
spending will increase to 2.5 percent in 2013, 0.5 percent of which is the surcharge.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, income 
poverty is measured by taking energy taxes and surcharges into consideration. Secondly, the 
development of energy poverty among German households is analysed. In addition, the 
impact of income poverty on energy poverty is studied with a probit model. Third of all, the 
impact of energy taxes on income poverty and energy poverty is further scrutinized with the 
help of tax simulations, which rely on estimates from an energy demand system. Furthermore, 
the paper uses a very recent data set and focuses on measuring energy poverty in Germany 
unlike the previous studies which just compared a set of indicators, without providing a 
concrete conclusion. Last but not least, the relationship between poverty and energy taxes is 
                                                 
40
 The study states that in 2011 alone, 322,000 cases of disconnection from the electricity grid have been 
reported and this number might be even higher in reality.  
41
  The Renewable Energy Act (EEG) was introduced to ensure sustainable energy supply for the future and 
development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES). For more 
details see Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2016. 
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graphically analysed by considering the trade-offs between poverty and energy surcharges or 
taxes.  
The descriptive evidence reveals that income poverty, measured at the individual 
level, has increased by around 31.6 percent between 1993 and 2013.
 
That is, if the headcount 
ratio is calculated using disposable equivalent income and 60 percent of the median 
disposable equivalent income is used as the poverty line. Once the headcount ratio is 
calculated on disposable equivalent income after electricity taxes and car fuels taxes, income 
poverty is higher for all years.
42
 On top of less income available to meet the needs for 
necessities, the price of electricity for households increased from 0.143 euros/kWh in 1993 to 
0.268 euros/kWh in 2013 (87 percent price growth over 20 years period). So the increasing 
prices of electricity, other energy goods, and housing, made it gradually more difficult for 
low-income households to afford their energy bills, which in turn led to growing energy 
poverty among German households. Energy poverty, using the ten percent rule (TPR) of 
energy expenditures share in income, has more than tripled in the period 1993–2013. Energy 
poverty is particularly pronounced among single parent households, households with 
unemployed or self-employed leaders, and households in rural areas. Probability of becoming 
energy poor is confirmed to be higher for the aforementioned categories of households as well 
as for households which are income poor. The elasticites obtained from the energy demand 
system indicate that electricity is a necessity good in Germany, with moderately low price 
elasticity (–0.235) that is especially low among high income households (–0.174). 
The paper investigates four alternative policy scenarios: doubling of the EEG 
surcharge, abolishing of the EEG surcharge, doubling or abolishing of the car fuels tax (CFT) 
accompanied by equivalent change in EEG. Doubling of the surcharge increases the 
electricity tax burden for all income deciles but the increase is highest percentage of income 
for the poorest households. Both income and energy poverty would increase by 1.4 and 13.3 
percent respectively while CO2 emissions coming from electricity decrease by around 9 
percent. Doubling of both the CFT and the EEG surcharge, leads to 5.1 percent increase in 
income poverty and 55.1 percent increase in energy poverty. Under such reform, CO2 
emissions would be 9.1 percent lower than in the status quo. If on the contrary the EEG is 
abolished, electricity related emissions would increase by around 6 percent. Energy poverty 
will decrease by 10.4 percent and income poverty will be 1.8 percent lower. The poorest 
households would benefit from elimination of the electricity tax also by having lower energy 
                                                 
42
 The poverty lines are defined to be 60 percent of the median disposable equivalent  income and 60 percent of 
the median disposable equivalent  income after energy taxes respectively.   
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tax burdens. When the CFT is also abolished, income poverty and energy poverty decrease by 
7.2 and 48.7 percent respectively and electricity related emissions increase by 12.3 percent.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the 
existing literature while Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 outlines the estimation 
methods and Section 2.5 provides an overview of the empirical evidence. The scenarios’ 
design and results are outlined in Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 concludes the paper.  
 
2.2 Literature review  
 
There is a substantial set of international literature on energy poverty, the impacts of 
energy taxes (or surcharges) on the income distribution or on the environmental deterioration. 
Table 2.8 in the Appendix provides an overview of all the relevant household level studies, 
which deal with energy demand, distributive effects, energy poverty, or emissions analyses.  
It is often argued that poor households spend a larger share of their income on energy 
taxes than rich households implying that energy taxes have regressive effects. According to 
this argument, higher energy taxes would affect the lower income households particularly 
hard (Flues and Thomas (2015)). One stream of the literature relies on the development of 
electricity tax burden across income deciles to investigate its impact on the income 
distribution, while ignoring the behavioral responses of the households. For instance, 
Jacobsen et al. (2003) find that taxing electricity as a necessity good harms the lowest income 
groups more than the richer ones in Denmark.  Flues and Thomas (2015) also provide 
evidence that electricity taxes are regressive in Germany. Withana et al. 2013 finds that in 
terms of distributional impacts, the electricity tax in Germany (as part of the Environmental 
Tax Reform-ETR) has demonstrated elements of regressivity.
43
 
Other studies
44
 investigate the impact of electricity taxes or surcharges by employing 
demand systems with the aim to include behavioral reactions while providing partial 
equilibrium analyses (restricted to the household sector only). Two such papers have 
considered the effects of electricity tax changes. Combining energy demand system and tax 
simulations, Brännlund and Nordström (2004) find evidence that a CO2 tax on electricity is 
regressive in Sweden. Gahvari and Tsang (2011) prove that an energy tax (on electricity) is 
                                                 
43
 ETR schemes in Denmark, Finland, Ireland and British Colombia were also found to be regressive. 
44
 Studies that deal with demand systems (including behavioral reponses) and impact of energy taxes on the 
income distribution include West and Williams III (2004), Beznoska (2014), Tiezzi (2005), Dumagan and Mount 
(1992), et cetera. Filipinni (1995) and Kohn and Missong (2003) estimate energy demand systems but refrain 
from distributional or poverty analyses.  
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detrimental for consumer welfare in the U.S., in spite of its environmental benefits. Neither of 
those studies have conducted detailed poverty analyses.  
Even though many studies
45
 have investigated the impact of energy taxes (including 
but not limited to electricity tax) on the income distribution, the effects of taxes or surcharges 
on poverty has barely received any attention in the existing literature. The only study I came 
across is the one of Klauss (2016), which by means of partial equilibrium model estimates 
how an energy price change influences poverty. Using Armenian data, the author finds that 40 
percent increase in the gas price leads to 2.8 percent higher poverty among households and 8 
percent of households shifting away from gas. Still, he does not consider the separate effects 
of energy taxes on poverty nor does he consider the behavioral responses of households. 
Meyer and Sullivan (2009) have analysed the impact of income taxes on poverty in the U.S. 
Their results confirm that poverty has declined due to changes in the income tax policy, 
particularly for families with children. 
Fourth set of research deals with the determinants of energy poverty and the role of 
energy expenditures (including taxes and surcharges) in pushing individuals or households 
below the poverty line. Legendre and Ricci (2015) propose a fuel vulnerability definition: 
households are fuel vulnerable if they are pushed into income poverty because of their 
domestic (heating) energy expenses. The authors estimate a logit model on the probability of 
being fuel poor in France and find evidence that the probability is higher for retired people, 
single adult households, tenants, and households with low energy performance of their 
dwelling. Having higher education and using district heating systems are associated with 
lower chance of becoming fuel poor. 
A fifth stream of literature investigates the overlap between income poverty and 
energy poverty, as well as the other determinants of energy poverty in partial equilibrium 
settings. Gonzales-Eguino (2015) claims that energy poverty is a reflection of both income 
inequality and income poverty. Households with low income have lower or inadequate energy 
consumption and are unable to invest in electric appliances and housing improvements, which 
is then manifested as energy poverty. Energy poverty could create a poverty trap and hence, 
the author recommends that energy poverty should be reduced by reducing absolute (income) 
poverty. Palmer et al. (2008) shown that in 2005, 75 percent of the fuel poor in England were 
also income poor.  The authors find descriptive evidence that being a single adult (both 
working age and pensioners) or being a rural poor household is a big factor behind fuel 
                                                 
45
 Other studies which deal with the distributive effects of energy taxes include: Araar et al. (2014), Oladsu and 
Rose (2007), Grösche and Schröder (2014), and many others.  
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poverty in England. A significant relationship between energy poverty and income poverty is 
also found in Papada and Kaliampakos (2016) for Greek households. Households under the 
income poverty threshold are much more likely to be energy poor (9 out of 10 households) 
than households above the threshold (4 out of 10 households).  Heindl (2014) finds that half 
of the German households which are identified as fuel poor are pushed below the poverty line 
after expenditures on energy.  
 
2.3 Data description 
 
2.3.1 Income concepts for the poverty analyses 
 
The Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) represents a comprehensive cross-sectional 
dataset, containing in-depth information on income, expenditures and characteristics of 
households in Germany. The households are asked to record their disposable income and 
wealth accumulation during the whole year. In addition, since 1998 they report expenditures 
on non-durables such as food during a four week period, while for some durable commodities 
or fuels they report their annual expenditures.   
The focus is put on the most recent waves after the reunification of Germany, namely 
1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. The 2013 wave of the IES has become available only 
recently and this study is among the first ones to use it in such detailed poverty and energy 
demand analyses. As there are differences in the classification of the goods and also in the 
households characteristics between the five surveys, achieving comparability and including 
the 2013 data wave was a complex assignment. The data waves must be high quality, 
comparable, and random so that to ensure that the requirements for an estimation of the 
energy demand system are met. Expenditures categories were carefully aggregated by 
following the original survey definitions and the same procedure was applied for the 
demographic characteristics across all five waves. After the data cleaning, 219,826 
households, across five time periods, are incorporated in the empirical analyses.
46
 Several 
household types are formed according to the number and age of household members: 
household type 1 – single adults; household type 2 – single parents; household type 3 – two 
adults no children; household type 4 – two and more adults with children.  
Before calculating the poverty indicators, the development of income, energy tax 
burdens, and energy expenditures should be considered (see Table 2.1). Energy expenditures 
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 Please refer to Section 1.3.1 in Chapter 1 for the specificities of the IES data preparation. 
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are important for the calculation of the income poverty and energy poverty indicators. 
Disposable income has been steadily increasing (in nominal terms) between 1993 and 2008 
but between 2008 and 2013 it stagnated. Disposable equivalent income (disposable income 
adjusted according to the modified OECD equivalence scale) has also been steadily increasing 
due to growing income but also to decreasing household size. While income grew by around 
37 percent, electricity expenditures electricity expenditures increased on average by 52 
percent; car fuels expenditures more than doubled during the twenty years period. Total 
energy expenditures (including electricity, car fuels, gas and central heating) increased by 64 
percent by 2013 relative to 1993. The tax burden for car fuels was around 330 euros in 1993 
and reached 571 euros in 2013 and the electricity tax and surcharge burden was around 42 
euros in 1993 but reached 274 euros in 2013, demonstrating that the average German 
household has been faced with constantly increasing burdens for energy goods.   
 
Table 2. 1 Development of variables relevant for measuring poverty 
 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Variable Mean 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 28708.220 31426.280 33898.480 34692.720 36805.630 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑞  18210.710 20479.610 22324.790 23233.660 24929.150 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  554.758 521.153 601.535 694.849 840.644 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  661.077 639.048 836.839 1089.509 920.666 
𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
 
 604.102 771.925 990.534 1174.111 1229.165 
𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 41.549 29.014 76.795 119.111 273.607 
𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 329.308 456.179 698.937 611.335 570.766 
Note. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 is disposable income, 𝑒 and 𝑡 stand for expenditures and tax burden. 
Weighted to assure representativeness of the German population.  
 
2.3.2 Variables for the demand system 
 
The following IES variables are needed for the demand system estimation: 
expenditures shares of food (food at home and food at restaurants) and nonalcoholic drinks; 
expenditures shares of electricity; expenditures shares of other fuels (gas, district heating, 
liquid and fossil fuels); expenditures shares of car fuels (gasoline and diesel); expenditures 
shares of residual expenditures (including education, leisure, furniture, hygiene products, 
communication, and housing); total expenditures (the sum of all expenditures); number and 
age of household members; place of residence; and frequency weights.
 47
 Then the IES data 
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 For descriptive statistics of the variables necessary for the demand system, refer to Table 2.9 in the Appendix. 
Table 2.10 includes the same variables across the different household types.  
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has to be combined with consumer prices, and in particular Stone Price Indices (SPIs) for the 
specific expenditures categories. 
48
 
 
2.4 Estimation techniques: A Demographically-Scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal 
Demand System (DQUIDS), price elasticites, and scenarios analyses 
 
In order to assess the effects of a policy change, a reliable framework is provided by a 
demand system because it allows for consumer behavior responses while it satisfies some 
necessary economic assumptions. Out of the many different types of demand systems, a 
Demographically-Scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (DQUAIDS)
49
 is chosen 
for the analyses because of its desirable empirical properties outlined in Section 1.4.1 of 
Chapter 1.  
As mentioned earlier, it is crucial to obtain price elasticities for the scenario analyses. 
The own and cross price elasticities are useful because they express the effect of price or tax 
change i.e. the percentage change in energy consumption that would result from one percent 
change in the price of specific good. Here, the elasticities from a DQUAIDS were obtained.
 50
 
Namely, the uncompensated price elasticity is calculated in the following manner: 
 
 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑢 =
𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑤𝑖
− 𝛿𝑖𝑗 (2.1) 
 
where, 
  
 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 ≡  
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕ln (𝑝𝑗)
= 𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖(𝛼𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑘ln (𝑝𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 )) − {
(𝜆𝑖(𝛽𝑗+∑ 𝜃𝑖s𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1 )
𝑏(𝑝)𝑐(𝑝,𝑧)
} {(ln(𝑚) −
ln (𝑎)) − ln(1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑧s
𝑡
𝑠=1 )}
2, 
(2.2) 
 
and 𝑤𝑖 is the expenditure share of good 𝑖 in total expenditures 𝑚; 𝑝𝑗 stands for the price of the 
good 𝑗; 𝑎(𝑝) is the subsistence level; 𝑧s stands for the demographic variables; 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑡 
denotes the number of demographic variables; 𝑏(𝑝) represents the bliss level; 𝑐(𝑝, 𝑧) is a 
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 Table 2.9 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of the logarithm of prices for the years 1993–2013. 
49
 For details on methodology, please refer to the Sections 1.4.1 and 1.9.2 of Chapter 1. 
50
 The paper closely follows Banks et al. (1997), Ray (1983), Blacklow et al. (2010), and Poi (2012) estimation 
techniques while it corrects for potential endogeneity (see Section 1.9.2.2 of the Appendix in Chapter 1). In order 
to ease notation, household and time period subscripts are suppressed.  
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simple Coubb-Douglas price aggregator;
 51
 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖𝑗, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖 are the parameters estimated 
from the demand system, and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is the Kroneker delta, 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 = 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. 
Once the demand system estimates and the elasticities are obtained, scenarios 
involving different electricity price change reforms are considered. Before that the breakdown 
of the final electricity price for households is considered.  The Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) defines post-tax total prices (POTP) as the sum of the commodity 
price, regulated transmission and distribution charges, and retail components (billing, 
metering, customer services, and a fair margin on such services) plus value-added tax, levies 
(local, national, and environmental), and any other surcharges.
 52
 
The following equation illustrates the breakdown of electricity price for German households 
in 2013: 
 𝑝𝑒 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝐸𝐷𝑒 + 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝑒 + 𝐶𝐹𝑒) ∗ (1 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇) (2.3) 
 
where 𝑝𝑝  represents the producer price, it was 0.143 euros per kWh (which included the costs 
of energy procurement and sales, network charges, measurement and billing; 𝐸𝐷𝑒  denotes the  
electricity tax or duty,
 53
 which amounted to 0.0205 euros per kWh; 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝑒  stands for the 
Renweable Energy Act Surcharge, which amounted to 0.0528 euros per kWh; 𝐶𝐹𝑒 denotes the 
concession fee, which was 0.0179 euros per kWh; 𝑉𝐴𝑇 denotes the value added tax. 54 The 
final consumer price, 𝑝𝑒, was 0.268 euros per kWh in 2013, which is among the highest 
electricity prices in Europe. 
To explore the effects of electricity price change through changes in the German EEG 
surcharge, the approach of Banks et al. (1997) is used.  The amount of the EEG surcharge is 
changed upwards or downwards, and then the after-price change expenditure functions, 
indirect utility function, subsistence, and bliss levels are derived (all of these functions are 
available in the Appendix of Chapter 1: Section 1.9.2.1). The effects of the price change on 
income poverty, energy poverty, energy tax burdens, and CO2 emissions are considered. In 
several scenarios, the price of car fuels is also changed together with the electricity price.  
                                                 
51
 For details concerning the subsistence and bliss levels, cost function, indirect utility function, please refer to 
Section 1.9.2.1 in the Appendix of Chapter 1.   
52
 See International Energy Agency (2013). 
53
 The electricity duty, as part of the Germany’s Ecological Tax Reform, is imposed on the basis of the 
Electricity Duty Act of 24 March 1999 and the Electricity Duty Implementing Ordinance of 31 May 2000. See 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014b and 2014c. 
54
 The Value Added Tax is imposed on the basis of the Value Added Tax Act of 15 July 2006. See Value Added 
Tax Act, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2014. See Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection, 2014d. 
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In order to measure income poverty, the paper implements the Foster, Greer, and 
Thorbecke (FGT) indicator. The general formula of the FGT indicator takes the following 
form:
 55
  
 
   𝐹𝐺𝑇𝛼 =
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑧
)
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1
 (2.4) 
 
𝑛 is the population size, 𝑞 represents the number of poor (households with income below the 
poverty line 𝑧), 𝑦𝑖 is the household income and 𝛼 represents the sensitivity parameter. If 𝛼 is 
set at zero, one obtains measure of the headcount ratio (proportion of households which fall 
below the poverty line). If 𝛼 is set to one, the poverty gap is obtained and if it set at two, the 
squared poverty gap is computed. The poverty gap indicator shows how far below the poverty 
line households are affected and indicates whether the situation has improved i.e. if the poor 
move closer to the poverty line.  The squared poverty gap indicator considers both the 
distance separating the poor from the poverty line and the inequality among the poor (higher 
burden is put on households far away from the poverty threshold). The depth and severity of 
poverty are hence measured with the poverty gap and squared poverty gap indicators. To see 
the effect of changes in the price of electricity on poverty, the change in the poverty measure 
on disposable equivalent income net of energy taxes is computed before and after the price 
change.  
The paper goes one step further by incorporating energy taxes in the poverty analyses. 
Both  𝑧  and 𝑦𝑖 from equation (2.4) are assumed to be affected by energy taxes. The poverty 
line, 𝑧, is chosen to be 60 percent of the median disposable equivalent income56 after energy 
taxes. 𝑦𝑖 is also lower by the amount of energy taxes (including electricity and car fuels 
taxes).  In the tax simulation scenarios, the poverty line remains unaffected by a change in a 
specific energy tax. The amount of disposable equivalent income changes with the tax 
change.  The poverty levels before the tax change (status quo) are calculated in the following 
manner: 
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 See Foster et al. (1984). 
56
 Disposable equivalent income is disposable income divided by modified OECD equivalence scale (1 + 0.5 ∗
(𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 − 1) + 0.3 ∗ 𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛). 
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 𝐹𝐺𝑇𝛼
0 =
1
𝑛
∑ (
(0.6 ∗ 𝑟50(
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
0
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
) − (
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
0
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
)
(0.6 ∗ 𝑟50(
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
0
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
)
)
𝛼
𝑞
𝑖=1
. (2.5) 
 
The poverty levels after the tax change are calculated in the following manner: 
 
 𝐹𝐺𝑇𝛼
1 =
1
𝑛
∑ (
(0.6 ∗ 𝑟50(
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
0
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
) − (
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
1
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
)
(0.6 ∗ 𝑟50(
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝0 − 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
0
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒
)
)
𝛼
,
𝑞
𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
 
where 𝑟50 indicates the median value, 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 stands for the modified OECD equivalence 
scale, superscript zero means before the tax change (status quo) and superscript one indicates 
after the tax change.  
Households that live with inadequate amount of energy services are defined as energy 
poor. Any energy poverty definition should take into account equalized incomes, housing 
cost, fuels costs, and minimum income standards (MIS). Following Heindl (2014) and sources 
therein, I use two alternative measures of energy poverty (the ten percent rule (TRP) and  the 
twice median expenditure share (2M) rule) that have been proven to have the desirable 
properties.  First, the total energy expenditure share in income is derived:  
 
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 =
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑠 + 𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝
 . (2.7) 
 
The ten percent rule (TRP) classifies households that spend more than ten percent of 
their income on energy services as energy poor. The twice median (2M) rule classifies  
households as energy poor if their energy expenditures share in income exceed twice the 
median energy expenditures share of the population. Heindl and Schüster (2015) find that the 
TPR and the MIS fare well from a dynamic perspective, i.e. they properly measure changes in 
energy poverty over time. Moore (2012) on the other hand favors relative poverty measures 
(using multiples of the median energy expenditures) to absolute fuel poverty (using the ten 
percent of income cutoff).  
Following Legendre and Ricci (2015), a probit model could be estimated to 
empirically test for the factors explaining energy or fuel poverty. The general probit model 
can be defined as:  
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 Pr(Y = 1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑘) = Ф(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘) (2.8) 
 
where Pr(Y = 1) in this case stands for the probability of being energy poor to be equal to 
one,  Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) and 𝑋𝑖 are the 
explanatory variables.
57
 The marginal effects from the probit model are not constant (they 
depends on the position in the distribution) and cannot be directly interpreted.  
The environmental criterion involves comparisons of the direct electricity related as 
well as the direct car fuels related CO2 emissions for the status quo and the alternative 
scenarios. The change in tax burdens should measure the impact of the price change on the 
income distribution.
58
 Finally, the relationship between income poverty, energy poverty, and 
energy taxes is then analysed by means of graphical representations. 
 
2.5 Empirical evidence 
2.5.1 Development of income and energy poverty 
 
When measuring income poverty, Heindl (2014) recommends to use equivalent 
income as welfare measure, 60 percent of median income as poverty line and to estimate 
several poverty indicators. As a next step, poverty in Germany is calculated on disposable 
equivalent income and disposable equivalent income after energy taxes (electricity and car 
fuels taxes) using three poverty indices: the headcount ratio, poverty gap, and squared poverty 
gap. For comparison purposes, poverty is also calculated on equivalent expenditures and 
equivalent expenditures after energy taxes.  Sixty percent of the median of the respective 
variable (equivalent disposable income or equivalent expenditures) is used as poverty line in 
both cases.  
Figure 2.1 presents the patterns of income poverty over time and it shows an overall 
upward trend. The headcount ratio (alpha is set to zero in equation (2.4)) indicates that 10.35 
percent of individuals were in income poverty in 1993 while the percentage increased to 
13.62 in 2013 (solid line). But between 2008 and 2013 poverty did not increase but rather 
decreased by 0.5 percent. For comparison of those results with other studies on poverty in 
Germany see Table 2.11 in the Appendix.  So, the calculations show that income poverty has 
grown by 31.59 percent during the past twenty years. The income poverty is higher in every 
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 See Wooldridge (2010), pages 387–388.  
58
 See Section 1.4.3 in Chapter 1 for details on how CO2 emissions and tax burdens are calculated.  
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following period if income after energy taxes
59
 is considered and the gap between poverty 
measured on income and poverty measured on income after energy taxes widens over time. 
The headcount ratio calculated on disposable equivalent income after energy taxes is almost 
ten percent higher than the headcount ratio calculated on disposable equivalent income in 
2013. But the overall increase in poverty between 1993 and 2013 is almost the same:  31.27 
percent increase (from 11.11 percent in 1993 to 14.91 percent in 2013 (dashed line in Figure 
2.1)). The data tables of Statista (2016) also show a slight upward trend for income poverty in 
Germany in the past ten years. For the U.S., Meyer and Sullivan (2009) find that relative 
income poverty rose in the early 1980s, but since 1990 the changes in relative poverty have 
been small.  
 
 
Figure 2. 1 Headcount ratio over time 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. Solid line stands for poverty calculated on disposable 
equivalent income while dashed line stands for poverty calculated on disposable equivalent income minus 
energy taxes. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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 The paper only considers electricity and car fuels taxes. Taxes on gas or district heating are not considered but 
it is expected that poverty will be even higher if these energy taxes are taken into consideration.  
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The poverty gap (alpha is set to one in equation (2.4)) and the squared poverty gap 
(alpha is set to two in equation (2.4))  demonstrate that income poverty in  Germany   has  
deepened after 1993. Figure 2.2 shows the upward trend in the poverty gap as indicator of 
income poverty.  While the poverty gap of income after energy taxes is 0.0296 in 2013, it is 
almost half of that or 0.0172 in 1993.  The poor individuals have moved further away from 
the poverty line in the period between 1993 and 2013. In both cases, poverty is significantly 
higher when energy taxes are taken into account.  
 
 
Figure 2. 2 Poverty gap over time 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. Solid line stands for poverty calculated on disposable 
equivalent income while dashed line stands for poverty calculated on equivalent income minus energy taxes. 
Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
Total household’s expenditures should be a proper measure of permanent income. 
Poverty measured on equivalent expenditures
60
 is lower than poverty measured on equivalent 
income for all three poverty indices. The HC ratio shows percentage of people below the 
poverty line is 9.31 in 1993, drops to 7.03 percent by 2003 and increases afterwards. If one 
looks at the expenditures after energy taxes, 10.41 percent of the German population were 
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 Please refer to Figures 2.5 and 2.6 in the Appendix. 
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poor in 1993, 8.90 percent in 2003, and 9.80 percent in 2013 (HC ratio). The poverty gap 
indicates that individuals moved closer to the poverty line between 1993 and 2003 and moved 
further away from the poverty line after 2003.  
The results further show that energy poverty, as measured by the TPR, was relatively 
low before 2000: only 6.24 and 7.46 percent of Germans were energy poor in 1993 and 1998 
(dashed line on the Figure 2.3).  But after the environmental taxes on several energy goods 
were introduced in 1999, increasing in several steps, the German population become 
increasingly energy poor and less able to afford their energy bills. By 2003, energy poverty 
more than doubled in comparison to 1993. In 2013, 22.05 percent of German citizens were 
under the energy poverty threshold. Still, it is striking that energy poverty in Germany more 
than tripled during the 1993–2013 period. The increase does appear to be sizeable but if the 
development of the energy expenditure share in income over time is considered, it is to be 
expected. The median expenditure share has increased by around 44 percent between 1993 
and 2013 and the variance of the expenditure share has also increased. Moreover, the whole 
distribution of the energy share gets flatter, shifts to the right (including the mode), and the 
tail gets fatter over time. All of those factors have made it easier for a households to exceed 
the TPR threshold.
61
 Furthermore, as already mentioned all energy prices either doubled or 
more than doubled during the period and income did not increase enough to compensate for 
the price increases. There are also large differences in energy expenditures and poverty 
between the households living in east and west Germany, with households in the east having 
larger increases in expenditures and poverty relative to the west. 
The second energy poverty indicator indicates whether energy expenditures are higher 
than twice the median expenditures – following the 2M rule. An interesting observation is that 
the 2M rule actually coincides with TPR for the years 1993 and 1998. The development of 
this energy poverty indicator demonstrates a more stable development between 1993 and 
2013 but still an upward trend (solid line in Figure 2.3). In 1993, 10.17 percent of individuals 
were energy poor while 9.85 percent were poor in 1998. This numbers are slightly higher than 
the energy poverty measured using the TPR.  According to  the 2M after 1998 the energy 
poverty was increasing and reached 12.43 percent in 2013. So, following  this measure shows 
that energy poverty increased by 22 percent in Germany during the past twenty years. The 
shift in the median energy expenditures share, as explained before, has made it more difficult 
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 The kernel density functions of the energy expenditure share in income for each year of the IES data are 
provided in Figure 2.7 in The Appendix.  
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for households to exceed the 2M threshold and be qualified as energy poor according to this 
indicator.  
 
 
Figure 2. 3 Energy poverty over time 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013.Dash and dotted line indicates energy poverty calculated 
using the ten percent rule (TPR) while solid line indicate energy poverty calculated using the twice median 
expenditures (2M) rule. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
2.5.2 On the relationship between income poverty and energy poverty  
 
In order for income poverty policies to have impact on energy poverty as well, there 
has to be an overlap between income poverty and energy poverty. The results in Table 2.2 
indicate that around one quarter of the households that are energy poor are also income poor 
throughout the 1993–2013 period. The proportion of energy poor households, which are also 
income poor, reached 5.7 percent in 2013, almost four times larger than the proportion in 
1993. This could indicate that income poverty is rather an important determinant of energy 
poverty. The share of energy poor households, which do not fall under income poverty, also 
increased by more than four times during this period. Similarly, the proportion of income poor 
households that are not energy poor has grown by around 55 percent.  
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Income poverty and energy poverty can be related to the type of employment status of the 
household’s leader. German households with an unemployed leader are at highest risk of 
income poverty and households with a retired leader are at second highest risk, both of which 
show an upward trend since 1993 (refer to Table 2.12 in the Appendix). Urban households are 
more likely to become income poor than rural ones. The risk of energy poverty is again 
highest among the unemployed and second highest for the self-employed. A household with 
unemployed leader is twice as likely to be energy poor as a household with employed leader. 
The rural households are more prone to energy poverty in comparison to the urban households 
(in 2013 the percentage energy poor among rural was around twice the one of the urban). 
Palmer (2008) also found that energy poverty is higher among rural households in the U.K. 
 
Table 2. 2 The overlap between income poverty and energy poverty 
 
Income poor  
 
Income poor not 
energy poor 
 
Both income and 
energy poor 
Energy poor not 
income poor 
Energy poor 
 
 (percent of all households) 
1993 7.504 6.282 1.390 4.408 5.680 
1998 7.034 5.698 1.501 4.961 6.318 
2003 9.108 6.638 2.829 9.842 12.148 
2008 12.176 8.165 4.738 17.866 21.090 
2013 14.485 9.848 5.673 18.173 22.011 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. Weighted to assure representativeness of the German 
population. 
 
Using the probit model from equation (2.8), I empirically investigate the effect of 
income poverty on the probability of becoming energy poor. Several variables are included as 
controls in the different probit specifications: binary indicator for income poverty, household 
size, working status, education, and binary indicator for rural area of residence.
62
  
Correlations of the variables included in the different probit model specifications are low to 
moderate in order to avoid multicollinearity. The estimates from the first probit specification 
(see Table 2.13 in the Appendix) do indeed prove that being income poor has positive and 
significant impact on energy poverty in Germany. An income poor household has a 29.1 
percent chance to be energy poor.
63
 Households which are not income poor are three times 
less likely to become energy poor (10.6 percent probability) in comparison to income poor 
households. Living in rural area leads to higher probability of being energy poor (12.5 
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 The choice of controls follows Palmer (2008), and Legendare and Ricci (2015).  
63
 The marginal effect is calculated from the first specification without including any additional controls. The 
probability measured at the mean values of the variables in the third specification indicates 29.1 percent chance 
for poor household to become energy poor.  
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percent) than living in urban area (7.4 percent).
64
 A household with unemployed leader has a 
14.7 percent chance of becoming energy poor. Being self-employed increases the probability 
of energy poverty and being retired or living in bigger household reduces it. Those results are 
in line with the descriptive evidence of Table 2.12 in the Appendix. The fourth probit 
specification demonstrates that households with more income and more educated leaders tend 
to be less likely to be energy poor.  
 
2.5.3 Differences in poverty levels across household types 
 
Income poverty levels are different across the different household types in Germany. 
The most vulnerable category appears to be single parents and single adults are the second 
most vulnerable category. If disposable equivalent income is used to calculate the head count 
ratio, 29 percent of all single parent households are poor in 1993 and 34 percent in 2013. If 
disposable equivalent income after energy tax burdens is considered, 30 percent of all single 
parent households are poor in 1993 and 36 percent in 2013. 
As before, energy poverty is measured using two different indicators. Table 2.3 
indicates that single parent households have the highest energy poverty levels under the TPR 
but the 2M shows that households with two adults and children are most energy poor (this is 
also due to the fact that the second indicator does not take household size into account). 
During the period between 1993 and 2013, the TPR points out that energy poverty increased 
among all the household types, with the number of energy poor single parent households 
increasing by 188 percent.  The second indicator of energy poverty shows that poverty among 
two adult households with children increased by around 73 percent.  
 
Table 2. 3 Income and energy poverty by household types 
 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
𝐻𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 16.071 17.751 19.946 24.330 26.343 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 27.712 31.894 28.831 32.149 28.343 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 7.394 7.403 8.017 9.669 9.556 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 8.496 8.987 6.496 8.964 7.790 
𝐻𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠) 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 16.680 18.294 21.285 25.510 27.694 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 29.593 33.084 32.043 34.341 31.530 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 7.802 7.939 9.088 10.534 10.544 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 9.563 9.868 7.720 10.041 8.910 
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Table 2. 4 (Continued) 
 
 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑃𝑅) 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 7.762 8.366 13.887 20.609 20.394 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 9.057 9.125 16.636 27.016 26.534 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 4.759 4.883 10.105 18.917 20.181 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 4.126 5.109 10.140 18.259 18.135 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 (2𝑀) 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 0.961 0.953 0.760 1.110 1.452 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 4.848 3.797 4.187 3.959 5.484 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 6.044 5.894 6.483 8.300 11.037 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 15.879 15.257 17.125 20.776 26.967 
Note. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3  –two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 –  
two or more adults with children. Weighted to assure representativeness of the German population. 
 
2.5.4 Price and expenditure elasticites of energy demand 
 
The demand system estimates
65
 allow for calculation of the price and expenditure 
elasticities of the energy goods. The elasticies obtained from the demand system are included 
in Table 2.4.   Electricity is found to have rather low own price elasticity throughout 
Germany: for 1 percent increase in the price of electricity, demand would decrease by 0.235 
percent, holding everything else constant. So, price change policies are not expected to be 
very efficient in reducing electricity consumption. The expenditure elasticity of electricity 
demand is 0.496, which shows that electricity is a necessity and normal good among German 
households: given 1 percent increase in expenditures will lead to 0.496 percent higher demand 
for electricity.
66
 Car fuels are also a necessity good (elasticity is 0.994) and demand for fuels 
is price inelastic in Germany: for 1 percent price increase consumption would go down by 
0.316 percent.  
The elasticities in Table 2.4 also reveal that there are differences in price responses 
according to the level of income. Low income households have highest price elasticity of 
demand for electricity (–0.478) while high income households have lowest elasticity (–0.173) 
in absolute terms. Poor households in Germany are three times more responsive to electricity 
price changes in comparison to rich households. Murray (2012) finds higher elasticity for 
electricity among poor than among rich U.S. households. Car fuels demand is again most 
elastic for the poor income households and least elastic for high income households. Car fuels 
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 For details on the demand system coefficient estimates, please refer to Table 2.15 in the Appendix. Table 2.16 
compares the elasticities obtained from demographic and base (QU) AIDS. 
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 Table 2.17 in the Appendix provides comparison of price and expenditure elasticites with similar papers from 
the existing literature. 
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are also found to be luxury good for the first six deciles of disposable equivalent income. Poor 
and rich German households also differ by the amount of their total expenditures devoted on 
energy goods. Low income households pay 4.024 percent of their total expenditures on 
electricity while for high income households the share is only 2.415 percent (almost 40 
percent lower share than the poor). The reverse holds for car fuels: while the poor devote 
2.968 percent of total expenditures to car fuels the rich devote 4.551 percent.  
The price and income elasticities by household type are summarized in Table 2.14 in 
the Appendix. The table indicates that there are differences as well as similarities in demand 
responses of the various households’ types. The price elasticities show that single parent 
households are most responsive to electricity price changes while single adults are least 
responsive.  If the demand for car fuels is considered, single parents have highest price 
elasticity and couples without children have lowest price elasticity. 
Low income households can ration their energy expenditures and also ration the food 
budget when faced with higher energy prices. The cross price elasticitis reveal that food is 
complementary with electricity and other fuels among German households: as prices of 
energy goods would go up, food demand will tend to decrease, indicating a heat or eat 
behavior. Food demand will decrease by 0.097 if price of other fuels increases by 1 percent 
and will decrease by 0.003 percent if electricity price increases by 1 percent. Murray (2012) 
also finds that U.S. households consider food and energy to be complements, but the effects 
are larger. A one percent increase in natural gas price causes 0.47 percent reductions in the 
food at home expenditures and a one percent increase in electricity price causes reductions in 
the food at home by 0.14 percent. 
 
2.6 Scenarios design and results  
 
First of all, marginal (1 percent) changes in the EEG surcharge for 2013 are 
considered. Secondly, marginal changes of the car fuels tax
67
 in addition to the EEG 
surcharge are studied. Then varying between 100 percent reduction and 100 percent increase 
in EEG only and both EEG and car fuels tax so overall four main scenarios are scrutinized. 
Moreover, the impact of such changes on income and energy poverty, and the environment is 
analysed in detail.  
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 For details on the disaggregation and development of the car fuels tax and price, please refer to Section 1.4.2.  
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Table 2. 5 Elasticities and expenditure shares according to disposable equivalent income deciles 
Disposable 
equivalent 
income 
deciles 
Price elasticities Expenditure elasticities Expenditure shares (percent of total expenditures) 
 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
1 –1.006 –0.478 –0.718 –0.327 –1.130 0.560 0.581 0.776 1.550 1.140 21.381 4.024 4.691 2.968 66.936 
2 –1.006 –0.430 –0.704 –0.402 –1.133 0.525 0.576 0.783 1.301 1.145 20.189 3.449 4.169 3.938 68.255 
3 –1.008 –0.395 –0.695 –0.421 –1.134 0.498 0.571 0.782 1.189 1.147 18.927 3.232 3.912 4.313 69.616 
4 –1.009 –0.373 –0.688 –0.429 –1.134 0.477 0.570 0.783 1.119 1.148 17.935 3.095 3.779 4.529 70.662 
5 –1.010 –0.352 –0.683 –0.431 –1.135 0.456 0.568 0.784 1.060 1.149 17.102 3.027 3.705 4.694 71.472 
6 –1.011 –0.332 –0.677 –0.431 –1.134 0.440 0.564 0.778 1.022 1.148 16.336 2.964 3.660 4.823 72.217 
7 –1.012 –0.317 –0.672 –0.427 –1.134 0.422 0.563 0.776 0.979 1.148 15.616 2.839 3.611 4.906 73.028 
8 –1.014 –0.291 –0.665 –0.407 –1.133 0.392 0.558 0.770 0.914 1.148 21.381 2.761 3.561 4.929 73.946 
9 –1.017 –0.263 –0.658 –0.379 –1.132 0.344 0.551 0.759 0.842 1.146 20.189 2.642 3.501 4.843 75.142 
10 –1.028 –0.174 –0.617 –0.123 –1.128 0.239 0.526 0.705 0.371 1.142 18.927 2.415 3.342 4.551 77.671 
Germany –1.003 –0.235 –0.657 –0.316 –1.136 0.488 0.496 0.770 0.994 1.149 17.044 3.231 4.030 4.183 71.513 
SE 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.075 0.023 0.043 0.039 0.095 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
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2.6.1 Scenarios with marginal changes in EEG surcharge 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the results from the four marginal tax scenarios (S1–S4) and 
identifies the baseline scenario or the status quo (S0). The situation in 2013 is taken as the 
status quo: the electricity tax amounts to 0.0201 euros/kWh, the EEG surcharge amounts to 
0.0528 euros/kWh, and the energy tax on car fuels amounts to 0.606 euros/liter. The average 
German household pays 186 euros for the EEG surcharge, 72 euros for electricity tax, and 
575 euros for car fuels taxes (CFT) annually. The energy tax burdens for electricity and CFT 
represent 0.870 percent and 1.674 percent of income respectively. However, the tax payments 
in euros and as percentage of income differ largely between the poor and the rich families and 
also according to household type. In the status quo, the average household emits 1.649 tons of 
CO2 related to electricity and 1.912 tons of CO2 related to car fuels. Around 16 percent of the 
German households live in energy poverty and around 19 percent live in income poverty. All 
variables are predicted using the expenditures weights obtained from the demand system 
rather than using the actual expenditure shares.  
Under the first scenario (S1), the EEG surcharge is one percent higher than under the 
baseline. Electricity related emissions would go down by 0.12 percent while income poverty 
as measured by the headcount ratio would increase by 0.04 percent and energy poverty would  
increase by 0.63 percent.  Tax burden of electricity is around 0.12 percent lower than the 
status quo. If in addition to the EEG surcharge, the car fuels tax is increased by one percent 
(S3), income poverty is 0.05 percent higher than the baseline and energy poverty is 1.27 
percent higher. S2 considers one percent decrease in the EEG surcharge and S4 considers one 
percent decrease in both the EEG surcharge and in the CFT.  Under S2, electricity related 
emissions remain same as under the baseline (price change is too small), income poverty goes 
down by 0.05 percent, and energy poverty goes up by 0.63 percent. In the fourth scenario 
(S4), energy poverty is 1.27 percent lower and income poverty is 0.10 percent lower than 
under the baseline.  
 
2.6.2 Other potential scenarios  
 
Departing once again from the status quo, the changes in tax burdens, emissions, 
energy poverty, and income poverty are analysed for another four scenarios (S5–S8) across 
disposable equivalent income deciles and household types. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 include the 
Chapter 2. How Electricity Prices Alter Poverty and CO2 Emissions ‒ The Case of Germany           72 
 
 
   
Table 2. 6 Scenarios with marginal changes 
 S0 
S1: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 + 1% 
S2: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 1% 
S3: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 + 1%; 
𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 1% 
S4: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 1%;  
𝐶𝐹𝑇 − 1% 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Emissions electricity (t) 1.649 0.003 1.647 0.003 1.649 0.003 1.646 0.003 1.650 0.004 
Emissions car fuels (t) 1.912 0.005 1.911 0.005 1.911 0.005 1.907 0.005 1.915 0.005 
EEG surcharge (euros) 185.667 0.379 187.298 0.382 183.856 0.375 187.246 0.382 183.907 0.400 
Tax burden electricity (euros) 72.087 0.147 72.000 0.147 72.105 0.147 71.980 0.147 72.124 0.156 
Tax burden car fuels (euros) 574.607 1.362 574.150 1.361 574.290 1.361 578.802 1.372 569.618 1.347 
Income povery (𝐻𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) 18.785 0.002 18.792 0.000 18.775 0.000 18.796 0.000 18.767 0.000 
Income poverty 
(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝) 0.041 0.001 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.000 
Income poverty 
(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑎𝑝) 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 
Energy poverty (𝑇𝑃𝑅) 0.369 0.002 0.370 0.002 0.368 0.002 0.372 0.002 0.367 0.002 
Note. 𝐸𝐸𝐺 is the renewable energy surcharge and 𝐶𝐹𝑇 is the car fuels tax. All poverty indices are calculated on disposable equivalent income after energy taxes.
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results of S5: doubling of the EEG surcharge and S6: abolishing the EEG surcharge 
respectively. Tables 2.18 and 2.19 in the Appendix include the results from S7: doubling of 
both the EEG surcharge and the CFT and S8: abolishing both the EEG surcharge and the 
CFT. 
Under S5, the electricity tax burden (the sum of EEG surcharge and electricity tax) 
increases for all income deciles but the increase is highest percentage for the low income 
households (0.69 percent of income). Withana et al. (2013) finds that the electricity tax is 
mainly born by low income households in Germany.  The households in the first decile have 
also the largest percentage decrease in electricity related emissions (9.47 percent) while the 
households in the tenth decile will have smallest emissions reductions (4.32 percent) as they 
have the lowest price elasticity. The households in the top income deciles experience largest 
increase in energy poverty
68
 of above 20 percent relative to the baseline. If the effects across 
the different household types are analysed, it appears that single parents have largest increase 
in electricity tax burden and largest emissions decrease if the EEG is doubled. Single adult 
households are least responsive to the change in the EEG surcharge so they would have 
smallest consumption and emissions reductions. Income poverty increases the most among 
two adults’ households without children and energy poverty among two adults’ households 
with children. 
Abolishment of the EEG surcharge makes the electricity price 22 percent price lower, 
leads to 109 euros lower energy tax burden for the low income households and 250 euros 
lower burden for the high income households. The decrease in tax burden as percent of 
income is largest for low income German households and also among the single parents. The 
poorest households have largest emissions increase  of 11.41 percent and the single parent’s 
households also emit 8.90 percent more CO2 emissions than under the baseline scenario. 
In spite of largest tax burdens decreases among poor and single parents households, it 
is the households in the tenth decile that experience largest decrease in energy poverty of 
around 30 percent relative to S0. Among the different household types, the two adults’ 
households with children will have largest income poverty decrease  (3.25 percent) and 
largest energy poverty decrease (17.3 percent). Overall, income poverty is 2 percent lower 
and energy poverty almost 14 percent lower. Aasnesss et al. (2002) also find evidence that 
reduced electricity tax increase equality in the income distribution and improves consumer 
welfare.  
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Table 2. 7 Scenario 5 (doubling of the EEG surcharge) results across income deciles and household types 
 Electricity tax burden Electricity emissions 
Income poverty  
(HC ratio) 
Energy poverty 
(TPR) 
 euros % of income tons % change before after before  after 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
1 88.054 32.951 0.688 0.117 –0.095 0.034 –9.473 1.006 1.000 1.000 33.356 36.664 
2 114.153 43.711 0.579 0.093 –0.110 0.043 –8.660 1.181 0.659 0.685 26.973 29.620 
3 132.124 49.812 0.524 0.089 –0.118 0.047 –8.085 1.373 0.000 0.000 21.655 24.306 
4 147.610 57.179 0.482 0.086 –0.124 0.053 –7.713 1.565 0.000 0.000 17.757 20.538 
5 162.140 63.028 0.451 0.081 –0.130 0.057 –7.394 1.650 0.000 0.000 13.270 15.625 
6 170.999 66.950 0.422 0.082 –0.130 0.061 –7.051 1.885 0.000 0.000 8.986 10.627 
7 181.561 70.580 0.391 0.075 –0.133 0.061 –6.846 1.844 0.000 0.000 6.805 8.161 
8 193.635 78.055 0.368 0.082 –0.130 0.066 –6.399 2.208 0.000 0.000 3.794 4.635 
9 206.947 82.302 0.334 0.076 –0.128 0.069 –5.970 2.466 0.000 0.000 2.305 2.921 
10 226.009 93.571 0.286 0.084 –0.096 0.096 –4.322 4.433 0.000 0.000 1.353 1.623 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒             
1 95.392 28.289 0.494 0.151 –0.066 0.030 –7.052 3.017 0.329 0.332 17.158 19.165 
2 144.640 46.685 0.539 0.137 –0.125 0.033 –8.170 1.630 0.398 0.402 23.482 26.297 
3 172.756 54.869 0.461 0.152 –0.129 0.034 –7.495 2.217 0.138 0.140 15.272 17.281 
4 234.379 75.164 0.448 0.136 –0.190 0.040 –7.803 1.575 0.116 0.119 12.052 13.988 
Overall change 154.009 75.477 0.476 0.150 –0.118 0.060 –7.451 2.459 1.629 0.000 13.333 0.000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 – two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 – two or more adults with 
children. 
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Table 2. 8 Scenario 6 (abolishing the EEG surcharge) results across income deciles and household types 
 Electricity tax burden Electricity emissions 
Income poverty 
(HC ratio) 
Energy poverty 
(TPR) 
 euros % of income tons % change before after before after 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
1 –108.590 39.826 –0.849 0.132 0.114 0.042 11.406 1.931 1.000 1.000 33.356 29.925 
2 –138.328 52.197 –0.701 0.097 0.125 0.053 9.842 2.266 0.659 0.629 26.973 23.975 
3 –158.184 58.970 –0.625 0.092 0.127 0.060 8.737 2.635 0.000 0.000 21.655 18.806 
4 –175.355 67.117 –0.570 0.085 0.129 0.068 8.021 3.003 0.000 0.000 17.757 14.526 
5 –191.351 73.577 –0.530 0.081 0.130 0.073 7.408 3.167 0.000 0.000 13.270 11.710 
6 –200.443 77.617 –0.492 0.081 0.125 0.082 6.748 3.617 0.000 0.000 8.986 7.078 
7 –211.880 81.503 –0.455 0.074 0.124 0.081 6.354 3.539 0.000 0.000 6.805 5.538 
8 –223.728 88.230 –0.423 0.079 0.112 0.096 5.495 4.240 0.000 0.000 3.794 2.944 
9 –236.962 91.431 –0.381 0.072 0.100 0.106 4.670 4.735 0.000 0.000 2.305 1.641 
10 –250.494 97.705 –0.316 0.081 0.033 0.176 1.516 8.354 0.000 0.000 1.353 1.084 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒             
1 –110.486 25.225 –0.584 0.189 0.058 0.065 6.761 5.745 0.329 0.325 17.158 15.064 
2 –172.548 51.087 –0.649 0.169 0.133 0.051 8.899 3.131 0.398 0.388 23.482 20.841 
3 –202.118 52.975 –0.547 0.185 0.123 0.083 7.600 4.262 0.138 0.135 15.272 13.248 
4 –276.997 79.687 –0.533 0.163 0.192 0.072 8.183 3.028 0.116 0.113 12.052 9.964 
Overall change –180.681 84.038 –0.566 0.184 0.114 0.089 7.518 4.698 –2.123 0.000 –13.291 0.000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 – two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 – two or more adults with 
children.
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Doubling of the CFT, accompanied by doubling of the EEG surcharge (S7), increases 
both income poverty and energy poverty by 5.1 and 55.1 percent. Emissions among German 
households would decrease by 9.1 percent. When the CFT is abolished together with the EEG 
surcharge (S8), income poverty and energy poverty are 7.2 percent and 48.7 percent lower 
respectively, and emissions are 12.3 percent higher than under S0. Since the two goods are 
found to be complementary, having both goods cheaper also activates the income effect.  
Alternatively, I have constructed a scenario in which total energy related emissions for 
the average German household would increase by only 0.03 tons while energy tax burden is 
around 65 euros lower than the status quo and the welfare loss is only 4.8 euros.
69
 At the same 
time, income poverty is 0.79 percent lower and energy poverty is 5.3 percent lower. The 
above mentioned effects would follow from a scenario in which the EEG surcharge is 
abolished while the CFT is increased by 25 percent (S9).   If the EEG surcharge is abolished 
and the CFT is increased by 50 percent (S10), emissions would go down by 0.7 tons, tax 
burden will be 46 euro higher, and welfare loss is 140 euros (0.34 percent of income). Income 
poverty and energy poverty would both increase under S10. On the other hand, S9 will be 
very beneficial for the German households while assuring minimal environmental damage 
and revenue loss for the government. Such policy would allow for large reduction in energy 
costs for the households and reductions in energy poverty and income poverty, and should 
definitely be considered by policy makers as a potential alternative for reducing electricity 
prices while assuring adequate revenues for financing the green energy.  
 
2.6.3 The relationship between poverty and energy taxes 
 
Figure 2.4 includes a total of 6 graphs: the upper three graphs include the relationship 
between the EEG surcharge rate and the income poverty indicators (HC ratio and poverty 
gap) and between the EEG surcharge and the energy poverty indicator (TPR) and  the lower 
three graphs include the relationship between the car fuels tax rate (CFT)  and the income 
poverty indicators (HC ratio and poverty gap) and between the CFT and the energy poverty 
indicator (TPR).  Both income poverty indicators show a positive relationship between 
poverty and the surcharge: income poverty increases with higher levels of EEG surcharge. 
Energy poverty is also growing in the EEG surcharge, with more pronounced effects than 
income poverty. As an example, by changing the EEG surcharge from 0.026 to 0.0317 euros 
per kWh, energy poverty would shift from 14.8 to 15.0 percent while income poverty would  
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 See Table 2.20 in the Appendix.  
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Figure 2. 4 The relationship between energy taxes and income poverty and energy 
poverty 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
 
 
shift from 18.58 to 18.63 percent. Increases in the CFT will potentially also lead to higher 
levels of income poverty and energy poverty among German households. For instance, 
increasing the CFT from 0.303 to 0.363 euros per liter, would change income poverty from 
18.28 to 18.36 percent and energy poverty from 12.7 to 13.3 percent. The effect of changes in 
the CFT on both income poverty and energy poverty is more pronounced than the effect of the 
EEG surcharge changes. That might be a consequence of the price elasticities of demand as 
well as of proportion that each tax/surcharge represents in the respective energy price. In 
monetary terms, CFT is ten times higher than the EEG, and as percentage of prices they 
represent 0.390 and 0.197 percent of car fuels and electricity price respectively. Both car fuels 
and electricity are necessity goods among German households, and price elasticities are 0.316 
and 0.235 respectively. The trade-offs between EEG surcharge, CFT, and poverty levels are 
hence confirmed by the graph and should be considered and addressed in policy design. 
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2.7 Interim conclusion 
 
Reduction of both income poverty and energy poverty reduction are given high 
priority in the EU policy agenda. In Germany, income poverty has increased by around one 
third between 1993 and 2013. During the same time, the price of electricity for households 
increased by around 90 percent. Accordingly, the growing poverty together with the 
increasing electricity prices  
made it more difficult for households to afford their energy bills which in turn led to more 
than tripling of energy poverty among German households. I find empirical evidence that 
being income poor, unemployed, or living in rural residential area are all associated with 
higher probability of falling under energy poverty.  
The results from the energy demand system indicate that electricity is a necessity 
good, with relatively low elasticity of demand, demonstrating that price change polices will 
not be very efficient in reducing electricity consumption. The paper investigates the effect of 
change in the electricity price (though changing the EEG surcharge) on income poverty, 
energy poverty, and CO2 emissions. Four rather extreme scenarios are scrutinized; doubling 
or eliminating of the EEG surcharge, doubling or eliminating of both the EEG surcharge and 
the car fuels tax (CFT).  
Doubling of the EEG surcharge brings highest increase in the tax burden as percentage 
of income for the poorest households. Income poverty and energy poverty both increase while 
electricity related CO2 emissions decrease. If in contrast, the EEG is abolished electricity 
related emissions would grow, which is not a desirable environmental result. However, 
energy poverty will decrease by around 13 percent and income poverty will decrease by 
around 2 percent. The low income and the single parent households would benefit from 
elimination of the EEG surcharge also by having lower energy tax burdens. Doubling of the 
CFT, accompanied by doubling of the EEG surcharge, leads to 5.1 percent increase in income 
poverty and 55.1 percent increase in energy poverty. Electricity related CO2 emissions would 
decrease by 9.1 percent. When the CFT is abolished simultaneously with the EEG surcharge, 
income poverty and energy poverty are 7.2 percent and 48.7 percent lower respectively, and 
emissions are 12.3 percent higher.  
Hence, I identify a positive relationship between poverty and energy surcharges or 
taxes  is i.e. higher levels of EEG surcharge or CFT are associated with higher levels of 
income poverty and energy poverty in Germany. My results indicate a possibility of 
abolishing the EEG surcharge while increasing the CFT by one quarter. Overall energy tax 
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burden is slightly lower and energy related emissions increase by a very small amount while 
income poverty and energy poverty both decrease (Scenario 9). The higher CFT is expected 
to encourage switch towards more efficient vehicles or electric means of transportation.  Such 
policy reform should definitely be scrutinized by energy policy makers as it is promising 
minimal revenue loss for the government and minimal environmental damage while reducing 
energy poverty and income poverty levels. Especially unemployed people, households in rural 
areas (as they already have higher poverty levels), single parent households (due to lower tax 
burdens), and larger families (due to lower poverty levels) are likely to benefit the most from 
lower electricity prices.  
Alternatively, an energy solidarity payment could be introduced, as suggested by 
Grösche and Schröder (2014b). According to the authors, such payment will generate the 
same amount of revenues as the EEG surcharge but will assure more fair and proportional 
distribution of payments (as it will be calculated proportionally to income tax contributions 
and hence will be independent of consumption). Generating an adequate amount of revenues 
through solidarity payment will make room for abolishing either the EEG surcharge or the 
electricity tax. Renewable energy production could be sponsored through the solidarity 
payment and will lead to further shifting the electricity mix towards higher  proportion of 
RES (and less carbon) so in the long run electricity emissions will go down, despite the lower 
electricity price. Income poverty and energy poverty will also decrease once the electricity 
price is reduced. Cheaper and cleaner electricity could also further motivate the use of electric 
cars, which would lead to even lower CO2 emissions levels.  
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2.8 Appendix 
 
2.8.1 Tables  
 
Table 2. 9 Relevant household level studies and their contribution to literature 
Study Country, and time period Energy goods Behavioral 
responses 
Scenarios with 
policy change 
Income poverty 
/Energy poverty 
analyses 
Emissions 
analyses 
Distributional 
analyses 
West and Williams III (2004) U.S., 1996–1998 Gasoline Yes Yes No/No No Yes 
Tiezzi (2005) Italy, 1985–1996 Domestic fuels, transport 
fuels, public transport 
Yes Yes No/No No  
Tiezzi  and Verde (2016) U.S., 2007–2009 Gasoline Yes Yes No/No No No 
Dumagan and Mount (1992) U.S., 1960–1987 Electricity, natural gas, oil Yes No No/No No Yes 
Beznoska (2014) Germany, 1998–2008 Heating, electricity, mobility Yes Yes No/No No Yes 
Filipinni (1995) Switzerland, 1991 Electricity Yes No No/No No No 
Kohn and Missong (2003) Germany, 1988–1993 Energy and shelter aggregate Yes No No/No No No 
Gahvari and Tsang (2011) U.S., 1996–1999 Energy aggregate good Yes Yes No/No No No 
Brännlund and Nordström 
(2004) 
Sweden, 1985–1992 Petrol, public transport, other 
transport, heating 
Yes Yes No/No No Yes 
Brännlund et al. (2007) Sweden, 1980–1997 Electricity, district heating, 
oil, car, public and other 
transport 
Yes Yes No/No Yes No 
Berkhout et al. (2004) Netherlands, 1992–1999 Electricity, gas Yes Yes No/No No Yes 
Miniaci et al. (2014) Italy, 1998–2011 Electricity, gas No No No/Yes No No 
Withana et al. (2013) Australia, British Columbia, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and U.K.; (2010) 
Natural gas, solid fuels, 
electricity, mineral oils 
No Yes No/No No Yes 
Flues and Thomas (2015) 21 OECD countries, 2008–2012 Transport fuels, heating 
fuels, electricity 
No No No/No No Yes 
Jacobsen et al. (2003) Denmark, 1997 Heating, transport fuels, 
electricity 
No No No/No No Yes 
Klauss (2016) Armenia, 2009–2011 Natural gas, biomass No Yes Yes/No No No 
Palmer et al. (2008) U.K., 2005–2007 Heating fuels, electricity No No Yes/Yes No No 
Legendre and Ricci (2015) France, 2006 Electricity, gas, heating No No No/Yes No No 
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Table 2. 8 (Continued) 
Study Country, and time period Energy goods Behavioral 
responses 
Scenarios with 
policy change 
Income poverty 
/Energy poverty 
analyses 
Emissions 
analyses 
Distributional 
analyses 
Papada and Kaliampakos 
(2016) 
Greece, 2015 Electricity, space heating No No No/Yes No No 
Sterner (2012) France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain (2006),  Serbia (2007), 
Sweden (2004–2006) 
Transport fuels No No No/No No Yes 
Labandeira et al. (2006) Spain, 1973–1995 Electricity, natural gas, LPG, 
car fuels, public transport 
Yes No No/No No No 
Labandeira et al. (2009) Spain, 1973–1995 Electricity, natural gas, LPG, 
car fuels, public transport 
Yes Yes No/No No Yes 
Ekins et al. (2011) 
 
Czech Republic, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, U.K.; (2005) 
Electricity, heating fuels, car 
fuels 
No Yes No/No No Yes 
Scarpellini et al. (2015) Spain (reg. Aragon), 2011–2015 Electricity, heating No No No/Yes No No 
Faik (2012) Germany, 2002–2010 - No No Yes/No No Yes 
Meyer and Sullivan (2009) US, 1960–2005 - No No Yes/No No No 
Grabka et al. (2015) Germany, 2000–2012 - No No Yes/No No Yes 
Grabka et al. (2012) Germany, 2005–2010 - No No Yes/No No Yes 
Heindl (2014) Germany, 2011 Electricity, heating No No No/Yes No No 
Moore (2012) U.K., 2008 Heating fuels No No No/Yes No No 
Aasness et al. (2002) Norway, 2000 Electricity No Yes No/No No Yes 
Alberini et al. (2011) US, 1997–2007 Electricity, gas Yes No No/No No No 
Halvorsen and Nesbakken 
(2002) 
Norway, 1993–1994 Electricity No Yes No/No No Yes 
Kratena and Wüger (2009) Austria 1990–2006 Gasoline/diesel, heating, 
electricity 
Yes Yes No/No No  
Kratena and Wüger (2010) Austria, 1972–2005 Gasoline, heating, electricity Yes Yes No/No No No 
Ghalwash (2007) Sweden, 1980–2002 Petrol, public and other 
transport, electricity, district 
heating, oil 
Yes No No/No No No 
Blacklow et al. (2010) Australia, 1988–2004 Electricity and housing fuels Yes No No/No No Yes 
Betti (2000) Italy, 1985–1994 Fuel and heating, transport Yes No No/No No No 
Romero-Jordán et al. (2016) Spain, 2006–2012 Electricity No No No/No No Yes 
Neuhoff et al. (2013) Germany, 1998–2008 Electricity No No No/No No Yes 
Murray (2012) U.S., 1999–2009 Natural gas, electricity Yes No Yes/Yes No No 
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Table 2. 8 (Continued) 
Study Country, and time period Energy goods Behavioral 
responses 
Scenarios with 
policy change 
Income poverty 
/Energy poverty 
analyses 
Emissions 
analyses 
Distributional 
analyses 
Grösche and Schröder (2014a) Germany, 2010 Electricity No Yes No No Yes 
Nikodinoska and Schröder 
(2016) 
Germany, 1993–2008 Electricity, other fuels, car 
fuels 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Schumacher et al.  (2015) Bulgaria , France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, U.K., E.U.; (2013) 
Electricity, gas No No No/Yes No No 
Frondel et al. (2015) Germany, 2006–2012 Electricity No Yes No/No No Yes 
Boonekamp (2007) Netherlands, 1990–2000 Electricity No Yes No/No No No 
Nygård (2013) Norway, 1978–2010 Electricity, fuels and district 
heating, coal, coke, peat and 
wood 
Yes Yes No/No No No 
Hills (2012) England, 2009 Electricity, gas No No No/Yes No No 
Note. All necessary information is taken from the respective studies.
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Table 2. 10 Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the demand system 
 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Variable Mean 
𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) 9.723 9.834 9.871 9.900 9.965 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  0.214 0.177 0.153 0.158 0.155 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.032 0.027 0.030 0.034 0.038 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  0.040 0.034 0.041 0.049 0.037 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  0.031 0.036 0.044 0.049 0.048 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  0.683 0.726 0.732 0.710 0.722 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑) 1.581 1.644 1.684 1.805 1.885 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 1.497 1.488 1.608 1.861 2.163 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 1.245 1.247 1.533 1.957 2.026 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠) 1.143 1.255 1.571 1.848 1.954 
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠) 1.539 1.655 1.681 1.691 1.777 
𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 1.887 1.834 1.804 1.758 1.727 
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛  0.424 0.359 0.334 0.298 0.281 
Note. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 𝑒 stands for expenditures, 𝑠 stands for expenditures share, 𝑝 is price  and 𝑛 is 
number. 
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Table 2. 11 Summary statistics by household type 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 2 3 4 
Variable Mean 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 20132.800 25713.360 37193.620 47140.910 
𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 14233.230 19321.400 24450.130 30586.120 
𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  1951.818 3294.660 3790.314 5237.592 
𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  433.663 640.870 695.769 852.427 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  601.943 785.250 952.226 998.902 
𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  503.110 777.413 1045.769 1507.134 
𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  10742.700 13823.210 17966.050 21990.070 
𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑  0.152 0.184 0.174 0.188 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.034 0.036 0.032 0.030 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  0.044 0.043 0.041 0.034 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠  0.034 0.039 0.044 0.051 
𝑠𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠  0.736 0.698 0.710 0.696 
Note. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 – two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 – 
two or more adults with children. Weighted to assure representativeness of the German population. 
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Table 2. 12 Comparison with previous studies on income and energy poverty 
 Income poverty - Head Count ratio (equivalent disposable income) 
Variable 
This study 
(2016) 
EU-SILC 
(2014) 
Faik 
(2012) 
Grabka et 
al. 
(2015) 
Grabka et 
al. (2012) 
4th Poverty 
report 
(2013) 
Statista 
(2016) 
 
Germany 
1993 10.4 
  
 11.5 
 
 
1998 11.1 
  
 10.8 10.4  
2003 10.9 
 
16.8 13.0 14.2 13.2  
2008 13.7 15.3 17.0 14.4 14.6 14.3 14.4 
2013 13.6 16.2 
 
 
  
15.5 
Energy poverty (TPR/LIHC) 
 
This study 
(2016) 
Palmer et al. (2008) 
Legendre 
and Ricci 
(2015) 
Hills (2012) 
 Germany England Scotland Wales 
Northern 
Ireland 
France England 
1993 5.3       
1998 6.0       
2003 11.4 
6.0 
(2004) 
23.0 
(2005-6) 
11.0 
(2004) 
23.0 
(2004) 
16.6 
(2006) 
 
2008 19.7 
7.0 
(2005) 
    
15.0 
(2009) 
2013 20.3       
Note. Faik (2012) uses 50 percent of mean single person household's net income as poverty line while all the 
other studies use 60 percent of median disposable equivalent income (according to OECD modified scale). HC 
ratio indicates the percent of poor within the whole population on. TRP stands for the ten percent rule, as 
described earlier and LIHC stands for Low Income High Costs, a measure used in Hills (2012).  
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Table 2. 13 Income and energy poverty according to working status and area of 
residence 
 Self-
employed 
Employed Unemployed Retired Rural Urban 
Income poverty (proportion poor) 
1993 0.056 0.032 0.361 0.095 0.065 0.085 
1998 0.044 0.033 0.386 0.078 0.055 0.089 
2003 0.060 0.035 0.454 0.091 0.074 0.105 
2008 0.076 0.039 0.719 0.109 0.086 0.138 
2013 0.125 0.045 0.734 0.148 0.102 0.165 
Energy poverty (proportion poor) 
1993 0.041 0.043 0.148 0.055 0.057 0.048 
1998 0.058 0.057 0.144 0.048 0.063 0.054 
2003 0.119 0.107 0.233 0.097 0.125 0.088 
2008 0.220 0.186 0.363 0.186 0.222 0.143 
2013 0.279 0.185 0.353 0.209 0.233 0.136 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
 
 
Table 2. 14 Results of the probit model: probability to be energy poor 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 0.679 0.010 
  
0.612 0.011   
𝑙𝑛 (𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) 
  
–0.546 0.006   –0.644 0.008 
ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
    
–0.086 0.003 0.044 0.004 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 
    
0.327 0.008 0.375 0.008 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 
    
–0.198 0.011 –0.080 0.011 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 
    
–0.276 0.011 –0.144 0.011 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
    
0.103 0.017 0.121 0.017 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
    
0.174 0.017 0.089 0.016 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 
    
–0.077 0.008 –0.119 0.009 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 –1.218 0.004 4.504 0.064 –1.166 0.011 5.196 0.079 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅2 0.026 0.048 0.047 0.068 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
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Table 2. 15 Elasticities for the different household types 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 2 3 4 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Price elasticities 
Food –1.0156 0.0192 –1.0051 0.0065 –1.0133 0.1051 –1.0024 0.0412 
Electricity –0.3284 0.1853 –0.3971 0.1004 –0.3555 0.1364 –0.3743 0.0970 
Other fuels –0.6746 0.3353 –0.6931 0.0263 –0.6871 0.0424 –0.6828 0.0233 
Car fuels –0.3814 0.5549 –0.3925 0.1878 –0.3638 0.2212 –0.3880 0.2723 
Other goods –1.1212 0.0012 –1.1371 0.0083 –1.1310 0.0023 –1.1512 0.0112 
Expenditure elasticities 
Food 0.4561 0.2002 0.4830 0.0909 0.4532 0.1102 0.4250 0.7033 
Electricity 0.5104 0.0620 0.5770 0.0387 0.5710 0.0346 0.6287 0.0341 
Other fuels 0.6962 0.3328 0.7985 0.0435 0.7690 0.0341 0.8785 0.0546 
Car fuels 1.3018 0.8325 1.1830 0.4012 1.0320 0.3956 0.7944 0.4706 
Other goods 1.1306 0.0013 1.1506 0.0106 1.1436 0.0016 1.1698 0.0141 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
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Table 2. 16 DQUAIDS and QUAIDS Coefficient Estimates 
 
DQUAIDS 
 
QUAIDS 
 
DAIDS 
 
AIDS 
 
 
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
𝛼1 0.1456 0.0002 0.1809 0.0002 0.1452 0.0002 0.1788 0.0003 
𝛼2 0.0250 0.0001 0.0331 0.0001 0.0252 0.0001 0.0329 0.0001 
𝛼3 0.0383 0.0001 0.0446 0.0001 0.0381 0.0001 0.0443 0.0001 
𝛼4 0.0492 0.0001 0.0464 0.0001 0.0470 0.0001 0.0450 0.0001 
𝛼5 0.7419 0.0000 0.6951 0.0000 0.7445 0.0000 0.6991 0.0000 
𝛽1 –0.0772 0.0006 –0.0162 0.0005 –0.0776 0.0006 –0.0303 0.0004 
𝛽2 –0.0164 0.0002 –0.0094 0.0002 –0.0163 0.0002 –0.0102 0.0002 
𝛽3 –0.0123 0.0004 –0.0092 0.0003 –0.0123 0.0004 –0.0105 0.0003 
𝛽4 0.0090 0.0003 0.0218 0.0003 0.0084 0.0003 0.0093 0.0003 
𝛽5 0.0969 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0979 0.0000 0.0418 0.0000 
𝛾11 –0.0129 0.0011 –0.0209 0.0012 –0.0099 0.0011 –0.0321 0.0011 
𝛾12 –0.0028 0.0004 –0.0043 0.0004 –0.0013 0.0003 –0.0042 0.0006 
𝛾13 –0.0190 0.0005 –0.0216 0.0005 –0.0168 0.0005 –0.0177 0.0005 
𝛾14 –0.0102 0.0006 –0.0133 0.0006 –0.0152 0.0006 –0.0216 0.0006 
𝛾22 0.0225 0.0005 0.0207 0.0005 0.0229 0.0005 0.0210 0.0003 
𝛾23 –0.0018 0.0003 –0.0029 0.0003 –0.0017 0.0003 –0.0027 0.0003 
𝛾24 –0.0029 0.0004 –0.0017 0.0004 –0.0033 0.0004 –0.0025 0.0004 
𝛾33 0.0126 0.0007 0.0106 0.0007 0.0120 0.0007 0.0086 0.0007 
𝛾34 0.0017 0.0006 0.0043 0.0006 0.0019 0.0006 0.0055 0.0006 
𝛾44 0.0300 0.0007 0.0264 0.0007 0.0297 0.0007 0.0247 0.0008 
𝛾43 0.0017 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 
𝛾42 –0.0029 0.0000 –0.0017 0.0000 –0.0033 0.0000 –0.0025 0.0000 
𝛾41 –0.0102 0.0000 –0.0133 0.0000 –0.0152 0.0000 –0.0216 0.0000 
𝛾32 –0.0018 0.0000 –0.0029 0.0000 –0.0017 0.0000 –0.0027 0.0000 
𝛾31 –0.0190 0.0000 –0.0216 0.0000 –0.0168 0.0000 –0.0177 0.0000 
𝛾21 –0.0028 0.0000 –0.0043 0.0000 –0.0013 0.0000 –0.0042 0.0000 
𝛾15 0.0449 0.0000 0.0601 0.0000 0.0432 0.0000 0.0756 0.0000 
𝛾25 –0.0152 0.0000 –0.0118 0.0000 –0.0167 0.0000 –0.0115 0.0000 
𝛾35 0.0065 0.0000 0.0096 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 
𝛾45 –0.0185 0.0000 –0.0157 0.0000 –0.0130 0.0000 –0.0062 0.0000 
𝛾54 –0.0185 0.0000 –0.0157 0.0000 –0.0130 0.0000 –0.0062 0.0000 
𝛾53 0.0065 0.0000 0.0096 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 
𝛾52 –0.0152 0.0000 –0.0118 0.0000 –0.0167 0.0000 –0.0115 0.0000 
𝛾51 0.0449 0.0000 0.0601 0.0000 0.0432 0.0000 0.0756 0.0000 
𝛾55 –0.0178 0.0000 –0.0423 0.0000 –0.0181 0.0000 –0.0642 0.0000 
𝜆1 0.0046 0.0004 –0.0177 0.0003     
𝜆2 0.0022 0.0001 –0.0010 0.0001     
𝜆3 –0.0001 0.0002 –0.0015 0.0002     
𝜆4 –0.0131 0.0002 –0.0156 0.0002     
𝜆5 0.0064 0.0000 0.0358 0.0000     
𝜃11 –0.0020 0.0004   
–0.0023 0.0003 
  
𝜃21 –0.0079 0.0001   
–0.0080 0.0001 
  
𝜃31 0.0019 0.0002   
0.0015 0.0002 
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Table 2. 15 (Continued) 
 DQUAIDS  QUAIDS  DAIDS  AIDS  
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
𝜃41 0.0011 0.0002   
0.0009 0.0002 
  
𝜃21 0.0026 0.0004   
0.0027 0.0004 
  
𝜃22 0.0027 0.0001   
0.0028 0.0001 
  
𝜃32 –0.0112 0.0002   
–0.0087 0.0002 
  
𝜃42 –0.0064 0.0002   
–0.0053 0.0002 
  
𝜃51 0.0087 0.0000   
0.0068 0.0000 
  
𝜃52 0.0105 0.0000   
0.0097 0.0000 
  
𝜌1 0.9308 0.0057   
0.9490 0.0059 
  
𝜌2 0.3674 0.0044   
0.3713 0.0045 
  
𝜈1 0.0121 0.0006 –0.0103 0.0006 0.0122 0.0006 –0.0127 0.0005 
𝜈2 –0.0025 0.0002 –0.0033 0.0002 –0.0025 0.0002 –0.0034 0.0002 
𝜈3 0.0044 0.0004 0.0061 0.0004 0.0044 0.0004 0.0061 0.0005 
𝜈4 –0.0146 0.0004 –0.0179 0.0003 –0.0145 0.0004 –0.0199 0.0003 
𝜈5 0.0006 0.0000 0.0254 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0299 0.0000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
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Table 2. 17 Comparison of demographic and base (QU)AIDS elasticities 
 
DQUAIDS 
 
QUAIDS  DAIDS  AIDS  
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Price 
elasticities         
Food –1.0026 0.0005 –1.1020 0.0000 –0.9858 0.0000 –1.1585 0.0003 
Electricity –0.2346 0.0079 –0.3164 0.0004 –0.2163 0.0043 –0.2975 0.0003 
Other fuels –0.6569 0.0005 –0.7126 0.0002 –0.6740 0.0003 –0.7599 0.0001 
Car fuels –0.3164 0.0048 –0.4973 0.0003 –0.3274 0.0005 –0.4508 0.0002 
Other goods –1.1357 0.0000 –1.0730 0.0000 –1.1381 0.0000 –1.1299 0.0000 
Expenditure 
elasticities         
Food 0.4876 0.0051 0.9080 0.0000 0.4989 0.0007 0.8196 0.0003 
Electricity 0.4955 0.0032 0.6935 0.0002 0.5116 0.0029 0.6626 0.0002 
Other fuels 0.7701 0.0005 0.7616 0.0002 0.7696 0.0003 0.7190 0.0002 
Car fuels 0.9942 0.0076 1.4295 0.0003 0.9327 0.0005 1.2095 0.0001 
Other goods 1.1491 0.0000 1.0185 0.0000 1.1512 0.0000 1.0581 0.0000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
 
 
Table 2. 18 Comparison with electricity demand elasticities from existing literature 
Studies 
This 
study 
(2016) 
Ghalwash 
(2007) 
Kratena 
and 
Wüger 
(2010) 
Dumagan 
and 
Mount 
(1992) 
Labandeira 
et al. 
(2006) 
Kratena 
and 
Wüger 
(2009) 
Blacklow et 
al. (2010) 
Nygård 
(2013) 
Price elasticity  –0.235 –0.140 –0.179 –0.067 –0.447 –0.124 –0.331 –0.140 
Expenditure 
elasticity  
0.496 0.460 4.466 0.723 0.739 0.334 0.132 0.59 
Note. Elasticities estimates are taken from the relevant studies. 
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Table 2. 19 Scenario 7 (doubling of the EEG surcharge and CFT) results across income deciles and household types 
 Electricity tax burden Electricity emissions 
Income poverty 
 (HC ratio) 
Energy poverty 
(TPR) 
 euros % of income tons % change before after before after 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
1 84.636 31.368 0.662 0.110 –0.108 0.039 –10.707 0.819 1.000 1.000 33.356 48.356 
2 109.220 41.406 0.554 0.086 –0.129 0.049 –10.069 0.962 0.659 0.740 26.973 38.217 
3 126.026 47.043 0.500 0.082 –0.140 0.055 –9.620 1.121 0.000 0.000 21.655 33.559 
4 140.479 53.830 0.458 0.078 –0.151 0.062 –9.336 1.275 0.000 0.000 17.757 28.070 
5 154.018 59.223 0.428 0.074 –0.160 0.066 –9.093 1.344 0.000 0.000 13.270 22.244 
6 162.160 62.773 0.400 0.075 –0.163 0.070 –8.825 1.533 0.000 0.000 8.986 16.998 
7 171.957 66.081 0.371 0.068 –0.169 0.072 –8.671 1.499 0.000 0.000 6.805 12.583 
8 182.944 72.685 0.347 0.074 –0.170 0.076 –8.322 1.783 0.000 0.000 3.794 8.134 
9 195.106 76.349 0.315 0.068 –0.172 0.076 –7.988 1.983 0.000 0.000 2.305 4.654 
10 211.653 85.791 0.268 0.076 –0.150 0.089 –6.674 3.525 0.000 0.000 1.353 2.353 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒             
1 90.558 25.431 0.471 0.146 –0.083 0.021 –8.737 2.405 0.329 0.341 17.158 0.261 
2 137.799 43.383 0.515 0.132 –0.151 0.037 –9.715 1.293 0.398 0.414 23.482 0.349 
3 163.884 49.824 0.439 0.146 –0.162 0.025 –9.180 1.746 0.138 0.147 15.272 0.235 
4 222.078 69.101 0.425 0.129 –0.235 0.048 –9.527 1.221 0.116 0.123 12.052 0.204 
Overall 146.118 70.284 0.454 0.144 –0.147 0.068 –9.132 1.960 5.117 0.000 55.063 0.000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 – two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 – two or more adults with 
children. 
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Table 2. 20 Scenario 8 (abolishing the EEG surcharge and CFT) results across income deciles and household types 
 Electricity tax burden Electricity emissions 
Income poverty 
(HC ratio) 
Energy poverty 
(TPR) 
 euros % of income tons % change before after before after 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
1 –106.967 39.119 –0.836 0.130 0.151 0.055 15.025 1.422 1.000 1.000 33.356 20.417 
2 –136.019 51.184 –0.689 0.094 0.178 0.070 13.921 1.671 0.659 0.551 26.973 14.821 
3 –155.352 57.767 –0.614 0.089 0.192 0.078 13.144 1.946 0.000 0.000 21.655 10.390 
4 –172.064 65.677 –0.559 0.082 0.205 0.087 12.654 2.213 0.000 0.000 17.757 7.601 
5 –187.620 71.948 –0.520 0.078 0.216 0.094 12.235 2.332 0.000 0.000 13.270 5.820 
6 –196.396 75.848 –0.482 0.077 0.218 0.099 11.771 2.661 0.000 0.000 8.986 3.154 
7 –207.497 79.609 –0.445 0.071 0.224 0.101 11.505 2.602 0.000 0.000 6.805 2.848 
8 –218.876 86.027 –0.414 0.075 0.223 0.107 10.899 3.096 0.000 0.000 3.794 1.445 
9 –231.610 89.020 –0.372 0.069 0.222 0.110 10.319 3.450 0.000 0.000 2.305 0.887 
10 –244.081 94.766 –0.308 0.078 0.180 0.141 8.025 6.136 0.000 0.000 1.353 0.609 
ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒             
1 –108.237 24.032 –0.573 0.186 0.109 0.039 11.607 4.166 0.329 0.313 17.158 9.720 
2 –169.383 49.691 –0.638 0.167 0.206 0.052 13.314 2.241 0.398 0.374 23.482 12.110 
3 –198.051 50.862 –0.537 0.182 0.216 0.045 12.380 3.044 0.138 0.126 15.272 7.535 
4 –271.444 77.183 –0.523 0.160 0.319 0.066 12.998 2.134 0.116 0.106 12.052 4.857 
Overall –177.068 81.872 –0.555 0.181 0.197 0.096 12.299 3.404 –7.165 0.000 –48.734 0.000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 1 – single adult; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 2 – single parent; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 3 – two adults with no children; ℎℎ𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 4 – two or more adults with 
children. 
 
Chapter 2. How Electricity Prices Alter Poverty and CO2 Emissions ‒ The Case of Germany     93 
 
 
   
Table 2. 21 Results of Scenario 9 and Scenario 10 
 
S9: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 100%; 
𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 25% 
S10: 
𝐸𝐸𝐺 − 100%; 
𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 50% 
Change in variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Emissions electricity (t)  0.102 0.095 0.089 0.098 
Emissions electricity (%) 6.340 4.933 5.641 5.124 
Emissions car fuels (t)  -0.071 0.058 –0.161 0.109 
Emissions car fuels (%) –3.368 0.000 –7.690 0.000 
Tax burden electricity (euros) –194.851 84.627 –195.420 84.964 
Tax burden electricity (% of income) –0.539 0.176 –0.540 0.176 
Tax burden car fuels (euros) 130.353 63.594 241.355 119.380 
Tax burden car fuels (% of income) 0.343 0.098 0.633 0.181 
Income povery (𝐻𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) –0.793 0.000 0.144 0.000 
Energy poverty (𝑇𝑃𝑅) –5.300 0.000 3.165 0.000 
Compensating variation (euros) 4.827 48.156 139.618 115.710 
Compensating variation (% of income) 0.062 0.183 0.338 0.239 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. 
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2.8.2 Figures 
 
 
Figure 2. 5 HC ratio on equivalent expenditures and equivalent expenditures after 
energy taxes 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. Solid line stands for poverty calculated on disposable 
equivalent expenditures while dashed line stands for poverty calculated on disposable equivalent expenditures 
minus energy taxes. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. 6 Poverty gap on equivalent expenditures and equivalent expenditures after 
energy taxes 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. Solid line stands for poverty calculated on disposable 
equivalent expenditures while dashed line stands for poverty calculated on disposable equivalent expenditures 
minus energy taxes. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. 7 Kernel density functions of energy expenditure share in income by years 
Note. Vertical lines stand for twice the median energy expenditure share (2M).  
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Chapter 3 
Inter- and Intra-generational Emissions Inequality in 
Germany: Empirical Analyses 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Several countries in Europe have experienced growing demand for residential energy 
and hence increasing anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the household 
sector (European Environment Agency, 2015). However, the increase in energy consumption 
and emissions has not been equally distributed among all households and it seems to be 
highly dependent on the level of income. Even in developed countries such as Germany, 
U.K., Sweden, France, U.S., and others there exists a wide gap in energy consumption and 
emissions (pollution) between  rich (high income) and the poor (low income) households.
70
 
Chancel and Piketty (2015) find that global CO2 emissions remain concentrated: the top 10 
percent of emitters are responsible for 45 percent of the emissions and the bottom 50 percent 
are responsible for only 13 percent of global emissions. To address the challenge of 
increasing and unequally distributed emissions, the interactions between environmental 
degradation and economic inequalities in specific countries should be explored. 
The differences in the levels of emissions/pollution among households are known as 
impact inequalities (Chancel (2014)). In this study, I distinguish between three types of 
impact inequalities: a) income – poor versus rich; b) place of residence – urban versus rural 
households; and c)year of birth – earlier (older) versus later cohorts (younger); the first two 
                                                 
70
 Rehdanz (2007) finds that income is an important determinant of heating costs and heating expenditures 
increase with income in Germany. Jamasb and Meier (2010) find that total energy expenditures increase with 
income in the U.K. Räty and Carlsson-Kanyama (2009) find that in Sweden and Germany CO2 emissions 
intensity increases with income. 
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being intra-temporal and the latter being inter-temporal inequalities.  Understanding the 
impact inequalities and their causes among households will provide a better understanding of 
inequalities in climate change and will contribute in creating public policies that aim at 
reduction of these inequalities possibly through changes in lifestyles. In addition, information 
about households’ emissions distributions can prove useful in designing improved mitigation 
policies. 
The results of this study should present evidence on the importance of birth cohorts in 
determining residential energy consumption and the related pollution in Germany. As the date 
of birth shapes lifestyle chances (access to education or employment, level of income, 
housing, et cetera.), it can also influence consumer behavior and the environmental footprint 
(see Chancel, 2014). If the cohort compositional differences are significant, this can provide 
an understanding about the creation and durability of energy and environmental practices 
among households. According to Mannheim (1952), cohort effects refer to how formative 
experiences are shaping individuals’ behavior and values.   
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Initially, I quantify 
residential energy related CO2 emissions in Germany by their source. Moreover, I investigate 
both intra-generational (by income and by place of residence) and inter-generational (by year 
of birth) emissions inequalities and their underlying causes. Furthermore, I scrutinize the 
differences between households according to the birth cohort of their household leader.  Most 
importantly, I study the birth cohort effects of not only the household leader but also of the 
other household members on emissions (the presence of other birth cohorts in the household). 
First of all, this study analyses the descriptive evidence on emissions inequalities, from 
a German micro data (Income and Expenditure Survey, 1993–2013), along the 3 dimensions 
mentioned above. I find that the richest German households emitted around 70 percent more 
CO2 than the poorest households in 1993 and the gap has almost tripled by 2013.
71
 The 
existence of emissions inequalities related to residence place is also confirmed: the rural 
households emitted around 11 percent more emissions than the urban households in 1993 and 
around 40 percent more in 2013. An inverted u-shaped relationship is found between total 
energy related emissions and the birth cohort of the household’s leader. The emissions are 
highest for the households that have a leader born between 1933 and 1963, and these 
households are found to emit around 9 percent more CO2 than the average German household 
                                                 
71
 In 2013, the households in the tenth equivalent income decile emitted almost 200 percent more CO2 than 
households in the first income decile. Chancel (2014) also finds that the rich households in France emit 3.2 times 
more CO2 than the poor while in the U.S. the rich emit 3 times more CO2 than the poor between 1980 and 2000, 
and the gaps have remained almost constant over time.  
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regardless of the age of the leader or the period in which the data was collected. The cohorts 
with leaders from the birth cohorts 1908–1928 and 1968–1993 have lower CO2 emissions 
than the average level.  
Next, this paper focuses on the effects of date of birth, age, and education of the 
household leader, income, and household size (or number of household members belonging to 
a specific birth cohort) on households’ direct energy related CO2 emissions in Germany. 
Special emphasis is put on the impact of year of birth of the household’s leader and other 
household members (cohort effects). For that purpose, a de-trended Age Period Cohort 
(APCD) model is applied on German household data. The data set contains detailed 
information on energy expenditures, income, age, education, and many other characteristics of 
the households.   
My estimates show that households with leaders born in 1933, 1938, 1943, 1948, 
1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, and 1973 emit more CO2 than the average German household and 
the cohort pure effects are statistically significant. The birth cohort effects of the household’s 
leader are still present and significant once I control for all the relevant variables. The 
magnitude of the cohorts’ effects is larger and they are positive for the cohorts born 1943–
1973, indicating that these cohorts have a stronger tendency to emit more CO2  than their 
predecessors or followers.  Having an additional household member, who belongs to the 
cohorts 1923, 1928, 1933, 1938, 1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, and 1968 leads to higher 
emissions on average. The APCD model for total emissions as well as for the emissions 
coming from the separate energy sources also confirms the presence of income- and place of 
residence-related emissions inequalities.  
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 3.2 provides a literature review; 
Section 3.3 describes the quantitative methods; Section 3.4 provides overview of the dataset 
and some descriptive evidence; Section 3.5 presents the empirical results; Section 3.6 outlines 
the results from the consistency check and Section 3.7 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
Table 3.2 in the Appendix lists all the relevant studies which deal with the 
determinants energy related emissions or energy consumption and hence points out the gaps 
in the literature. The table includes both household level analyses as well as analyses of 
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aggregate data across countries.
72
 Larger emphasis is put on the residential level studies, 
which focus on one or few (mostly developed) countries  and are more relevant for the 
analyses here. Among the studies which investigate the determinants of energy related 
emissions, very few consider birth cohorts as important factors. Even fewer studies have 
adressed cohort effects in an age period cohort (APC) framework and none have adressed the 
effects of birth cohorths of other members of the household. This review first scrutinizes  
papers with determining factors of energy and emissions, then describes in detail the papers 
involving APC models in their household level analyses, and finally presents evidence from 
cross-countries analyses dealing with cohort effects. 
A number of factors such as income and income inequality are found to be important 
determinants of energy consumption and intra-generational gaps in energy related emissions 
levels. Hargreaves et al. (2013) find that emissions of U.K. households are strongly correlated 
with income: the richest ten percent emit three times more than the poorest ten percent of 
households. The results of Weber and Matthews (2008) demonstrate that the total US 
household CO2 footprint is best predicted by total household’s income and expenditures. The 
authors also find that households differ considerably in their CO2 responsibilities, with at least 
a factor of ten difference between low- and high-impact households. Fahmy et al. (2011) 
show that income inequalities are determining factors in explaining emissions and energy 
consumption of U.K. households. Räty and Carlsson-Kanyama (2009) find that energy 
consumption of households increases almost linearly with income in Germany, Greece, 
Norway, and Sweden. 
Brännlund and Ghalwash (2008) also provide evidence that residential CO2 emissions 
in Sweden are increasing in income (at a decreasing rate) and are decreasing in income 
inequality. Moreover, Ghalwash (2007) finds evidence in support of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve hypothesis (EKC – humped shaped relationship between emissions and per 
capita income
73
) in Sweden. According to his results, expenditure on environmental services 
increases with higher income. The results of Papathanasopoulou and Jackson (2009) confirm 
that fossil resources consumption inequality between rich and poor U.K. households grew by 
24 percent while the inequality in the total expenditures rose by 13 percent between 1968 and 
2000.  
Area of residence, age, and household size are found to be the additional factors 
behind explaining emissions’ levels.  Hargreaves et al. (2013) find the following 
                                                 
72
 For studies which conduct cross-countries analyses on the determinants of emissions, please refer to Lenzen et 
al. (2006), Grunewald et al. (2016), Ravallion et al. (2000), Heerink et al. (2001), Ajmi et al. (2015), et cetera. 
73
 See Kuznets (1955). 
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characteristics of U.K. households to be associated with higher emissions: multi-adults 
households and couples, middle aged households (35–60 years), households containing 
multiple workers, households that use oil for heating, and properties in rural areas. Büchs and 
Schnepf (2013)  show that elderly, low income, and jobless households in the U.K. are more 
likely to have high emissions from home energy than from other domains, which could 
indicate that they may be less affected by carbon taxes on transport  or on total emissions. 
Energy consumed in housing increased with age in Norway, Sweden, Greece, and Germany 
(Räty and Carlsson-Kanyama (2009)). 
Several studies have focused their analyses on German households. Weber and Perrels 
(2000) find that home energy emissions in West Germany are negatively related with income 
and positively related with age and household size. Transport related emissions are found to 
be positively related with income and  negatively related with age and household size. The 
results of Rehdanz (2007) demonstrate that heating expenditures are lower among German 
households that own the dwelling where they live in comparison to households which rent 
their dwellings. Deutsch and Timpe (2013) provide evidence of clear age related effects 
(separate from overlaps with housing condition, household size, and economies of scale) in 
energy consumption in Germany. Similarly, Nikodinoska and Schröder (2016) find evidence 
of a trade-off between residential CO2 emissions and income inequality in Germany. Räty and 
Carlsson-Kanyama (2009) find gender related consumption inequalities in Germany: men are 
higher energy consumers than women, and this is especially pronounced among older people 
(the generation born before 1945).  
A number of articles in the field of economics have used Age Period Cohort (APC) 
models to explain inter-generational differences in residential energy consumption and 
emissions. For instance, Chancel (2014) applies a De-trended Age Period Cohort (APCD) 
model on direct CO2 emissions of French and American households for the period 1980–
2005. He finds no evidence of the effect of year of birth of the household leader on emissions 
in the USA, but in France strong birth cohort effects are present. The French households with 
leaders born between 1930 and 1955 are the highest CO2 emitters compared to cohorts born 
before 1930 or after 1955 (even after introducing other control variables in the model). He 
concludes that the generational impact might be a consequence of progressive economic 
marginalization of younger generations as well as carbon intensive dwellings used by the 
older generations. 
Moreover, using an APC model, Sànchez-Peña (2013) finds proof that cohort 
compositional differences are relevant in explaining residential energy consumption patterns 
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in Mexico. The results of the paper further show that for the cohorts that came to age during 
economic expansion there is a cohort pure effect i.e. they have higher consumption above and 
beyond their other characteristics. Pampel and Hunter (2012) use multi-level APC model to 
investigate the role of birth cohorts and socio economic status in explaining support for 
environmental spending in the U.S. They find that birth cohorts play an important role in 
explaining willingness to pay for environmental protection, with younger generations having 
higher willingness to pay (but they do not exhibit lower CO2 emissions in comparison to other 
cohorts). 
Furthermore, Segall (2013) integrates an APC model into Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) framework in order to test the existence of generational or cohort effect in the 
U.S. spending behavior. The model is then tested on consumer expenditure survey data and 
the results indicate that household budget allocations (including the budget for energy) show 
statistically significant cohort effects. Moreover, her results demonstrate that adding cohort 
effects improves demand models that only take age into account. Similarly, Aguiar and Hurst 
(2013) integrate cohort effects in demand system with the goal to deconstruct lifecycle 
expenditures of U.S. households. They  find evidence of cohort and family compositional 
effects in explaining utilities consumption, which displays no decline after middle age but 
rather an increase.  
Evidence from cross sectional analyses of OECD countries about cohorts effects in 
explaining emissions is mixed.  Menz and Welsch (2012) have found that cohort composition 
has contributed to increasing carbon emissions. Their results clearly show robust cohort 
effects, with the people born after 1960 being found as relatively emissions intensive. The 
authors also found that higher per capita income raises carbon emissions, which is in contrast 
to the EKC. Menz and Küling (2011) do similar analyses of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
and find that people born before1960 emit more SO2 than their followers.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
Age Period Cohort (APC) models have been extensively applied in social, behavioral, 
and human health sciences (see for instance Chauvel and Schröder (2014, and 2015), Yang et 
al. (2004, and 2008), Yang and Land (2006), Carstensen (2005), et cetera). Those studies have 
shown that generational factors can be important determinants of observed differences among 
households or individuals. According to Chauvel and Schröder (2015), an APC model can 
identify how an outcome (in this study CO2 emissions) is explained by the position in the life 
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cycle (the effect of age), the time of measurement (the effect of the period), and year of birth 
(the effect of the cohort). The general APC model can be described as, 
 
  𝑦𝑎𝑝𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑎) + 𝑔(𝑝) + ℎ(𝑐) (3.1) 
 
where  𝑦𝑎𝑝𝑐 can stand for the logged-CO2 emissions (the variable of intereset here), 𝑎 is age, 
𝑝 refers to the period variable, 𝑐 refers to the cohort variable, and 𝑓(),  𝑔(), and ℎ() are 
functions. The empirical identification of age, period and cohort effects is difficult due to the 
linear relationship between the explanatory variables, namely 𝑐 = 𝑝 − 𝑎. In order to assure 
identification, the model needs to be constrained. One such model is a de-trended Age Period 
Cohort (APCD) model (Chauvel, 2012). One of the main goals of the APCD model is the 
detection of “intrinsic” cohort effects, and according to Chancel (2014), the APCD cohort 
estimates are most reliable in comparison to other APC models.  The main focus of the APCD 
model are the cohortal fluctuations, i.e. the non-linearities that cannot be represented by a 
combination of age and period variables. This model considers how the effects of age, period, 
and cohort fluctuate around a linear trend, which it absorbs.  According to Chauvel (2012), 
and Chauvel and Schröder (2014, 2015), the APCD model can be defined as, 
 
 𝑦
𝑎𝑝𝑐 = 𝛼𝑎 + 𝜋𝑝 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛼0𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎) + 𝛾0𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑐) + 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑗
 (3.2) 
 
where 𝛼𝑎 is the vector of age effect; 𝜋𝑝 is the vector of period effect; 𝛾𝑐 is the vector of cohort 
effect (all those vectors reflect exclusively the nonlinear effects of age, period and cohort); the 
terms  𝛼0𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎), and 𝛾0𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑐) absorb the linear trends; 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 is a transformation 
that standardizes the coefficients 𝛼0 and 𝛾0 i.e. it transforms age (𝑎) from the initial code 
𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 to the interval –1 to +1; 
74
   𝛽0 is the general intercept; 𝑋𝑗 represent the 
additional control variables. 
The constraints under (3.3) – (3.6) allow for unique estimates of the de-trended cohort 
effect and solve the identification problem: 
 
  𝑝 = 𝑎 + 𝑐 (3.3) 
                                                 
74
 For instance, if 𝑎 is 45, 𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛  is 25 and  𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥 is 85, then 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎) = 2 ∗
(𝑎−𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛)
− 1 or –0.33. Cohort is 
similarly rescaled. 
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 ∑ 𝛼𝑎 = ∑ 𝜋𝑝
𝑝𝑎
= ∑ 𝛾𝑐
𝑐
= 0 (3.4) 
   
 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎(𝛼𝑎) = 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑝(𝜋𝑝) = 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝛾𝑐) = 0 (3.5) 
   
 min(𝑐) < 𝑐 < max (𝑐). (3.6) 
 
Restrictions (3.4) and (3.5) indicate that each vector sums up to zero, and its slope is also zero 
(the orthogonality assumption, for details see Cartensen (2007), p. 3029 and Deaton (1997), p. 
108). Restriction (3.6) indicates that the first and last cohorts, which appear just once in the 
model, are excluded. 
Alternatively, the constrained generalized linear models (CGLIM)  with equality 
constraints on age-period-cohort effects use a single equality constraint on the coefficients so 
that to solve the identification problem in APC models (see Chancel, 2014). This method 
includes an indicator variable for each unique value of age, period, and cohort as independent 
variable, uses a constraint to these indicator variables, and then completes the generalized 
linear model. According to the author, the CGLIM estimates are expected to have some bias 
since the cohort effects estimates assume that there is no time variation.   
Yet another solution for the identification problem of  age period cohort models has 
been suggested by  Yang et al. (2004 and 2008);  it is called the Age Period Cohort Intrinsic 
Estimator (APC-IE). As the authors infer, the numbers of age groups and time periods (the 
design matrix) may affect the estimates obtained from conventional CGLIM estimators. 
Hence, the APC-IE employs a special principal components regression that removes the 
influence of the null (column) space of the design matrix on the estimator. The APC-IE adds 
an indicator variable for each unique value of age, period, and cohort as independent variable, 
but omits one category for each of age, period, and cohort. Once the principal components 
regression has been estimated, the zero-sum constraints are used to obtain estimates for the 
deleted age, period, and cohort categories. In summary, the APC-IE tries to isolate a linear 
trend specific to cohorts. Chancel (2014) claims the results from the APC-IE should be 
interpreted with caution, but comparison of the APC-IE and APCD estimates should provide 
insight about the robustness of the cohort effect estimates.  
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3.4 Data and descriptive evidence 
 
The main data source for this paper is the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), an 
extensive micro data survey conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office.
 
This survey 
represents a cross-sectional household data set, which is collected once in every five years 
since 1973.
 75
 The IES includes detailed information on various household’s characteristics 
such as age, residential location, households size; as well as expenditures and incomes. The 
analyses here use the data from 1993 to 2013. In comparison to the dataset in Section 1.3.1 
(Chapter 1), this paper includes the last available IES wave for 2013 and focuses only on the 
energy expenditures.  
I use the following IES variables in the estimations: disposable income; education, and 
age of the household’s leader; total expenditures; expenditures on electricity, gas, and car 
fuels; number and age of household members; dwelling size; type of heating system installed; 
number of electric appliances and cars; region (state); and frequency weights at the state 
level.
76
 The final data comprises around 220,000 German households, across five cross-
sections. 
Since only household’s expenditures information is available in the data, I have used 
the average commodity specific prices to calculate the consumed quantities of electricity and 
gas in kWh and car fuels (both diesel and gasoline) in liters. Then, the quantities are used so 
that to derive the household’s direct energy related CO2 emissions.  The direct emissions from 
electricity (𝐸𝑒), gas (𝐸𝑔), and car fuels (𝐸𝑐𝑓) are calculated as the product of the carbon 
factor of the respective energy good (𝜃𝑖) and the quantity of that energy good 𝑞𝑖: 
 
 𝐸𝑖 =  𝜃𝑖𝑞𝑖 (3.7) 
 
where 𝑖 stands for 𝑒, 𝑔 or 𝑐𝑓.77 Total energy emissions (𝐸𝑡) are calculated as the sum of the 
three. The estimable APCD equation for emissions then takes the following form, 
 
 ln(𝐸𝑖)
𝑎𝑝𝑐 = 𝛼𝑎𝑖 + 𝜋𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼0𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎) + 𝛾0𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑐) + 𝛽0𝑖 +
𝛽1𝑖ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 + 𝛽4𝑖ln (𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) + 𝛽5𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(3.8) 
                                                 
75
 For more detailed information on the dataset and pooling strategies, see Section 1.3.1 in Chapter 1 and Section 
2.3.1 in Chapter 2.  
76
 Frequency weights at the state level are used to ensure that the data is representative of the whole German 
population. 
77
 For simplicity, household, age, period, and cohort sub-indices are omitted. 
Chapter 3. Inter- and Intra-generational Emissions Inequality in Germany: Empirical Analyses    107 
 
 
 
 
where ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 stands for household size (number of adults plus children), 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 is a binary 
variable indicating whether the household’s leader78 has completed high school or other 
specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 similarly indicates if the household’s leader  has university or 
higher education , 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 is the disposable income of the household, and 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 is a binary 
variable indicating if the household liver in rural residential area. 79 Dwelling size, number of 
electric appliances, and type of heating system are used as additional control variables in the 
equations for electricity and gas emissions. Numbers of old and new cars are used as controls 
in the equation for car fuels emissions.   
One relevant issue is addressed in this paper:  the cohort effects of other household 
members (not just the household leader) are analysed. There can be persons from different 
cohorts living in the same household and the energy consumption (and emissions) is then 
blurred by the consumption activities of several birth cohorts. Previous literature has totally 
disregarded the presence of other birth cohorts in the household and focused only on the 
effect of the leader’s birth cohort on emissions. Therefore, instead of household size, I include 
the number of household members belonging to a specific birth cohort are as controls, 
 
 ln(𝐸𝑖)
𝑎𝑝𝑐 = 𝛼𝑎𝑖 + 𝜋𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼0𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎) + 𝛾0𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑐) + 𝛽0𝑖 +
∑ 𝜇𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑐
1988
𝑐=1908 + 𝛽2𝑖 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 + 𝛽4𝑖 ln(𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) + 𝛽5𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(3.9) 
 
where 𝑛𝑐 stands for the number of household members belonging to particular cohort 𝑐 and 
𝜇𝑐𝑖 is the cohort effect, coming from that particular household member, on emissions.  
To examine the changes in characteristics and energy consumption of the average German 
household, Table 3.1 includes the summary statistics of the main variables of interest, 
weighted for the whole German population. The average German household got smaller, 
older, and richer between 1993 and 2013. The leaders of the households tend to be more 
educated: while in 1993 only 8.3 percent had completed high school or other specialized 
education in 2013 this number is up to 11.1 percent (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2); the proportion of leaders with 
university or higher education also increased (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3). The average household tend to own 
more electric appliance and to live in bigger dwellings in 2013 in comparison to earlier 
                                                 
78
 Date of birth (birth cohort), age, and education are defined for the  leader of the household, who is the main 
income earner in the family. Many studies that investigate cohort effects among households make such an 
assumption (Chancel (2014), Sànchez-Peña (2013), and Segal (2013)).  
79
 Some variables are logged and others are binary indicators so that to make the interpretation of the coefficients 
easier. Chancel (2014) also measures income in logs so that to obtain the income elasticity of emissions. 
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Table 3. 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 1.887 0.820 1.834 0.802 1.804 0.804 1.758 0.789 1.727 0.778 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 0.424 0.819 0.359 0.757 0.334 0.734 0.298 0.692 0.281 0.682 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 50.479 16.297 51.267 16.447 51.650 16.627 51.693 16.516 52.464 17.145 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 28708.220 16807.470 31426.280 18937.680 33898.480 20528.100 34692.720 21922.690 36805.630 22777.440 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐1 0.649 0.477 0.700 0.458 0.684 0.465 0.647 0.478 0.653 0.476 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 0.083 0.275 0.108 0.310 0.118 0.322 0.122 0.327 0.111 0.314 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 0.114 0.318 0.127 0.333 0.142 0.349 0.131 0.337 0.150 0.357 
𝑇𝑉𝑠 1.227 0.641 1.419 0.751 1.474 0.843 1.483 0.869 1.675 0.964 
𝑃𝐶𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠 0.249 0.498 0.463 0.656 0.866 0.893 1.224 1.080 1.810 1.342 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.717 0.755 1.994 0.739 1.917 0.831 1.796 0.888 1.269 0.535 
𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.313 0.466 0.461 0.505 0.583 0.507 0.643 0.497 0.752 0.465 
𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.112 0.537 1.236 0.582 1.322 0.608 0.386 0.491 1.441 0.627 
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 85.808 38.192 89.785 40.927 92.665 42.002 92.316 41.748 92.809 42.366 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤 0.446 0.586 0.432 0.587 0.410 0.578 0.367 0.561 0.431 0.607 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 0.478 0.641 0.535 0.677 0.605 0.710 0.625 0.716 0.669 0.758 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.179 0.384 0.154 0.361 0.153 0.360 0.163 0.369 0.168 0.374 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.636 0.481 0.740 0.439 0.776 0.417 0.771 0.420 0.773 0.419 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 3879.428 2876.294 3644.427 2734.130 3880.870 2898.537 3144.112 2462.313 3136.729 2534.392 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 21325.060 16043.200 20614.440 22579.500 17434.150 20917.880 15345.200 22644.410 12967.130 22570.810 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 904.344 855.088 1047.388 1000.752 958.891 901.726 847.734 842.634 792.499 787.780 
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Table 3. 1 (Continued) 
 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 2.165 1.605 2.034 1.526 2.166 1.617 1.754 1.374 1.750 1.414 
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 8.935 6.722 8.637 9.461 7.305 8.765 6.430 9.488 5.433 9.457 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 2.170 2.052 2.514 2.402 2.301 2.164 2.035 2.022 1.902 1.891 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 13.270 7.561 13.185 10.342 11.772 9.749 10.219 10.345 9.086 10.255 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 0.143 0 0.143 0 0.155 0 0.221 2.78E-17 0.268 0 
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 0.031 0 0.031 0 0.048 0 0.071 0 0.071 0 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 0.668 0 0.737 0 1.033 0 1.385 0 1.551 0 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 38376 47747 41046 42315 50342 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 stands for disposable income, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the 
household’s leader has completed high school or other specialized school, e𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 
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periods, which consequently requires more electricity and space heating. Germans also own a  
higher proportion of older cars in comparison to new, which adds to the consumption of car 
fuels because the older cars are less energy efficient. The data shows that households that own 
old cars have on average six percent higher consumption of car fuels than households that 
own new cars.  
Table 3.1 reveals no clear trend in the consumption of electricity and the related 
emissions, but it appears that consumption is much lower in 2013 than it was in 1993 
(consumption decreased by 19.2 percent). The decrease in electricity consumption is mainly 
due to higher electricity prices (which almost doubled during the period) and partially due to 
more energy efficient electric appliances (which is difficult to measure given the dataset). 
Concerning heating of their homes, the German households rely increasingly on central 
heating, which is usually gas operated.  But gas consumption has also decreased by around 
39.2 percent during the period whereas the gas price has more than doubled.  Similarly, the 
consumption of car fuels and the related emissions have decreased by 12.4 percent. So, also 
the total direct energy related CO2 emissions for the average German household have declined 
during the last twenty years of the IES data. The drop could be a consequence of the decrease 
in the average household size and the increase of energy prices but potentially also due to the 
economic crisis.  
 In order to investigate the emissions inequality between the poor ‒ low income and the 
rich ‒ high income households in Germany (determined by the level of equivalent income: 
disposable income divided by modified OECD scale),  the emissions for each equivalent 
income decile are computed separately. The development of total energy related CO2 
emissions over time for the first (empty triangles), fifth (empty circles), and tenth decile 
(empty diamonds) of equivalent disposable income is provided in Figure 3.1.
80
 The figure 
also includes the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. The low income 
households emitted 10.6 tons of CO2 in 1993 and only 4.4 tons of CO2 in 2013. The CO2 
emissions of the high  income  German households  have increased slightly from 1993  to 
1998, then declined to 17.0 tons  in 2003 and further to 13.1 tons of CO2 in 2013 (overall they 
decreased by 26.7 percent). The fifth (middle) decile exhibits similar pattern to the tenth 
decile, only with smaller magnitude. The emissions inequality according to income levels is 
quite evident in Germany. Figure 3.1 further shows that in 1993 the rich emitted 68.9 percent 
                                                 
80
 Table 3.4 in the Appendix includes the total energy related CO2 emissions for each year and each decile 
separately. 
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more emissions than the poor while in 2013 even 196.8 percent more emissions
81
. Thus,  the 
income emissions inequality has further widened during the period 1993–2013 but one has to 
be cautious since this evidence comes from raw data without controlling for any other 
relevant variables which might partly explain the difference. Rich and poor households differ 
in household size, age, and education levels. Richer households are likely to be older (age is 
usually related to higher energy consumption) and more educated while poorer households are 
likely to be bigger in size, all of which could partly explain the emissions inequalities between 
the two groups. Moreover, low income households are also less likely to own a car or electric 
home appliances and are more likely limit their consumption of other energy goods due to 
budget limitations. 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Development of total CO2 emissions for the first, fifth and tenth equivalent 
income decile over time 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Empty triangles denote the first, empty circles denote the fifth decile, and 
empty diamonds denote the tenth equivalent income decile. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence 
intervals. 
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 As mentioned in the literature review, rich households in the U.S., France (Chancel (2014)), and U.K. 
(Hargreaves et al. (2013))  are also found to emit around three times more CO2 than the poor households. 
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Figure 3.2 presents the total energy related emissions of rural (empty circles) and 
urban (empty diamonds) households during the period 1993‒2013. Rural households are 
defined as households living in areas with less than 100,000 inhabitants.
82
 The gap between 
the rural and urban households’ emissions has widened during the period, despite the 
decreasing trend in direct CO2 emissions (for the rural households this trend starts only after 
1998). In 1993, the average urban household emitted 13.2 tons while the rural emitted 14.9 
tons total direct energy related CO2 emissions; the difference was 12.9 percent. However, by 
2008 the gap widened further to 27.7 percent and by 2013 to 39.1 percent with urban and 
rural households emitting 6.9 and 9.6 tons of CO2  respectively. Other differences between the 
rural and urban households, which might clarify the place of residence emissions inequalities, 
include household size, age, income, and education (see Table 3.3 in the Appendix). Rural 
households are found to be bigger, older and richer while urban households are found to be 
more educated ‒ higher education is usually associated with higher environmental 
consciousness and thus lower emissions.  
 
 
Figure 3. 2 Differences in emissions levels between rural and urban households 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Empty circles denote the urban and empty diamonds denote the rural 
households. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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 Using an alternative specification of rural as households living in areas with below 50,000 inhabitants, 
demonstrates that the gap between urban and rural households is even wider.   
Chapter 3. Inter- and Intra-generational Emissions Inequality in Germany: Empirical Analyses     113 
 
 
 
 
For the emissions inequality according to year of birth (birth cohort), I have prepared 
Figure 3.3. The figure shows sort of an inverted u-shaped relationship between total energy 
related emissions and the birth cohort of the household leader. It can be seen in Figure 3.3 that 
the households which have a household leader born between 1933 and 1963 emit around 8.8 
percent more CO2 than the average German household. The highest emitters appear to be the 
cohort born in 1953, with 16.1 percent higher than average emissions. The households with 
leaders born 1908–1923 and 1968–1993 have lower than average emissions. As extreme 
cases, the cohorts born 1993 and 1995 have 44.8 percent and 58.1 percent lower emissions 
than the average German household.  
 
 
Figure 3. 3 Birth cohorts and total emissions 
Note. Database is IES 1993-2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
Once again, other household’s characteristics could also explain such large differences 
in emissions levels.
 83
 Namely, household size is 5.9 percent larger than average among the 
households with leaders born 1953–1978. Moreover, households with leaders from birth 
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 Table 3.5 in the Appendix summarizes the variables of interest according to birth cohort of the household’s  
leader.  
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cohorts 1933–1963 live in 6.4 percent larger dwellings. Furthermore, if the households has a 
leader born between 1948 and 1978, income tends to be 6.7 percent higher. Hence, overall 
energy consumption appears to be highest among cohorts 1933–1963. Energy taxes on 
electricity would be more effective in reducing emissions if imposed on the generations 
1933–1988 and energy taxes on gas should be imposed on the generations 1913-1963. Also, 
households with leaders from certain birth cohorts tend to have larger number of household 
appliances: cohorts 1943–1963 own 7.2 percent higher number of TVs, cohorts 1948–1993 
own 12.6 percent higher number of PCs and notebooks, cohorts 1928–1958 own 6.5 percent 
higher number of refrigerators and freezers, cohorts 1943–1993 own 11.2 percent higher 
number of dishwashers, and cohorts  1943–1963 own 6.1 percent higher number of washing 
machines and driers. In addition, the cohorts 1948-1993 possess 10.8 percent larger than 
average number old cars, and the cohorts 1928–1958 possess 7.1 percent larger than average 
number of new cars. Increasing car fuels tax for the  cohorts born before 1953 would affect 
emissions by less than if imposed on the cohorts born after 1953.  
 
3.5 Empirical results 
 
3.51. Total energy related emissions 
 
The results from the APCD specification, where only age, period, and cohort are 
included as explanatory variables, show that the households with leaders born between 1933 
and 1973 have a stronger tendency to emit CO2 than the households with leaders born before 
1933 and after 1973 (see Figure 3.4). All the cohort effects are statistically significant
84
 
indicating that birth cohorts are important determinant of energy related emissions in 
Germany. So, the total energy emissions of German households exhibit sort of an inverted u-
shaped relationship with the birth cohort of the household’s leader.  The cohorts born 1933–
1973 emit more CO2 than the average German household, holding everything else constant. 
Figure 3.4 also shows that the households whose leader is born in 1913, 1918 or 1983 emit 
less emissions than the average household probably due to lower demand for energy goods 
(for instance demand for car fuels among the earlier generations). The existence of strong 
generational emissions inequalities in Germany could be explained by the fact that baby 
boomers are wealthier, live in energy inefficient dwellings, and have certain types of habits 
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 With exception of the cohorts 1923 and 1973. Table 3.6 in the Appendix shows the details on the estimated 
coefficients of the model without additional controls, with controls, and with other cohorts’ effects. 
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and life styles. The estimates  from the APCD model overlap with the descriptive evidence 
(see Figure 3.3 in Section 3.4), which shows the households with leaders born 1933–1963  to 
be the highest emitters (irrespective of age, period, and other characteristics). So, controlling 
for age, period, and cohort effects helped to explain part of of the inter-generational emissions 
gap found in the data. 
The generational effect is still present once income, education, other socioeconomic, 
demographic, and life style variables are included in the model. Figure 3.5 shows the effect of 
birth cohort of household’s leader on CO2 emissions with additional explanatory variables and  
number of household members of certain cohorts (except of the household’s leader), as 
described by equation (3.9). 
85
  This specification significantly improved the model fit and  
 
Figure 3. 4 Cohort effects of household’s leader on total energy CO2 emissions without 
controls 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
also allowed for analyses of the influence of household’s members (potentially belonging to a  
different  birth cohort from the leader ) on emissions. The results reveal that generations born 
between 1943 and 1973 have higher CO2 emissions than the average German household and 
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 Household size (number of adults and children) as control is included in the second specification (equation 
(3.8)). See the third column in Table 3.6 in the Appendix for the results. 
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most of the cohort effects are statistically significant.
 86
   Households whose leader belongs to 
the 1963 birth cohort are the highest CO2 emitters. It seems that the 1943–1973 cohorts have 
difficulties in adapting to more energy efficient consumption patterns and lifestyles. The 
households’ leader belonging to the generations born before 1943 and after 1973 have lower 
tendency to emit CO2. Chancel (2014) claims that the sign of the cohort effects is more 
important than the actual magnitude. The cohort effects for Germany are comparable to the 
results of Chancel (2014) for France, where the cohorts born between 1930 and 1955 are the 
highest CO2 emissions emitters (using data for the period 1980–2000), and overlap also with 
the results of Menz and Küling (2011) for OECD countries (using data for the period 1970–
2000), where people born before1960 are found to have lower SO2 emissions). Sànchez-Peña 
(2013) finds that in Mexico, the cohorts born between 1923 and 1968 consume more energy 
(and therefore emit more CO2 emissions) than the average household. The results of Menz 
and Welsch (2012) demonstrate that people born 1920 and earlier, and between 1941 and 
1960 emit significantly less CO2 than people born after 1960.
 87
  
As explained before, including the number of other household members belonging to a 
certain birth cohort (see equation (3.9)) as control variables, allowed for the examination of 
the impact of the birth cohorts of other household members on energy emissions, which has 
not been done in earlier studies. The cohort effect of the household members born between 
1918 and 1988 is positive and statistically significant. Only the cohort effect of the household 
members born in 1908 is negative but insignificant (Figure 3.9 and Table 3.5 in the 
Appendix). Having an additional household member, who belongs to the birth cohorts 1923, 
1928, 1933, 1938, 1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963 or 1968, increases energy related CO2 
emissions.
 
Additional members from the cohort 1943 have highest effect on emissions. 
Interestingly enough, the results indicate that having either a households leader or at least one 
household member from the birth cohorts 1943–196888 leads to higher energy consumption 
and tendency to emit more CO2.   
The results of the APCD model with controls and other household members cohorts’ 
controls provide several further details about the determinants of energy related emissions, 
besides the birth cohorts of the leader and other members.  The effect of dwelling size on total 
energy emissions is positive and statistically significant. High school or university education 
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 For details on the estimated coefficients and their standard errors, please refer to Table 3.6 in the Appendix. 
The cohort effects of household’s leader on emissions are insignificant only for the cohorts born 1913, 1938, and 
1973. 
87
 The data used in Sànchez-Peña (2013), and  Menz and Welsch (2012) cover the period 1992–2008 (in 4 years 
gaps) 1960–2005 respectively.  
88
 This is the overlap of the results of Figures 3.6 and 3.11. 
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of the household’s leader appears to have small but negative effect on total emissions. 
Households which have a leader aged between 50 and 75 are found to emit more CO2 than the 
average German household. In France, households with leaders aged above 60 emit more CO2 
than the average household (Chancel (2014)). The age of the household’s leader has been 
associated with the life cycle of the household. Households that are at later stages of their life  
cycle usually increase their consumption net of other effects (Pachauri, 2004). Indeed in some 
developed countries, age is found to be positively related with higher residential energy 
consumption (see for instance Rehdanz (2007), Liddle and Lund (2010), and O’Neill and 
Chen (2002)).   
 
 
Figure 3. 5 Cohort effects of household’s leader on total energy CO2 emissions with 
control variables and other cohorts effects 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
To examine the effect of income on emissions and to confirm the oresence of income 
emissions inequalities among German households, the sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficient of income in equation (3.9) are important. The results demonstrate that income has 
positive and significant effect on emissions – comparing two households with same 
characteristics but with  different income levels, the households with higher income is 
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expected to have higher energy related emissions. Weber and Matthews (2008), find that 10 
percent increase in the income of US households leads to 3.5 to 5.2 percent increase in the 
carbon footprint.
89
 Similarly, to confirm the presence of place of living inequalities, the 
coefficient on the rural variable should be significant.
90
  A household living in rural area in 
Germany is expected to have higher total energy related emissions than a household living in 
urban residential area, holding everything else constant.  
 
3.5.2 Emissions from the separate sources: electricity, gas, and car fuels 
 
The cohort effects  for the separate energy related emissions
91
 (electricity, gas, and car 
fuels) are displayed in Figure 3.6. The effects represented on the graph are coming from the 
model with additional control variables and other cohorts’ effects.92 For electricity related 
emissions, the households with leaders born between 1948 and 1978 are highest CO2 emitters. 
Having an additional household member from the cohorts 1933–1953 increases electricity 
related emissions (see Table 3.7 in the Appendix). The household with leader born between 
1928 and 1968 are responsible for more gas related CO2 emissions than the average 
household. Gas related emissions are higher if the household has an additional member from 
the cohorts 1928–1953. The cohort effects of the household’s leader for car fuels related 
emissions demonstrate that the cohorts 1958–1973 are the highest emissions emitters.  Having 
an additional household member from the cohorts 1938–1963 leads to higher than average car 
fuels related emissions. Households with either a household’s leader or member from birth 
cohorts 1948–1953, 1928–1953, and 1938–1963 have propensity to emit more electricity, gas, 
or car fuels related emissions respectively.  
The outcomes from the APCD further provide evidence of income related emissions 
inequalities for electricity, gas, and car fuels related emissions.
93
 So, a positive relationship 
between income and total energy related CO2 emissions is reconfirmed for the emissions 
coming from separate energy sources, as was also found in Brännlund and Ghalwash (2008). 
Table 3.7 in the Appendix also presents evidence of area of residence emissions inequalities 
for CO2 emissions coming from gas and car fuels. Rural households are expected to have 
                                                 
89
 The authors consider the carbon footprint across all goods categories (not just energy) and consider both 
domestic and emissions included in imported goods and services.  
90
 See Table 3.5 in the Appendix for details on estimated coefficients for income and rural place of residence. 
The descriptive evidence from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is in line with the empirical results included in Table 3.5.  
91
 For details on the estimates, please refer to Table 3.7 in the Appendix.  
92
 For the pure cohort effects, without controls, please check Figure 3.10 in the Appendix. They are comparable 
to Figure 3.6 but slightly larger in absolute value. 
93
 Please refer to Table 3.7 in the Appendix. 
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higher gas related emissions and higher car fuels related emissions, probably due to more 
travel necessary for everyday life. As expected, there is no difference between rural and urban 
households in CO2 emissions related to electricity.  
 
 
Figure 3. 6 Cohort effects of household leader on different energy CO2 emissions 
sources, with additional control variables and other cohorts effects 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Years 13–83 stand for 1913–1983.   Line segments indicate the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
The results have several policy implication concerning which groups of the population 
should be targeted in order to achieve highest  CO2 emissions savings. In Germany, rural and 
high income households have higher electricity, gas, and car fuels related emissions. Carbon 
taxes would decrease emissions more for the rural and rich than for the urban and poor 
households.
94
 Energy taxes on gas would be more effective in reducing emissions if imposed 
on the generations 1928-1968, and energy taxes on electricity should be imposed on the 
generations 1948-1973. Increasing car fuels tax for the  cohorts 1953-1973 would affect 
emissions more than if imposed on the cohorts born before 1953 or after 1973. So for the 
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 This also depends on the price elasticites of demand of the respective groups, and for instance in Chapter 2, I 
have shown that low income households  have higher elasticity for electricity demand than the high income 
households. 
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earlier cohorts, energy taxes on domestic energy would be more efficient than taxes on 
transport. Having higher emissions from gas or electricity than from car fuels can indicate that 
taxes on car fuels will not be as effective in reducing emissions for that part of the population.  
Hence, mitigation policies need to be scrutinized for the separate emission domains in order 
to assure fairness. Moreover changes in lifestyles can also contribute to lowering residential 
energy related emissions in Germany. Living in bigger household size and smaller (energy 
efficient) dwellings, lower number or more efficient electric appliances and cars can all bring 
CO2 savings. 
 
3.6 Consistency checks and methodological issues 
 
The Age Period Cohort Intrinsic Estimator (APC-IE) model
95
 is estimated to check the 
robustness of the APCD results. The estimates from the APC-IE reconfirm the inverted u-
shape of residential energy emissions in Germany but as the estimates are expected to include 
some bias, the predicted coefficients should be interpreted with caution.  Figure 3.7 includes 
the cohorts’ effects of the household’s leader on total energy emissions as predicted by the 
APC-IE model without controls. The figure demonstrates that households with leader from 
the birth cohorts 1923–1973 have higher emissions whereas the 1943 and 1948 cohorts are 
found to have highest tendency to emit CO2. This was also the case in the APCD model 
without controls: 1948 cohort is the highest emitter, and the cohorts 1933–1973 emitting more 
CO2 than the average household.  
Figure 3.8 shows the birth cohort effects from the APC-IE model with controls and 
other household members cohorts’ effects. On this figure, it can be seen that the households 
with leaders belonging to birth cohorts 1933–1973 emit more CO2, and the leaders belonging 
to 1963 cohort emit more CO2 than the average household. APCD also predicted households 
with leaders from the 1963 birth cohort as highest emitters and positive and significant cohort 
effect on emissions if the leader is from the birth cohorts 1943–1973. The APC-IE cohort 
effects of other household’s members indicate that household’s members belonging to cohorts 
1928–1963 raise energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
96
  
                                                 
95
 For details on model specifications, please refer to Yang et al. (2004 and 2008), Yang and Land (2006), 
Rutherford et al. (2010), Sasieni (2012), and Schulhofer-Wohl and Yang (2006). Detailed results from the 
German data are provided in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.11 in the Appendix. 
96
 The cohorts’ effects of other household members from APC-IE are very similar to APCD estimates (compare  
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 in Appendix).  
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Figure 3. 7 Cohort effects of household’s leader from the APC-IE model without 
controls 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013.  Years 13–83 stand for 1913–1983.  Line segments indicate the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
The only big difference between the APCD and the APC-IE estimates (both including 
additional controls and other cohorts’ effects as in equation (3.9)) is that the latter model has 
higher cohort effects overall and identifies the 1933–1973 birth cohorts as the highest emitters 
while the APCD identifies the cohorts 1943–1973 as the highest CO2 emitters. The APC-IE 
model also includes two more cohorts (1908 and 1998) and has larger 95 percent confidence 
intervals in comparison to the APCD, which cuts the corner cohorts, leading to large 
improvement in the efficiency of the estimates. The results from APC-IE also confirm the 
presence of intra-temporal emissions inequalities in Germany. Emissions are higher among 
households with higher income levels and households that live in rural area.  
The comparison of the results from the two different estimation methods support the 
idea of the robustness of both the cohort trends and the overall estimations. As mentioned 
earlier, the trend is also more relevant than the actual magnitude of the cohort coefficients. So, 
the results should still be carefully interpreted even if the de-trended estimator is more 
appropriate than the intrinsic estimator.  
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Figure 3. 8 Cohort effects of household’s leader from the APC-IE model with additional 
controls and other cohorts effects 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Years 13–83 stand for 1913–1983.  Line segments indicate the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  
 
  There can be potentially other factors, such as behavioral, housing, and income, 
behind the cohort trends.
97
  The number and type of household appliances, or the number and 
type of cars, and the frequency of their usage could be interpreted as behavioral as well as 
income determined factors. The cohorts 1933–1963 own larger than average number of 
household appliances, the cohorts 1948–1993 own larger than average number of old cars, 
and the cohorts 1928–1958 own larger than average number of new cars. Some of the electric 
appliances owned by generations born after 1973 might be more energy efficient but it also 
might be the case that the latter generations use the appliances less frequently due to 
environmental concerns or different habits.
98
 Similarly,  newer cars could be more energy 
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 The issue of inter-generational emissions gaps was already touched upon at the end of Section 3.4 (and Table 
3.5 in the Appendix). 
98
 Lighting and heating requirements are also very different for a retired person who spends significant amount 
of time at home and a student who spends significant amount of time at the university buildings.  
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efficient and different birth cohorts could have different behavioral patterns. 
99
 Households 
with leaders born between 1933 and 1963 live in larger dwellings, which requires more 
lighting and heating and represents the housing factor. Unfortunately, data on type of 
dwelling and year of construction was not available for all the waves of the IES data.  
The household size and type of heating system are also determined by both behavior 
and income. For example, household size is higher than average among the households with 
leader born 1953–1978. Households with leaders born 1958–1993 rely more on central 
heating, which is usually gas operated. The income factor is clearly present and income is 
higher than average among the households with leader born 1948–1978. This could indicate 
that the younger generations as well as pensioners are more resources restricted, which in turn 
is reflected in lower energy consumption and emissions. It is worth to note that all three 
factors overlap for the generations 1953 and 1958, which are also identified as higher emitters 
by the APCD.    
An additional concern might be that the only direct energy emissions of households 
are included in the analyses. According to some studies, the indirect energy emissions (which 
are incorporated in the goods and services purchased by the households) account for 40-50 
percent of total households’ emissions (see Chancel, 2014). In addition, the emissions levels 
in this paper are measured based on energy expenditures, assuming that all households pay 
the same price for specific energy good in a given year. Consequently, higher energy 
consumption levels might be assigned to a household that pays higher energy price per unit of 
energy good, hence overstating their emissions. So, surveys that collect data on both energy 
quantity (consumption) and price might be more suitable for analyses in the future. Another 
potential reason for caution with the results’ interpretation is that the APCD requires that age 
and cohort variables to be equality spaced with the frequency of the data collection ( which in 
the case of the German IES is five years). So actual age and year of births were converted to 
an interval: for instance if the leader was born in 1976 and was aged 38 in 2013, he or she will 
be assigned to the birth cohort 1973–1978 and age of 40. This might slightly alter the 
predictions on the size of cohorts and age effects.   
 
3.7 Interim conclusion 
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 For instance, the student might opt out for using a bicycle or public transport whereas a pensioner might 
choose to drive the car.  
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The goal of this paper is to investigate energy related emissions inequalities and their 
underlying causes. For that purpose, first the direct residential CO2 emissions are derived 
from German households data. Secondly, two types of emissions inequalities among German 
households are identified: i) intra-generational – a) poor versus rich and b) rural versus urban 
inequalities, and ii) intergenerational – birth cohort inequalities. The descriptive evidence 
demonstrates that the high income German households emit around 200 percent more CO2 
than low income households in 2013. Also the gap between the rural and poor households’ 
emissions is large, with rural emitting 40 percent more CO2 than urban households in 2013. 
Some of the intra-generational emissions inequalities could be potentially explained by 
differences in household size and composition, age, education, income, and area of residence. 
An inverted u-shaped relationship is found between total energy related emissions and the 
birth cohort of the household’s leader. The emissions are highest for the households that have 
a leader born between 1933 and 1963. The cohorts born 1908–1928 and 1968–1993 have 
lower than the average emissions. The younger (later) German generations appear to be more 
environmentally conscious as well as resources restricted and this could partly explain the 
intergenerational CO2 emissions inequality. 
Thirdly, the analyses focuses the role of year of birth in driving emissions by applying 
a De-trended Age Period Cohort (APCD) model. The estimates indicate the presence of clear 
cohort effects on residential energy related CO2 emissions. The households with leaders born 
1933–1973 (in 5 years gaps) are found to be the highest CO2 emitters. Adding additional 
controls to the model demonstrates that the generational effect is still present, statistically 
significant, and might be a reflection of both large and energy inefficient infrastructures as 
well as higher number of motor vehicles used by earlier generations.  The German households 
with leaders born 1943–1973 emit more CO2 than their predecessors or followers.   The 
estimates confirm the presence of intra-temporal, namely income- and area of residence-
related emissions inequalities in Germany. Households in rural areas and richer households 
have higher energy related emissions.   
This paper tackles a crucial issue:  estimating the birth cohort effects of additional 
household members on emissions. The cohort effects of other household members prove that 
additional household members born between 1913 and 1988 have positive and statistically 
significant effect on emissions. Household’s members belonging to the birth cohorts 1923, 
1928, 1933, 1938, 1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963 or 1968 add more to emissions than the 
average household member. 
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The results demonstrate solid evidence that birth cohort effects (both of household’s 
leader and household’s members) are significant in explaining residential energy related 
pollution in Germany. The cohort compositional differences provide knowledge about the 
creation of environmental practices of households and can be useful in creating improved 
environmental policies, which would target specific birth cohorts in the population. The 
cohort effects partly explain the durability of energy practices of German households and 
maybe in the future lower pollution levels will be achieved by cohort replacement.   
The empirical outcomes have several policy implications on how to reduce emissions 
and to overcome emissions inequalities. Carbon or energy taxes would decrease emissions 
more if imposed/increased for the rural and the high income households. Taxes could reduce 
emissions by larger amounts if imposed on the households leaders or members from the 
generations 1943–1968. Also for the earlier (older) cohorts taxes on domestic energy would 
be more effective than taxes on car fuels. Fahmy et al. (2011) also  recommend policies which 
aim at reduction of energy consumption among the groups which are “overconsuming” 
relative to the population (for instance taxing private vehicle and aviation transport among the 
rich households). Last but not least, changes in lifestyles such as smaller (energy efficient) 
dwellings, bigger household size, less or more efficient cars, and electric appliances can play 
an important role in lowering residential energy related emissions in Germany. 
There are several possibilities for future research. The empirical analyses could be 
repeated for actual consumption (including other domestic fuels besides gas) or emissions 
data when such dataset becomes available for an extended period of time. The analyses can be 
conducted for other pollutants like sulfur dioxide (SO2) or nitrogen oxides (NOx). Similarly, 
the examination of the presence of cohort effects of the household’s leader and other 
household’s members in other countries of the European Union (E.U.) might be worthwhile to 
identify potential target groups for more effective mitigation policies. 
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3.8 Appendix 
 
Table 3. 2 Relevant studies and their contribution to literature 
Study Country, and time 
period 
Energy/ 
Resources 
inequalitiy 
Determinants of 
energy consumption/ 
emissions 
Age-Period-
Cohort model 
Cohort effects of 
household‘s 
leader/members 
Age 
effects 
Income 
effects 
Rural  
(Urbanization 
effects) 
Ghalwash (2007) Sweden, 1984–1996 Yes No No No/No No Yes No 
Aguiar and Hurst (2013)  U.S., 1980–2003  No Yes (with behavioral 
responses) 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No 
Segall (2013) U.S., 1980–2003 Yes Yes (with behavioral 
responses) 
Yes Yes/No Yes Yes No 
Deutsch and Timpe 
(2012) 
Germany, 2008 Yes Yes No No/No Yes No No 
Sànchez-Peña  (2013) Mexico, 1992–2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes No 
Chancel (2014) France, US, 1980–
2000 
Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes No 
Papathanasopoulou and 
Jackson (2009) 
U.K., 1968–2000 Yes No No No/No No Yes No 
Papathanasopoulou (2007) Greece, 1990–2006 Yes Yes No No/No No No No 
Fahmy et al. (2011) U.K., 2002–2008 Yes Yes No No/No Yes Yes Yes 
Hargreaves et al. (2013) G.B., 2004–2007 Yes Yes No No/No Yes Yes Yes 
Büchs and Schnepf (2013)  U.K., 2006 –2009 Yes Yes No No/No Yes Yes Yes 
Pampel and Hunter (2012) U.S., 1973–2008 No Yes (environmental 
spending) 
Yes Yes/No Yes Yes No 
Weber and Matthews 
(2008) 
U.S., 2004 Yes Yes No No/No No Yes No 
Weber and Perrels (2000) West Germany,  
Netherlands, and 
France, 1990 
No Yes No No/No Yes Yes No 
Rehdanz (2007) Germany, 1998–2003 No Yes No No/No Yes Yes No 
Jamasb and Meier (2010) U.K., 1991–2007 No Yes No No/No No Yes Yes 
Meier and Rehdanz 
(2010) 
U.K., 1991–2005 No Yes No No/No Yes Yes No 
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Table 3. 2 (Continued) 
Study Country, and time 
period 
Energy/ 
Resources 
inequalitiy 
Determinants of 
energy consumption/ 
emissions 
Age-Period-
Cohort model 
Cohort effects of 
household‘s 
leader/members 
Age 
effects 
Income 
effects 
Rural  
(Urbanization 
effects) 
Bin and Dowlatabadi 
(2005) 
 
U.S., 1997 No Yes No No/No No No No 
Xu et al. (2016)  
 
China, 2011 Yes Yes No No/No Yes Yes  Yes 
O’Neill and Chen (2002) U.S., 1993–1994 No Yes No No/No Yes Yes Yes 
Räty and Carlsson-
Kanyama (2009) 
Germany, 2003; 
Norway, 2001–2003; 
Greece, 2004–2005; 
Sweden, 2003–2005 
Yes Yes No No/No Yes Yes No 
Chancel and Piketty 
(2015) 
Worldwide, 1998–
2013 
Yes  No No/No No Yes No 
Grunewald  et al. (2016) 158 countries, 1980–
2008 
Yes (income 
inequality) 
Yes No No/No No Yes No 
Menz and Küling (2011) 25 OECD countries, 
1970–2000 
Yes Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Menz and Welsch (2012) 26 OECD countries, 
1960–2005 
Yes Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Ravallion et al. (2000) 42 countries, 1975–
1992 
Yes (income 
inequality) 
Yes No No/No No Yes Yes 
Note. All necessary information is taken from the respective studies.   
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Table 3. 3 Summary statistics of rural and urban households 
 Rural Urban All 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 1.886 0.822 1.638 0.730 1.955 0.811 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 0.388 0.789 0.239 0.620 0.447 0.836 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 51.699 16.251 51.296 17.338 52.470 15.019 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 35182 20845 29762 19703 39184 21647 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐1 0.700 0.458 0.606 0.489 0.615 0.487 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 0.106 0.308 0.114 0.317 0.145 0.352 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 0.111 0.314 0.175 0.380 0.171 0.376 
𝑇𝑉𝑠 1.500 0.851 1.405 0.816 1.548 0.874 
𝑃𝐶𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠 0.980 1.133 0.912 1.082 1.075 1.135 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.803 0.821 1.587 0.730 1.797 0.828 
𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.600 0.506 0.486 0.511 0.636 0.499 
𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.158 0.681 1.033 0.681 1.174 0.678 
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 99.274 43.061 75.220 32.307 98.509 42.263 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤 0.448 0.604 0.361 0.545 0.479 0.615 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 0.653 0.735 0.462 0.634 0.634 0.729 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.109 0.312 0.263 0.440 0.150 0.357 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.793 0.405 0.647 0.478 0.742 0.438 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 3778 2895 3036 2280 3801 2844 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 18603 24021 15126 15659 18780 22650 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 1038 914 672 777 1073 923 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 12.394 10.888 9.644 7.522 2.121 1.587 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 147922 71904 219826 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
stands for disposable income, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the household’s leader has completed high school or 
other specialized school, e𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 
 
 
Table 3. 4 Total energy related emissions across the deciles 
Decile/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year Mean CO2 emissions (in tons) 
Germany 
1993 10.562 12.258 13.086 13.793 14.312 14.878 15.598 16.032 17.940 17.346 
1998 9.311 11.241 12.311 13.089 14.025 14.833 15.676 16.351 18.083 16.682 
2003 7.393 9.150 10.373 11.122 12.032 12.810 13.710 14.301 17.029 15.160 
2008 5.496 7.294 8.360 9.552 10.463 11.427 11.919 12.948 14.922 13.708 
2013 4.415 5.996 6.914 8.079 8.746 9.645 10.585 11.116 13.120 11.824 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 
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Table 3. 5 Summary statistics of households according to birth cohort of household’s leader 
Cohorts 
All 
cohorts 
1908 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 
Variable Mean 
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 1.798 1.272 1.329 1.389 1.431 1.565 1.722 1.735 1.808 1.992 2.094 2.039 1.942 1.805 1.711 1.601 1.562 1.535 1.487 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 0.336 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.015 0.042 0.134 0.320 0.535 0.684 0.719 0.696 0.573 0.360 0.153 0.070 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 51.557 85.000 82.898 80.134 76.318 73.679 70.572 66.902 62.571 56.458 51.614 47.032 42.207 38.017 35.246 31.735 28.604 25.359 22.477 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 33274 16809 17935 21025 22560 25457 28512 30133 32864 36178 37838 38071 37337 36486 36362 34200 30863 26327 21403 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐1 0.667 0.626 0.683 0.686 0.674 0.663 0.652 0.672 0.687 0.680 0.671 0.671 0.688 0.686 0.681 0.621 0.584 0.587 0.473 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 0.109 0.026 0.049 0.050 0.071 0.099 0.104 0.117 0.118 0.119 0.114 0.114 0.110 0.114 0.110 0.121 0.113 0.088 0.037 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 0.134 0.053 0.045 0.069 0.083 0.110 0.132 0.121 0.125 0.142 0.156 0.155 0.142 0.135 0.131 0.155 0.165 0.141 0.046 
𝑇𝑉𝑠 1.467 0.979 1.048 1.096 1.194 1.265 1.406 1.457 1.541 1.633 1.636 1.577 1.491 1.418 1.410 1.390 1.450 1.452 1.643 
𝑃𝐶𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠 0.956 0.002 0.010 0.054 0.091 0.233 0.456 0.661 0.895 0.982 1.075 1.143 1.126 1.162 1.262 1.354 1.516 1.646 1.736 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.727 1.413 1.517 1.651 1.770 1.854 1.888 1.842 1.821 1.902 1.876 1.808 1.726 1.642 1.524 1.406 1.351 1.276 1.256 
𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.560 0.070 0.098 0.166 0.229 0.341 0.457 0.526 0.587 0.630 0.633 0.637 0.626 0.618 0.612 0.586 0.580 0.597 0.740 
𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.114 0.782 0.868 0.988 1.029 1.068 1.096 1.080 1.180 1.234 1.204 1.189 1.175 1.066 1.036 0.956 0.985 0.953 1.443 
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 90.808 71.976 73.115 77.047 82.304 86.627 91.596 92.699 94.662 97.167 98.587 97.955 94.849 90.789 89.398 82.942 75.328 65.578 58.137 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤 0.418 0.144 0.161 0.251 0.336 0.425 0.486 0.512 0.504 0.523 0.489 0.447 0.384 0.348 0.328 0.293 0.297 0.312 0.428 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 0.586 0.079 0.110 0.136 0.183 0.257 0.366 0.441 0.557 0.629 0.696 0.695 0.705 0.725 0.724 0.710 0.698 0.635 0.668 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.163 0.212 0.159 0.182 0.175 0.181 0.186 0.195 0.185 0.170 0.171 0.157 0.144 0.131 0.128 0.140 0.170 0.180 0.165 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.742 0.521 0.638 0.654 0.665 0.697 0.706 0.715 0.727 0.749 0.741 0.750 0.757 0.773 0.793 0.783 0.772 0.763 0.767 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 3517 3039 2926 3083 3231 3380 3545 3552 3662 3955 4092 3963 3747 3462 3201 2925 2579 2125 1885 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 17379 19527 18224 19436 19224 19354 19678 19152 19369 20155 19829 18975 17821 15950 13804 11126 9595 7983 5730 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 909 108 156 239 316 450 610 686 824 1020 1116 1130 1151 1123 1120 1038 897 743 559 
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Table 3. 5 (Continued) 
Cohorts 
All 
cohorts 
1908 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 
Variable Mean 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 1.963 1.696 1.633 1.720 1.803 1.886 1.978 1.982 2.043 2.207 2.283 2.211 2.091 1.932 1.786 1.632 1.439 1.186 1.052 
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 7.282 8.182 7.636 8.144 8.055 8.109 8.245 8.025 8.116 8.445 8.308 7.950 7.467 6.683 5.784 4.662 4.020 3.345 2.401 
𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 2.182 0.259 0.374 0.574 0.757 1.079 1.465 1.647 1.977 2.447 2.678 2.712 2.762 2.695 2.688 2.490 2.152 1.783 1.341 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 11.426 10.137 9.643 10.438 10.615 11.075 11.689 11.654 12.136 13.099 13.269 12.873 12.320 11.309 10.258 8.784 7.612 6.314 4.794 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 stands for disposable income, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the 
household’s leader has completed high school or other specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education.
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Table 3. 6 Coefficient estimates of the APCD model 
 
Without additional 
controls 
With additional 
controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1913 –0.047 0.015 –0.026 0.014 –0.015 0.014 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1918 –0.047 0.010 –0.033 0.009 –0.026 0.010 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1923 –0.020 0.008 –0.028 0.008 –0.026 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1928 –0.003 0.007 –0.012 0.007 –0.021 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1933 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.006 –0.012 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1938 0.029 0.006 0.004 0.006 –0.006 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1943 0.043 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.013 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1948 0.046 0.006 0.031 0.005 0.032 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1953 0.034 0.005 0.048 0.005 0.051 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1958 0.023 0.005 0.050 0.005 0.055 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1963 0.029 0.005 0.051 0.005 0.059 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1968 0.026 0.006 0.039 0.005 0.052 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1973 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1978 –0.042 0.008 –0.045 0.007 –0.052 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1983 –0.088 0.010 –0.107 0.009 –0.111 0.010 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 25 –0.214 0.009 0.023 0.009 0.013 0.009 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 30 –0.143 0.006 –0.012 0.006 0.000 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 35 0.015 0.005 –0.035 0.005 –0.012 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 40 0.087 0.005 –0.064 0.005 –0.045 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 45 0.141 0.005 –0.037 0.005 –0.033 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 50 0.150 0.005 0.010 0.005 –0.002 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 55 0.141 0.005 0.049 0.005 0.027 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 60 0.086 0.006 0.067 0.005 0.042 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 65 –0.008 0.006 0.058 0.005 0.038 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 70 –0.042 0.006 0.044 0.005 0.034 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 75 –0.012 0.006 0.016 0.006 0.019 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 80 –0.059 0.008 –0.023 0.007 –0.008 0.007 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 85 –0.141 0.010 –0.097 0.009 –0.072 0.009 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1993 –0.046 0.002 –0.021 0.002 –0.024 0.002 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1998 0.013 0.003 –0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2003 0.060 0.003 0.032 0.003 0.033 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2008 0.025 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.029 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2013 –0.052 0.002 –0.034 0.002 –0.038 0.002 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
 
Without additional 
controls 
With additional 
controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑜ℎ –1.766 0.014 –1.905 0.013 –2.002 0.016 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒 –0.870 0.007 –0.949 0.007 –1.016 0.008 
ln(𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝)   0.303 0.004 0.277 0.004 
ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒   0.066 0.002   
𝑛1908     –0.050 0.046 
𝑛1913     0.017 0.031 
𝑛1918     0.046 0.017 
𝑛1923     0.076 0.012 
𝑛1928     0.116 0.010 
𝑛1933     0.149 0.008 
𝑛1938     0.150 0.007 
𝑛1943     0.192 0.007 
𝑛1948     0.178 0.006 
𝑛1953     0.171 0.006 
𝑛1958     0.141 0.006 
𝑛1963     0.104 0.006 
𝑛1968     0.015 0.003 
𝑛1973     0.029 0.003 
𝑛1978     0.050 0.003 
𝑛1983     0.069 0.004 
𝑛1988     0.117 0.004 
ln(ℎ_𝑞𝑚)   0.358 0.005 0.356 0.005 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2   –0.010 0.004 –0.008 0.004 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3   –0.024 0.004 –0.019 0.004 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙   0.048 0.003 0.047 0.003 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 –0.189 0.002 –0.014 0.002 –0.015 0.002 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.402 0.003 –2.685 0.033 –2.380 0.035 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 2.177 1.978 1.972 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 –2548613 –2568754 –2569055 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 216578 216578 216578 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
stands for disposable income, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the household’s leader has completed high school or 
other specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 𝑛1908 − 𝑛1988 indicate 
number of household members from these birth cohorts. ℎ_𝑞𝑚 is dwelling size. 𝐴𝐼𝐶 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 stand for Akaike 
and Bayesian Information Criterion.
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Table 3. 7 Estimates from APCD with additional controls for electricity, gas, and car fuels 
 Electricity Gas Car fuels 
 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑖) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1913 –0.001 0.010 0.014 0.011 –0.067 0.018 –0.066 0.019 0.006 0.020 0.066 0.021 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1918 –0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 –0.039 0.012 –0.040 0.013 –0.035 0.012 –0.005 0.013 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1923 –0.006 0.006 0.003 0.006 –0.034 0.010 –0.034 0.010 –0.026 0.010 –0.012 0.010 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1928 –0.016 0.005 –0.018 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.008 –0.003 0.009 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1933 –0.003 0.004 –0.016 0.005 0.029 0.008 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.007 –0.022 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1938 0.001 0.004 –0.017 0.005 0.033 0.007 0.028 0.008 –0.012 0.006 –0.050 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1943 0.013 0.004 –0.005 0.005 0.047 0.007 0.044 0.008 0.013 0.006 –0.029 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1948 0.023 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.050 0.007 0.053 0.008 0.017 0.006 –0.020 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1953 0.014 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.047 0.006 0.054 0.007 0.026 0.005 –0.005 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1958 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.041 0.006 0.050 0.007 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1963 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.029 0.006 0.040 0.006 0.022 0.005 0.018 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1968 –0.005 0.004 0.009 0.004 –0.007 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.039 0.006 0.058 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1973 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.005 –0.040 0.009 –0.041 0.009 0.045 0.007 0.067 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1978 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 –0.054 0.010 –0.063 0.010 –0.032 0.008 –0.007 0.009 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1983 –0.025 0.007 –0.024 0.007 –0.044 0.013 –0.055 0.013 –0.093 0.011 –0.062 0.011 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 25 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.059 0.011 0.052 0.011 –0.017 0.010 –0.041 0.010 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 30 –0.021 0.004 –0.018 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.008 –0.021 0.006 –0.020 0.006 
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Table 3. 7 (Continued)  
 Electricity Gas Car fuels 
 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑖) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 35 –0.033 0.004 –0.020 0.004 –0.015 0.006 –0.005 0.007 –0.052 0.005 –0.040 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 40 –0.036 0.004 –0.021 0.004 –0.031 0.006 –0.022 0.006 –0.079 0.005 –0.064 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 45 –0.014 0.003 –0.006 0.004 –0.022 0.006 –0.018 0.006 –0.026 0.005 –0.016 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 50 0.018 0.004 0.018 0.004 –0.015 0.006 –0.018 0.006 0.039 0.005 0.042 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 55 0.031 0.004 0.024 0.004 –0.002 0.006 –0.010 0.007 0.090 0.005 0.087 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 60 0.048 0.004 0.038 0.004 0.004 0.007 –0.007 0.007 0.108 0.006 0.101 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 65 0.040 0.004 0.031 0.004 –0.012 0.007 –0.021 0.007 0.093 0.006 0.086 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 70 0.023 0.004 0.017 0.004 –0.003 0.007 –0.008 0.007 0.063 0.006 0.058 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 75 –0.006 0.004 –0.007 0.004 –0.009 0.008 –0.011 0.008 0.019 0.007 0.020 0.007 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 80 –0.021 0.005 –0.018 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.009 –0.065 0.009 –0.060 0.009 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 85 –0.050 0.007 –0.041 0.007 0.030 0.012 0.043 0.012 –0.151 0.012 –0.152 0.012 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1993 0.021 0.002 0.019 0.002 –0.054 0.003 –0.048 0.003 –0.078 0.002 –0.088 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1998 –0.062 0.002 –0.066 0.002 0.156 0.003 0.152 0.004 0.100 0.003 0.106 0.004 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2003 0.057 0.002 0.064 0.003 0.051 0.004 0.044 0.004 0.022 0.003 0.030 0.004 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2008 –0.012 0.002 –0.006 0.003 –0.354 0.003 –0.353 0.004 –0.032 0.003 –0.027 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2013 –0.004 0.002 –0.011 0.002 0.201 0.003 0.204 0.003 –0.012 0.002 –0.021 0.003 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑜ℎ –0.568 0.012 –0.571 0.014 –2.224 0.017 –2.223 0.021 –0.701 0.016 –0.777 0.019 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒 –0.207 0.006 –0.230 0.007 –0.986 0.009 –1.007 0.011 –0.708 0.008 –0.738 0.009 
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Table 3. 7 (Continued)  
 Electricity Gas Car fuels 
 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑖) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) 0.144 0.003 0.124 0.003 0.109 0.005 0.097 0.005 0.445 0.004 0.423 0.004 
ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.111 0.001   0.035 0.002   0.052 0.002   
𝑛1908   0.165 0.034   –0.051 0.060   –0.103 0.049 
𝑛1913   0.129 0.023   0.051 0.040   –0.121 0.036 
𝑛1918   0.171 0.013   0.106 0.023   –0.036 0.020 
𝑛1923   0.147 0.009   0.089 0.015   0.003 0.014 
𝑛1928   0.163 0.007   0.082 0.012   0.045 0.011 
𝑛1933   0.186 0.006   0.104 0.010   0.074 0.008 
𝑛1938   0.202 0.005   0.094 0.009   0.122 0.007 
𝑛1943   0.220 0.005   0.113 0.009   0.161 0.007 
𝑛1948   0.209 0.005   0.093 0.008   0.161 0.007 
𝑛1953   0.198 0.005   0.080 0.008   0.158 0.006 
𝑛1958   0.167 0.004   0.062 0.008   0.146 0.006 
𝑛1963   0.138 0.004   0.037 0.007   0.119 0.006 
𝑛1968   0.085 0.002   0.009 0.004   0.030 0.003 
𝑛1973   0.096 0.002   0.026 0.004   0.023 0.003 
𝑛1978   0.089 0.002   0.039 0.004   0.029 0.003 
𝑛1983   0.102 0.003   0.036 0.004   0.042 0.004 
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Table 3. 7 (Continued)  
 Electricity Gas Car fuels 
 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑖) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑛1988   0.133 0.003   0.043 0.005   0.081 0.004 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 –0.055 0.003 –0.053 0.003 –0.017 0.005 –0.015 0.005 –0.007 0.004 –0.003 0.004 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 –0.089 0.003 –0.085 0.003 –0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 –0.035 0.004 –0.030 0.004 
ln(ℎ_𝑞𝑚) 0.363 0.004 0.362 0.004 0.486 0.006 0.485 0.006     
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 –0.446 0.005 –0.444 0.005 0.296 0.008 0.298 0.008     
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 –0.345 0.004 –0.342 0.004 0.406 0.008 0.409 0.008     
𝑇𝑉𝑠 0.019 0.001 0.017 0.001         
𝑃𝐶𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.001         
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.049 0.002 0.046 0.002         
𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.064 0.003 0.066 0.003         
𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.062 0.002 0.064 0.002         
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤         0.203 0.003 0.198 0.003 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑         0.228 0.003 0.225 0.003 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 –0.001 0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.055 0.004 0.054 0.004 0.145 0.003 0.145 0.003 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 –0.016 0.003 –0.017 0.003 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 –2.722 0.026 –2.423 0.027 –1.871 0.044 –1.727 0.046 –4.372 0.039 –4.107 0.040 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 1.376 1.371 2.289 2.288 1.991 1.987 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 –2569152 –2569226 –2035358 –2035278 –2166322 –2166480 
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Table 3. 7 (Continued)  
 
Electricity 
 
Gas 
 
Car fuels 
 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
With controls 
and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and 
other 
cohorts effects 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 213440 213440 176933 176933 185188 185188 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 stands for disposable income, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the 
household’s leader has completed high school or other specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 𝑛1908 − 𝑛1988 indicate number of household 
members from these birth cohorts. ℎ_𝑞𝑚 is dwelling size. 𝐴𝐼𝐶 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 stand for Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table 3. 8 Consistency check: Estimates from the APC-IE model 
 
Without additional 
controls 
With controls  and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and other cohorts 
effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
ln (𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝)   0.305 0.004 0.280 0.004 
ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒   0.066 0.002   
𝑛1908     –0.039 0.042 
𝑛1913     0.030 0.028 
𝑛1918     0.044 0.017 
𝑛1923     0.076 0.012 
𝑛1928     0.116 0.010 
𝑛1933     0.149 0.008 
𝑛1938     0.150 0.007 
𝑛1943     0.191 0.007 
𝑛1948     0.178 0.006 
𝑛1953     0.171 0.006 
𝑛1958     0.142 0.006 
𝑛1963     0.105 0.006 
𝑛1968     0.015 0.003 
𝑛1973     0.028 0.003 
𝑛1978     0.050 0.003 
𝑛1983     0.070 0.004 
𝑛1988     0.118 0.004 
ln (ℎ𝑞𝑚)   0.359 0.005 0.358 0.005 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2   –0.010 0.004 –0.008 0.004 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3   –0.025 0.004 –0.020 0.004 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙   0.049 0.003 0.048 0.003 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 –0.187 0.002 –0.012 0.002 –0.013 0.002 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 25 –0.207 0.011 0.032 0.010 0.033 0.010 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 30 –0.136 0.007 –0.005 0.006 0.017 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 35 0.021 0.006 –0.030 0.005 0.001 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 40 0.091 0.005 –0.061 0.005 –0.036 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 45 0.144 0.005 –0.036 0.005 –0.028 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 50 0.152 0.005 0.010 0.005 –0.001 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 55 0.141 0.005 0.048 0.005 0.026 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 60 0.085 0.006 0.066 0.005 0.039 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 65 –0.011 0.006 0.056 0.005 0.032 0.006 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
 
Without additional 
controls 
With controls  and ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
With controls and other cohorts 
effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 70 –0.045 0.006 0.041 0.006 0.025 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 75 –0.018 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 80 –0.067 0.008 –0.029 0.007 –0.023 0.007 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 85 –0.150 0.011 –0.104 0.010 –0.090 0.010 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1993 0.241 0.003 0.293 0.003 0.309 0.004 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1998 0.157 0.003 0.156 0.003 0.167 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2003 0.060 0.003 0.032 0.003 0.033 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2008 –0.119 0.003 –0.132 0.003 –0.138 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2013 –0.339 0.003 –0.348 0.003 –0.372 0.003 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1908 0.055 0.026 0.095 0.023 0.092 0.024 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1913 –0.008 0.017 –0.002 0.015 –0.002 0.016 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1918 –0.011 0.011 –0.010 0.010 –0.012 0.011 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1923 0.013 0.009 –0.007 0.008 –0.013 0.009 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1928 0.027 0.008 0.007 0.007 –0.007 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1933 0.041 0.007 0.018 0.007 0.002 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1938 0.052 0.007 0.019 0.006 0.007 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1943 0.063 0.007 0.035 0.006 0.026 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1948 0.063 0.006 0.043 0.006 0.044 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1953 0.047 0.006 0.058 0.005 0.063 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1958 0.032 0.006 0.058 0.005 0.065 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1963 0.035 0.005 0.057 0.005 0.069 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1968 0.028 0.006 0.043 0.005 0.060 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1973 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1978 –0.048 0.008 –0.044 0.008 –0.045 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1983 –0.097 0.011 –0.109 0.010 –0.104 0.010 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1988 –0.293 0.019 –0.270 0.017 –0.257 0.017 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.383 0.004 –2.735 0.033 –2.428 0.034 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 2.183 1.982 1.977 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 –2578843 –2599493 –2599803 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 218998 218998 218998 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 
stands for disposable income, e𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the household’s leader has completed high school or 
other specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 𝑛1908 − 𝑛1988 indicate 
number of household members from these birth cohorts. ℎ_𝑞𝑚 is dwelling size. 𝐴𝐼𝐶 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 stand for Akaike 
and Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Figure 3. 9 Cohorts effects of other household members on total energy CO2 emissions 
with control variables 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
  
Chapter 3. Inter- and Intra-generational Emissions Inequality in Germany: Empirical Analyses     141 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 10 Cohort effects of the household leader on different energy CO2 emissions 
sources, without controls 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Years 13–83 stand for 1913–1983.   Line segments indicate the 95 percent 
confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3. 11 Other household members’ cohort effects from the APC-IE model 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
  
 
    
  144      
Concluding Remarks 
 
Environmental and energy taxes are crucial components behind the policies aiming at 
pollution reduction from the residential sector. As in many other E.U. countries, the car fuels 
tax in Germany is imposed with the goal to limit energy consumption: 0.53 euros are levied 
on the final consumers for every purchased liter of gasoline, leading to around 40 percent 
higher relative consumer prices. The price elasticity of gasoline demand determines the 
potential for reductions in consumption and CO2 emissions. Despite their desirable 
environmental effects, those taxes usually also influence households’ budgets (after-tax 
income), and hence both the consumer welfare and the income distribution.  Since the 
consumption of particular energy good serves as the tax base, the tax can have regressive 
effects, which might offset any policy efforts to reduce income inequality. 
The first paper proposed and employed a framework which relies on estimates from 
Demographically-scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (DQUAIDS).  Such 
framework has allowed for thorough investigation of the potential trade-offs between CO2 
emissions, income distribution, and welfare targets. Clear emissions–inequality and 
emissions–welfare trade-offs are identified.  If the car fuels tax is increased by 5 percent, this 
indicates emissions reduction of 0.9 percent, inequality increase of 0.04 percent, and welfare 
reduction of 35 euros (0.24 percent of income).   
 Similarly, the EEG surcharge as part of the electricity price, is imposed in Germany 
with the goal to finance electricity production from renewable energy sources. The EEG 
surcharge has led to substantial electricity price increases, which affect certain types of 
households more than others. In particular, higher energy prices are expected to hurt poor 
households, making them to restrict their heating consumption (leading to health problems) or 
to ration their other budgets (like food). The above mentioned factors have led to tripling of 
energy poverty (inadequate amount of energy services) among German households between 
1993 and 2013. Being income poor, unemployed, or living in rural residential area are all 
associated with higher probability of being energy poor.  
The estimates show that electricity is a necessity good in Germany, with relatively low 
elasticity of demand (-0.235), demonstrating that price change polices will not be very 
effective tools in managing electricity consumption. Also electricity and other fuels are found 
to be complementary goods with food, indicating a heat or eat behavior.  Abolishing the EEG 
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surcharge would make electricity related emissions higher but still energy poverty will 
decrease by around 10 percent and income poverty will decrease by around 2 percent. Such 
policy reform would help the poorest and single parent household by lowering their energy 
tax burdens. Abolishing both the CFT and the EEG surcharge, increases emissions by 12.3 
percent while income and energy poverty are 7.2 percent and 65 percent lower respectively. 
Hence, I identify a positive link between poverty and energy taxes is i.e. higher levels of EEG 
surcharge or CFT are associated with higher levels of income and energy poverty in Germany.  
My results indicate a potential policy reform which would decrease energy poverty 
while increasing energy related emissions only slightly.  The EEG surcharge could be 
abolished and the CFT could be increased by 25 percent. This change in energy policy is 
expected to bring limited environmental damage and minimal revenue loss for the 
government. The groups of people expected to have highest benefit are: unemployed people,  
single parent households, and larger families.  
The final paper investigated the sources of residential energy related emissions 
inequalities. Two types of emissions inequalities are identified among German households: i) 
intra-generational – a) poor versus rich and b) rural versus urban inequalities, and ii) 
intergenerational – birth cohort inequalities. I find that high income (rich) households emitted 
around 200 percent more CO2 than low income (poor) households; and rural emitted 40 
percent more CO2 than urban households in 2013. An inverted u-shaped relationship is found 
between total energy related emissions and the birth cohort of the household’s leader. The 
estimates from a De-trended Age Period Cohort (APCD) model demonstrate the presence of 
clear birth cohort effects in explaining emissions.  The German households with leaders born 
between 1943 and 1973 emit more CO2 than their predecessors or followers.   The results 
confirm the presence of intra-temporal, namely income- and area of residence-related 
emissions inequalities in Germany. Households in rural areas of residence have 5 percent 
higher emissions while each additional percentage of income adds 0.3 percent to energy 
related emissions.   
This paper investigates an imperative question which was disregarded by previous 
studies: the effect of the presence of other persons, potentially from different birth cohorts, on 
carbon emissions. The estimates reveal that each additional household member who belongs 
to the birth cohorts 1923 to 1968 increases emissions by more than the average member, who 
increases emissions by 7 percent. The results confirm the significance of birth cohort effects 
in explaining energy related CO2 emissions of German households and provide potential 
sources on how to reduce emissions and to overcome emissions inequalities. The evidence 
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presented in this paper can be used in creating birth cohort specific (targeted) environmental 
policies. For instance, carbon or energy taxes would be more effective in reducing emissions 
if imposed on the household’s leaders or members from the generations 1943–1968. Also for 
the earlier cohorts taxes on domestic energy would be more effective than taxes on car fuels. 
Such taxes could lead to larger emissions’s reductions if imposed on the rural and the high 
income households. In addition, changes in habits and lifestyles such as bigger household 
size, smaller dwellings, lower number of cars and electric appliances, can lead to lower 
emissions inequality and lower energy related CO2 emissions in Germany. 
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Appendix A: Separate Analyses for Schleswig-Holstein  
 
As mentioned already, Germany is a leader in Europe when it comes to energy 
production from Renewable Energy Sources (RES). In particular, the federal state Schleswig-
Holstein (SH) has been a pioneer in harnessing renewable energy, especially on- and off-shore 
wind energy. It is expected that in the foreseeable future electricity consumption could be 
covered by generation from wind turbines, but grid stability could be compromised with the 
decommissioning of the three nuclear power plants in the region. As SH supplies energy for 
other states in Germany, demand will play a big role both in SH as well as throughout the 
country. Hence, it is crucial to understand the residential energy demand for better and 
sustainable energy policy design. On the demand side, the costs for the household of supporting 
the financing of RES (through the Renewable Energy Act surcharge-EEG Umlage) can possibly 
impacts the public acceptance of certain policies. Similarly, the households in this region can be 
affected by increased environmental taxes (such as the car fuels tax) and determining the tax 
burden and the tax effects on income inequality and poverty is essential.  
Predicting the household energy consumption in this federal state could help in designing 
better energy and environmental policies, with the aim of decreasing carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions, and circumventing usage of fossil fuels in power generation. The vast possibilities of 
biofuels, given that a large share of the industry in Schleswig-Holstein is agriculture, need to be 
incorporated in power and heat generation both on a large and small scale which also leads to 
unification of policies for household energy usage as well as industry. Adjustment of household 
energy consumption models will keep SH on the path to meeting the emissions requirements 
beyond the Kyoto protocol and set an example for the rest of the German federal states. 
Data from the German Income and Expenditure Survey for the federal state of Schleswig-
Holstein is used to analyse energy demand and energy related emissions. IES data is combined 
with data of consumer prices, also provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. For 
detailed data description, please refer to Section 1.3 in Chapter 1. Around 6,664 (8,697) 
households are observed in Schleswig-Holstein during the years 1993–2008 (1993–2013).  
 Using IES data for SH for the period between 1993 and 2008, I find electricity, car fuels, 
and other fuels to be necessity goods and price inelastic in the federal state Schleswig-Holstein. 
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The existence of emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs is also confirmed for SH. 
The higher is the car fuels tax, the lower are the emissions, but the higher is the welfare loss and 
inequality in the post-tax income distribution.  
The results from the energy demand system for the period 1993–2013 indicate that 
electricity has a relatively low elasticity of demand in the federal state Schleswig-Holstein. 
Households in Schleswig Holstein are least vulnerable to price increases in electricity (and have 
lower than average increases in income poverty and energy poverty) so in this federal state it 
might be a good idea to enforce higher prices so that to generate more tax revenues. 
The factors behind inter- and inter-generational emissions inequalities are also 
investigated for the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein. Birth cohort of the household’s leader is 
not significant in explaining energy related CO2 emissions for Schleswig-Holstein. However, 
birth cohorts of the other household’s members are important determinants of emissions’ levels. 
So, inter-generational emissions inequalities are confirmed by the results. Income- and rural-
related emissions inequalities (both being intra-generational) are also established for SH.  
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A1 Car fuels tax 
 
Using the estimates from a Demographically-scaled Almost Ideal Demand System 
(DAIDS) on data from the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) for Schleswig-Holstein for the 
period 1993–2008, the price and income elasticities of demand are obtained for this federal state. 
Table A1 summarizes those elasticities. It appears that car fuels are necessary good among 
households in Schleswig-Holstein: for one percent increase in income, demand for car fuels will 
decrease by 0.795 percent.  Food, electricity, and other fuels are also necessary goods. Demand 
for car fuels is also price inelastic: for one percent increase in the price, demand will go down by 
0.261 percent. Electricity demand is also relatively price inelastic, with elasticity of –0.104. 
Throughout Germany, electricity demand is more price elastic (–0.787) and car fuels demand is 
less price elastic (–0.165). This is indicative that price instruments (through managing the energy 
tax) will be more effective in managing electricity demand in Germany and car fuels demand in 
Schleswig-Holstein.  The cross price elasticities show that car fuels are complementary goods 
with food and electricity, demonstrating the “drive or eat behavior” and the “heat or eat 
behavior” where consumers are rationing their other budgets (like food) due to increase in energy 
price. 
Two different policy change scenarios are considered for Schleswig-Holstein: doubling 
of the car fuels tax (CFT) and abolishing of the CFT, leading to 52 percent increase and decrease 
in the car fuels price respectively (see Table A2). Under the first scenario, car fuels related 
emissions will be 18.9 percent lower and electricity related emissions will be 5.7 percent lower, 
or total energy related emissions will be 24.5 percent lower than the status quo: the situation as it 
was in 2008. The compensating variation and equivalent variation, as measures of consumer 
welfare, indicate a welfare loss of 656 euros and 642 euros (both representing around 1.7 percent 
of income). Tax burden is 382 euros higher than under the status quo and represents 0.987 
percent of income and the inequality in the post-tax income distribution increases, as measured 
by the Gini index. If the CFT is abolished, total energy related emissions will be 35.6 percent 
higher than under the status quo. The equivalent and compensating variation both show welfare 
gain, which is approximately 2 percent of income. The tax burden in this case is 604 euros lower 
and the inequality in the post-tax income distribution decreases by 0.666 percent. The results 
indicate the presence of the emissions–inequality and emissions–welfare trade-offs in SH. Those 
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trade-offs provide evidence for policy makers about balancing environmental with income 
inequality and consumer welfare concerns.    
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Table A. 1 Income and price elasticities (uncompensated) in Schleswig-Holstein 
 
Income 
elasticities 
SE Price elasticities 
   Food SE Electricity SE Other fuels SE Car fuels SE Other goods SE 
Food 0.5043 0.0027 –0.9175 0.0004 0.0851 0.0007 –0.1397 0.0001 –0.1671 0.0001 –0.0044 0.0000 
Electricity 0.5244 0.0038 0.0150 0.0001 –0.1043 0.0067 –0.0002 0.0000 –0.1193 0.0001 –0.0284 0.0000 
Other fuels 0.8213 0.0001 –0.0216 0.0001 0.0107 0.0001 –0.6936 0.0002 0.3061 0.0002 –0.0273 0.0000 
Car fuels 0.7947 0.0004 –0.0313 0.0001 –0.1686 0.0013 0.3230 0.0002 –0.2614 0.0006 –0.0427 0.0000 
Other goods 1.1399 0.0000 0.4512 0.0024 –0.3473 0.0024 –0.3108 0.0002 –0.5530 0.0005 –1.0371 0.0000 
Note. Database is IES, 1993-2008. 
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Table A. 2 Results of policy change scenarios in Schleswig-Holstein 
 Doubling of CFT Abolishing of CFT 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Electricity emissions (% change) –0.0565 0.0209 0.1144 0.0530 
Car fuels emissions (% change) –0.1886 0.0260 0.2411 0.0520 
Total emissions (% change) –0.2450 0.0444 0.3555 0.0723 
CV 656.5212 327.8904 –804.0259 403.0891 
CV (% of income) 1.7019 0.5558 –2.0836 0.6859 
EV 642.6838 321.5386 –824.4658 412.3253 
EV(% of income) 1.6652 0.5436 –2.1385 0.7047 
Tax burden (% change) 381.6311 203.7450 –604.0883 291.2950 
Tax burden change (% of income) 0.9872 0.3565 –1.5672 0.4830 
Gini index (% change) 0.3858 0.0000 –0.6661 0.0000 
Note. Database is IES, 2008. 
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A2 EEG surcharge 
 
Applying the separate IES data for Schleswig-Holstein for the period 1993–2013, I was 
able to obtain estimates from the Demographically-scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand 
System (DQUAIDS). The elasticies obtained from this demand system are included in Table A3. 
The expenditure elasticities indicate that electricity is a necessity good and the households in SH 
are extremely unresponsive (almost price inelastic) to electricity price changes: for 1 percent 
price increase, demand will decrease by only 0.021 percent. This indicates that as electricity 
price goes up or down, the quantity demanded will change by very little amounts, proving that 
energy or environmental policies (which are price related) will not be very effective in SH.   
The expenditure elasticity of electricity shows that electricity is normal good among households 
in Schleswig-Holstein: for 1 percent increase in expenditures, households would increase their 
electricity consumption by 0.766. Car fuels are found to be a luxury good within this federal state 
(expenditure elasticity is 1.298). Demand for other fuels is also price inelastic: for 1 percent price 
increase consumption would go down by 0.316 percent and by 0.377 in Germany and Schleswig-
Holstein respectively. 
Several scenarios with changes in the Renewable Energy Act Surcharge (EEG surcharge) 
are considered for SH – S5: the EEG is doubled; S6: abolishing of the EEG; S7: doubling of both 
the EEG and the Car Fuels Tax (CFT);  and S8: abolishing of both the EEG and the CFT. The 
results are summarized in Table A4. I compare all relevant variables with their values in the 
status quo (the situation in 2013) in order to calculate the percentage change in tax burdens, 
emissions or poverty. If the EEG surcharge is doubled, the electricity tax burden will be 184 
euros lower in Schleswig-Holstein, which represents almost 0.5 percent of average income. 
Income and energy poverty will increase by 1.2 and 11.3 percent respectively. Electricity related 
emissions will be 4.5 percent lower than under the status quo. Under this scenario, the emissions’ 
reduction in Schleswig-Holstein is much smaller than in Germany (7.5 percent), and the increase 
in poverty is also smaller. Under S6, tax burden is 203 euros lower in SH and energy poverty 
will decrease by 14.2 percent. Households in SH increase their electricity’s consumption (and 
emissions) by much less than households in Germany when the EEG surcharge is abolished. 
They also experience much smaller reduction in income poverty due to such policy reform (0.6 
percent in SH versus 2.1 percent in Germany). 
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If both the EEG surcharge and the CFT are doubled (S7), the electricity tax burden for 
households in Schleswig-Holstein will be 148 euros (0.4 percent of income) higher than the 
status quo. The tax burden change is lower under S7 than under S5 due to the fact that electricity 
and car fuels are found to be complementary goods: as price of electricity increases demand for 
car fuels goes down and also as car fuels price goes up demand for electricity goes down.  
Residential CO2 emissions in SH will decrease by 11.8 percent but income and energy poverty 
will increase by 4.3 and 45.9 percent respectively. The emissions reductions in SH are more 
pronounced in SH than in Germany while the poverty indicators are more responsive in Germany 
than in SH alone. Under S8, the reduction in electricity tax burden and increase in electricity 
related emissions is more pronounced in SH than in Germany. Income poverty and energy 
poverty will decrease by 5.8 and 67.3 percent in SH respectively. Throughout Germany, income 
and energy poverty decrease by 7.2 and 65 percent. Scenarios 5 and 7 are efficient in reducing 
emissions while scenarios 6 and 8 are effective in reducing income poverty and energy poverty 
in Schleswig Holstein.  
Alternatively, a ninth scenario (S9) leads to lower income and energy poverty while 
energy related CO2 emissions (both from electricity and car fuels) are only slightly increased. 
Those effects would occur if the EEG surcharge is abolished whereas the car fuels tax is 
increased by 25 percent. Such policy reform should be considered by policy makers in Germany, 
and hence be implemented at the federal level, not just in Schleswig-Holstein.  
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Table A. 3 Elasticities and expenditure shares Schleswig-Holstein versus Germany 
 
Price elasticities Expenditure elasticities Expenditure shares (% of total expenditures) 
 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
Food Electricity 
Other 
fuels 
Car 
fuels 
Other 
goods 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
–1.004 –0.021 –0.822 –0.377 –1.024 0.899 0.766 0.762 1.298 1.039 17.048 3.060 4.058 4.396 71.438 
SE 0.002 0.015 0.004 0.019 0.001 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.047 0.001 0.069 0.020 0.040 0.036 0.088 
Germany –1.003 –0.235 –0.657 –0.316 –1.136 0.488 0.496 0.770 0.994 1.149 17.044 3.231 4.030 4.183 71.513 
SE 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.075 0.023 0.043 0.039 0.095 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 1993–2013. 
 
Table A. 4 Scenarios S5-S8 results Schleswig-Holstein versus Germany 
 Electricity tax burden Electricity emissions 
Income poverty 
(HC ratio) 
Energy poverty 
(TPR) 
 change in euros % of income change in tons % change % change % change 
Scenarios 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
S5–doubling of 𝐸𝐸𝐺             
Schleswig-Holstein 184.117 75.060 0.488 0.144 –0.072 0.078 –4.451 5.098 1.223 0.000 11.321 0.000 
Germany 154.009 75.477 0.476 0.150 –0.118 0.060 –7.451 2.459 1.629 0.000 11.111 0.000 
S6–abolishing of 𝐸𝐸𝐺             
Schleswig-Holstein –202.791 74.551 –0.545 0.160 0.014 0.145 1.763 7.615 –0.612 0.000 –14.151 0.000 
Germany –180.681 84.038 –0.566 0.184 0.114 0.089 7.518 4.698 –2.123 0.000 –13.890 0.000 
S7–doubling of 𝐸𝐸𝐺and 𝐶𝐹𝑇             
Schleswig-Holstein 147.488 57.568 0.393 0.114 –0.208 0.074 –11.789 2.871 4.281 0.000 45.912 0.000 
Germany 146.118 70.284 0.454 0.144 –0.147 0.068 –9.132 1.960 5.117 0.000 48.700 0.000 
S8–abolishing of 𝐸𝐸𝐺and 𝐶𝐹𝑇             
Schleswig-Holstein –187.584 67.730 –0.506 0.149 0.362 0.124 20.431 3.958 –5.810 0.000 –67.296 0.000 
Germany –177.068 81.872 –0.555 0.181 0.197 0.096 12.299 3.404 –7.165 0.000 –65.050 0.000 
Note. Own calculations. Dataset is IES 2013. 𝐸𝐸𝐺 stands for the Renewable Energy Act Surcharge and 𝐶𝐹𝑇 is the Car Fuels Tax. 
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A3 Emissions inequalities 
 
The socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of households are relevant factors in 
explaining residential energy consumption and energy related emissions. The characteristics of 
the households in Schleswig-Holstein (SH) differ slightly than the ones from the rest of the 
country. Around 9,000 observations are available for SH from the IES database, across five time 
periods (1993–2013). Households in SH tend to be slightly larger in size, older, wealthier, and 
more educated (see Table A5). They also possess larger number of electric appliances, old cars, 
and live in larger dwellings. Households in this state consume larger amounts of energy in 
comparison to the other states: electricity consumption is 4.7 percent larger, gas consumption is 
10 percent larger, and car fuels consumption is 3.2 percent larger.  
Both the emissions of the low and high income households in Schleswig-Holstein are 
larger than the German averages. Low income (first equivalent income decile) households 
emitted around 11 tons of CO2 in 1993 and around 5 tons in 2013. High income (tenth equivalent 
income decile) households emitted 19.6 in 1993 and 12.5 tons of CO2 in 2013. Hence, the gap 
between low and high income households has widened in SH, where high income households 
emitted 78 percent more CO2 than the low income households in 1993 and 146.9 percent more 
by 2013 (Table A6). Hence, income-related emissions inequalities are confirmed by the data. 
Rural households in SH are also found to be higher emitters than urban households. While 
households in rural areas emitted 14.6 tons of CO2, households in urban areas emitted 11 tons of 
CO2. Area of residence-related emissions inequalities exist also in SH.   
Inter-generational emissions inequalities are also investigated for households in SH. An 
inverted u-shaped relationship between the emissions and the birth cohort of the household 
leader is also identified for Schleswig-Holstein.
100
 Similarly to the whole country, households in 
SH with a leader from the birth cohorts 1933–1963 have higher CO2 emissions (7.6 percent 
higher). The cohort 1943 emits even 14.4 percent more CO2 that the average household in 
Schleswig-Holstein.  
A de-trended age period cohort (APCD) model is employed to separate the effects of 
birth cohort, age, and period on energy related CO2 emissions. No birth cohort effects of the 
household’s leader are identified for Schleswig-Holstein (they are statistically insignificant).101 
                                                 
100
 See Figure A1.  
101
 See Table A7 for the estimates of the APCD model for Schleswig-Holstein and Germany.   
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This has been also the case for households in the US, where cohort effects were also statistically 
insignificant (see Chancel, 2014). Birth cohorts of the other household members are important 
determinants of emissions’ levels. Namely, additional household members belonging to 1918–
1958 birth cohorts increase emissions by more than the average household member. Income- and 
rural-related emissions inequalities are confirmed by the APCD model for Schleswig-Holstein, 
with higher income and rural households emitting more CO2. Also households with leaders aged 
65–75 are found to be higher emitters.  
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Table A. 5 Summary statistics of rural and urban households in Schleswig-Holstein versus Germany 
 Schleswig-Holstein Germany 
 Rural Urban All All 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 2.006 0.796 1.727 0.745 1.933 0.793 1.955 0.811 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 0.543 0.934 0.344 0.742 0.491 0.892 0.447 0.836 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 53.451 14.913 51.034 16.666 52.818 15.427 52.470 15.019 
𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝 42235 20515 33581 19787 39969 20679 39184 21647 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 0.168 0.374 0.145 0.352 0.162 0.368 0.145 0.352 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 0.130 0.337 0.172 0.378 0.141 0.348 0.171 0.376 
𝑇𝑉𝑠 1.715 0.958 1.531 0.900 1.667 0.946 1.548 0.874 
𝑃𝐶𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑠 1.088 1.153 1.034 1.096 1.074 1.139 1.075 1.135 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.900 0.856 1.618 0.758 1.826 0.841 1.797 0.828 
𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 0.698 0.477 0.537 0.508 0.656 0.490 0.636 0.499 
𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 1.250 0.675 1.094 0.692 1.209 0.683 1.174 0.678 
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 107.853 41.142 80.460 34.680 100.681 41.343 98.509 42.263 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤 0.459 0.590 0.375 0.537 0.437 0.578 0.479 0.615 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 0.675 0.739 0.544 0.672 0.640 0.724 0.634 0.729 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.147 0.354 0.400 0.490 0.214 0.410 0.150 0.357 
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0.824 0.381 0.573 0.495 0.758 0.428 0.742 0.438 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 4253 2976 3241 2676 3988 2934 3801 2844 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑎𝑠 22100 22972 17389 17018 20867 21671 18780 22650 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑠 1219 956 794 794 1108 938 1073 923 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 14.559 10.635 11.000 8.239 2.225 1.637 2.121 1.587 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 6420 2277 8697 219826 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the household’s leader has 
completed high school or other specialized school, e𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 
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Table A. 6 Total energy related emissions in Schleswig-Holstein across the deciles 
Decile/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year Mean CO2 emissions (in tons) 
1993 10.979 12.382 14.376 15.263 16.715 16.196 17.387 17.821 18.493 19.631 
1998 8.531 10.792 13.961 12.343 16.348 15.425 15.544 18.592 18.023 18.074 
2003 7.602 10.143 12.416 12.162 12.903 15.559 15.675 14.556 18.581 20.377 
2008 5.395 7.901 9.077 10.380 11.044 10.869 12.927 13.174 15.335 14.983 
2013 5.066 7.503 8.498 8.223 10.554 9.712 13.073 12.470 12.710 12.506 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Weights used to assure representativeness of the German population. 
 
 
 
Figure A. 1 Birth cohorts and total emissions in Schleswig-Holstein 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013. Line segments indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.  
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Table A. 7 Coefficient estimates of the APCD model for Schleswig-Holstein versus 
Germany 
 Schleswig-Holstein Germany 
 
With controls and other cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1913 0.112 0.061 –0.015 0.014 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1918 –0.038 0.043 –0.026 0.010 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1923 –0.083 0.038 –0.026 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1928 –0.067 0.034 –0.021 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1933 –0.053 0.031 –0.012 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1938 0.020 0.029 –0.006 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1943 –0.011 0.029 0.013 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1948 –0.011 0.029 0.032 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1953 0.058 0.027 0.051 0.006 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1958 0.077 0.025 0.055 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1963 0.090 0.023 0.059 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1968 0.062 0.025 0.052 0.005 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1973 –0.013 0.033 0.005 0.007 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1978 –0.062 0.041 –0.052 0.008 
𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 1983 –0.080 0.049 –0.111 0.010 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 25 0.019 0.040 0.013 0.009 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 30 0.061 0.028 0.000 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 35 –0.001 0.024 –0.012 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 40 –0.069 0.022 –0.045 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 45 –0.042 0.022 –0.033 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 50 –0.019 0.023 –0.002 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 55 –0.017 0.024 0.027 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 60 0.000 0.026 0.042 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 65 0.042 0.026 0.038 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 70 0.029 0.025 0.034 0.005 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 75 0.035 0.027 0.019 0.006 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 80 –0.022 0.032 –0.008 0.007 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 85 –0.016 0.041 –0.072 0.009 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1993 –0.015 0.012 –0.024 0.002 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1998 –0.023 0.015 0.000 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2003 0.079 0.016 0.033 0.003 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2008 –0.029 0.015 0.029 0.003 
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Table A. 7 (Continued) 
 Schleswig-Holstein Germany 
 With controls and other cohorts effects 
ln(𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2013 –0.012 0.011 –0.038 0.002 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑜ℎ –1.956 0.075 –2.002 0.016 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒 –0.986 0.038 –1.016 0.008 
ln(𝑦𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝) 0.309 0.018 0.277 0.004 
𝑛1908 –0.126 0.279 –0.050 0.046 
𝑛1913 0.142 0.135 0.017 0.031 
𝑛1918 0.130 0.083 0.046 0.017 
𝑛1923 0.124 0.057 0.076 0.012 
𝑛1928 0.102 0.051 0.116 0.010 
𝑛1933 0.156 0.037 0.149 0.008 
𝑛1938 0.099 0.034 0.150 0.007 
𝑛1943 0.177 0.032 0.192 0.007 
𝑛1948 0.165 0.032 0.178 0.006 
𝑛1953 0.127 0.031 0.171 0.006 
𝑛1958 0.110 0.028 0.141 0.006 
𝑛1963 0.049 0.027 0.104 0.006 
𝑛1968 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.003 
𝑛1973 0.041 0.013 0.029 0.003 
𝑛1978 0.024 0.015 0.050 0.003 
𝑛1983 0.029 0.018 0.069 0.004 
𝑛1988 0.089 0.017 0.117 0.004 
ln(ℎ_𝑞𝑚) 0.427 0.024 0.356 0.005 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 –0.004 0.019 –0.008 0.004 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 –0.029 0.020 –0.019 0.004 
𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 0.038 0.016 0.047 0.003 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 –2.935 0.161 –2.380 0.035 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 1.867 1.972 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 –73576 –2569055 
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 8533 216578 
Note. Database is IES 1993–2013.𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 indicates whether the household’s leader has completed high school or 
other specialized school, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐3 if she or he has a university or higher education. 𝑛1908 − 𝑛1988 indicate 
number of household members from these birth cohorts. ℎ_𝑞𝑚 is dwelling size. 𝐴𝐼𝐶 and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 stand for Akaike 
and Bayesian Information Criterion.
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